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This is the third year that the Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) has thoroughly examined the
nature and form of governance in Bangladesh, and presents its major findings in the
. The State of Governance research project, which started in 2006,
has the declared objective of examining the various facets of governance and explains the reasons
for its failures and successes. The first Report published in 2006 looked at the fifteen-year period of
democratic rule and found 'the system….unconsolidated, politicised, confrontational and marred
by bad governance'. Before the ink of the 2006 Report could dry Bangladesh experienced the '1/11'
event of 2007. In the 2007 Report the Institute focused on the various reform measures
undertaken by the 'extended' Caretaker Government of Bangladesh. The 2007 Report attempted
to 'provide an account and analysis of the context, process and trajectory of the reform efforts' of
that year.
The present Report, together with the previous two, chronicles a trilogy of governance tragedy
despite relatively free and fair elections the 'first-past-the-post' electoral system together with
patron-client culture and strong anti-incumbency tendency Bangladesh has consistently elected
'winner takes all' governments. This has given rise to confrontational politics as the Opposition had
little incentive to follow the rules of parliamentary democracy. The present Report attempts to
provide a theoretical framework to explain the dynamics behind Bangladesh's confrontational
politics. The Report also bravely recommends some ways and means of increasing institutional
accountability, by factoring into the analysis the incentive structure of policy makers, which would
reduce the high political stakes and thus create a more level playing field for the political players of
Bangladesh. In other words, greater accountability could result in healthy political competition
and reduced confrontational politics. Could this be the beginning of the end of the perennial
Bangladeshi governance 'trap'? Thus the title of this Report: Confrontation, Competition,
Accountability.
The Report reflects, like the first two, the excellence of the research team who deserve recognition
and appreciation. This Report has been delayed for a number of reasons. We regret this fact but
hope to address this shortcoming with the next Report. Our hope is to revert back to our declared
intention of developing replicable measures of governance that are relevant to the Bangladesh
context. Due to the exceptional situation prevailing in Bangladesh in 2007 and 2008 we felt
obliged to deviate from our plan but hope to get back to our original course in the future.
As with any collaborative project, there are too many people and organisations whose
contributions were indispensable in assuring the standard and quality of this Report to be
acknowledged individually. But I would like to express my gratitude to the World Bank whose
support has financed this project.
Manzoor Hasan
Director
The State of
Governance in Bangladesh 2008
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The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008 is the third annual report published by the Institute of
Governance Studies (IGS) at BRAC University. This report is the product of an ongoing long-term research
programme on governance in Bangladesh initiated by the Institute in 2006. The concept of governance is
viewed by IGS as the sum total of the institutions and processes by which society orders and conducts its
collective or common affairs. The mission of the Institute is to identify, promote and support effective,
transparent, accountable, equitable and citizen-friendly government in Bangladesh and South Asia. In
pursuit of this mission, the Institute is dedicated to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of
governance in Bangladesh and South Asia through research and academic pursuits.
Over almost two decades, Bangladesh moved from what may be considered a 'minimalist democracy' -
regular free and contested elections, peaceful transfer of power, fundamental freedoms, civilian control over
policy and institutions - to what has been called illiberal democracy - misuse of state power for partisan and
personal gain; and institutions brought under partisan political pressure. The practice of partisan politics has
severely undermined the accountability mechanisms of the political system and rendered it largely
dysfunctional. The institutions of the democratic multi-party state have been dominated and undermined
by partisan politics and party patronage networks run by the major parties. Bangladesh is further
characterised by high levels of competition between major parties, absence of intra-party democracy, highly
centralised decision-making and personalisation of internal party structures. These have had a negative
impact on the overall governance of the country.
The current Report focuses on the functioning of formal accountability mechanisms particularly prior to
1/11 and identifies how comprehensive accountability mechanisms can help ensure functional democracy
in Bangladesh in the years to come. The Report has analysed the informal norms that affect the functioning
of political parties, the bureaucracy, oversight institutions, the Parliament and the Judiciary - through both
primary and secondary research, and solicited public opinion on governance issues through a nationwide
survey. In addition to the overview chapter, the report has five chapters that present analyses and findings
on: political governance, oversight institutions, Parliamentary accountability, judicial oversight and public
perceptions on the state of governance. The conclusions are presented in the final chapter.
The State of Governance
in Bangladesh 2008
Executive Summary
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Appropriate analytical frameworks and research methods were selected to fit the objective of each chapter
and include an institutional analysis (political governance), a national quantitative perception survey, and
qualitative studies and Institutions of Accountability (Parliamentary accountability).
The target audience is academics, researchers and expert practitioners in the field of governance and
development, among whom it is hoped it will provide a basis for discussion and debate. It is also expected
to provide information for students on the increasing number of courses devoted to the study of
governance and development in Bangladesh. Criticisms and comments are actively welcomed, as the State
of Governance in Bangladesh research project continues beyond the publication of this Report.
It remains the Institute's intention to build local research capacity, and the Report highlights the work of the
team of a new generation of Bangladeshi researchers who contributed to the dynamic debate over the
Report's shape and findings. As was the case last year, the Report was an opportunity for younger scholars
on the team to develop their research, writing, and editing skills. And it is the Institute's research team that
takes full responsibility for the contents of this Report.
The governance process has been analysed in this Report from the view-point of game theory explaining
how payoffs are generated and distributed in the political game, which ultimately decide how political
actors will behave in a social setting. The focus is on searching for historical bias toward a particular set of
rules of the game over others, interface between the rules and the culture (beliefs, values, norms and
attitudes of the political actors) and its implication on the structure of the political organisations.
The political history of Bangladesh reveals the degree of control over public resources as the most critical
factor determining political behavior of interacting political actors. The ruling party always try to establish
their hegemonic control over the use public resources to further their partisan interests (under the façade of
public interest) at the expense of the opposition party. This zero-sum game is caused partly by the apparent
absence of institutions that clearly demarcate between the partisan and public interests and enforce
conformity, partly by the apparent absence of institutions that facilitate communication between rival
political actors, and partly by the strong presence of a political culture characterised by patron-clientelism
and social distrust.
The patron-client culture has driven political parties in search of party people who would distribute
patronage instead of serving party ideology. Pervasive patronage penetrates other political actors
(bureaucracy, military, business interests, professional interest groups and oversight institutions) in a bid to
build a rent-seeking coalition between the political parties and those actors. Social distrust, the other
cultural variable, has also transformed political competition into conflict by making communication and
cooperation among rival political actors difficult.
Chapter 1 An Overview
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Both patron-clientelism and social distrust have had a considerable impact upon the structure of political
organisations that define intra-party dynamics (internal distribution of power) and inter-party relations.
Clientelist politics also deters institutionalisation of political parties as parties become more dependent on
the personal capacity of the patrons rather than organisational structure and discipline. Such personality
based politics encourages the rise of charismatic leaders who centralise power.
Parties characterised by centralised power at the top, often irresponsible yet charismatic leadership, factions,
and lack of institutional means to voice dissent and acting within a culture of distrust compete with each
other within the rubric of an 'enemy discourse'. The design of our political institutions also facilitate the
process through conferring unfettered power to the Executive head, establishing Executive dominance over
the legislature through constitutional means and providing the marginal majority with the right to
dominate all state apparatus through the single plurality electoral system. Thus Bangladesh has developed a
'winner takes all' system in which the losing parties have little stake to play the game in a cooperative
manner.
The concentration of political power in the two major parties has helped to form governments with large
stable majorities, but this has also resulted in a system in which winners in elections take all and the losers
have difficulty in reconciling themselves to their loss. The result is a dysfunctional Parliament and highly
confrontational politics. There is little democratic practice within the major parties, which are run by
authoritarian control from the top; this is a reflection of the personalised and patron-client relationships
pervading the Bangladeshi society at large.
Confrontational politics leading to unhealthy political competition drives the ruling party towards
monopolisation of state resources on the one hand, and on the other, it leads the opposition towards
mobilisation politics. All key state institutions are brought under their sway of the ruling party for regime
maintenance and to create a beneficiary group through the distribution of favor (from state resources).
Bureaucracy becomes the first victim of such political control. Politicisation breaks its chain of command,
hierarchy and weakens the formal accountability mechanisms. Local government institutions are similarly
monopolised through intimidation, influence over the local election, partisan control of funds etc.
Structural, behavioral and political factors account for the deviant behavior of political parties and
politicians. What is needed most are measures to hold those exercising political power accountable. The
traditional mechanisms used to ensure accountability do not seem to work properly, not because of
numerous inherent defects, but mostly because of the absence of an 'enabling environment' caused by
different structural factors. There is an urgent need for major changes in the way(s) power is acquired and
exercised.
Chapter 2 Political Governance
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The Chapter views the following as essential elements required to break the vicious cycle and bring about
qualitative changes in the electoral system: balance in Parliament-Executive relations,
strengthening/promoting intra-party accountability, democratisation of local government and making local
elections non-partisan, professionalisation of the bureaucracy, and depoliticisation.
In contemporary Bangladesh, despite its constitutional position, the Parliament has become merely the 'law
approving body'. It has turned into an institution which has failed to hold the Executive accountable and
play the 'consensus-building' role due to a dotted history of political turmoil, amendments to the
Constitution and changes in political dimension and actors.
Since the 1990s, some reforms have been brought into the formal arrangements of the Parliament in general
and the committee system in particular. These include broadening the jurisdictions of standing committees
to deal with legislation and oversight simultaneously, replacing ministers by backbenchers as committee
chairs and introducing Prime Minster's Question Hour among others. However, long boycotts of the
Parliament by the opposition, the refusal of the ruling party to give enough opportunity to the opposition to
criticise the government and the dysfunction of the Parliamentary committees transformed the Parliament
into a rubber stamp institution (TIB 2007b).
During the tenure of the last Caretaker Government, a number of efforts were taken to bring about
qualitative change in the functioning of the political parties, consistent with the spirit of positive change, for
the first time in the history of parliamentary democracy of Bangladesh, all the standing committees have
been formed within the first session of the Parliament and opposition party members will chair two of the
standing committees on ministries. However, the present Parliament has some in-built problems as the
ruling party/coalition enjoys an overwhelming majority. If the government/ ruling party even agrees to
follow a proportional principle in the distribution of committee positions, the opposition will have at most
one member in a ten-member committee. The scope of opposition scrutiny of government measures will
thus be remote (Ahmed 2009b).
Thus, a few good practices may not result into an effective Parliament, unless and until, the political parties
come to a consensus in bringing about significant change in the Rules of Procedure such as '…the
introduction of opposition days or the provision for regular unscheduled debates to subject the government
policies and measures to more effective parliamentary scrutiny', which will allow the opposition a better
opportunity to be pro-active. Simultaneously, an effective Parliament requires the presence of pro-active
government backbenchers to form a coalition with the opposition. This new rule of the game, in fact, will
determine the effectiveness of the institution in holding the Executive accountable.
Chapter 3 Parliamentary Accountability
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Chapter 4 Judicial Oversight
Chapter 5 Institutions of Accountability
The narrative of the Judiciary in the independent Bangladesh is very much the other side of the story of
constitutionalism, which teaches state actors that the legal bounds of the system cannot be transgressed for
the achievement of partisan political gains. As the stakes of political power increased with the quantum of
resources that were potentially the spoils of office, and the risk of access to rents being closed when losing
office, there were strong incentives for incumbent governments to hamper judicial independence and few
restraints preventing them from doing so.
The Chapter recognises corruption and external interference in the lower courts as a serious problem, and
highlights the growing recognition that the superior courts have suffered a long term decline in both quality
and integrity. While there have been many changes to the formal institutional framework, judicial
independence has principally been undermined in recent years through the appointment of poor quality
party loyalists to the bench. They are beholden to those who appoint them, and are more open to improper
influence and corruption, leading to a long term decline in both quality and integrity. This has had an
obvious effect on the quality of justice and on the fairness and impartiality of decisions. This has been aided
by a drastic fall in the real and relative value of judicial salaries and benefits and the failure to preserve non-
material incentives (such as status and prestige) for judicial service over decades. The legitimacy of the
courts and citizens' trust in their decisions have thus been undermined.
Despite the separation of Judiciary from the Executive branch of government during the CTG tenure, judicial
rulings generally followed the political script of the period. Generally speaking, judges did not rule against
the vital interests of the CTG or military. With the expansion of patrimonialism, informal rules and incentives
developed over time which has governed the Judiciary. These appear to have such strong roots that
substantial changes to the formal legal framework have had relatively little impact.
The Chapter analyses institutions of accountability - the Bangladesh Election Commission, the Public
Service Commission, the Office of Comptroller & Auditor General and the Anti-Corruption Commission -
under four key themes: independence (how independent the institutions are from any influence),
accountability (state of accountability mechanisms of these institutions), efficiency (organisational structure
and capacity in discharging their mandate) and effectiveness (how far the institutions are achieving their
mandate).
These oversight institutions in Bangladesh enjoy the necessary Constitutional and statutory protection but
the leadership has not been pro-active enough to exercise this in their favour. Rather, in many cases they are
perceived to be partisan and compliant to external pressure. There are evidences of Executive influence
through issues pertaining to human resources and budget. Appointment of the leadership is the main
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channel of politicisation, which needs to be addressed immediately. Accountability mechanisms need to be
rationalised, especially to the citizens. Institutionalisation of the accountability mechanisms, both internal
and external, is likely to reinforce efficiency and effectiveness.
Structural and systematic loopholes often become constraints to effective functioning. The successes are
overlooked mainly due to corruption and partisan behaviour. The human resources lack capacity and
motivation and the issue of deputation make the scenario worse. Dependence on the Executive, for both
fiscal and human resources, to certain extent curb independent functioning and also prevent long-term
capacity building.
Finally, political will is the main catalyst that can bring about real changes that make the institutions
effective in a democratic framework. This, in turn, is likely to ensure good governance for the society as a
whole.
After the abrupt political transition of 11 January 2007, the political environment has gone through a series
of changes for two years. The objectives of the nationwide public perceptions survey were, broadly, to
gauge public perceptions about the state of the governance, the political system and political culutre in
Bangladesh. It also attempted to ascertain citizen's perceptions and opinions about the institutional reform
initiatives of the CTG, especially their effectiveness, sustainability and impacts on the political system in
Bangladesh. The survey also evaluated the performance of CTG in holding fair and credible election and
initiatives against corruption. Last but not the least, it tried to determine public opinion about service
delivery in education, health, water, and electricity The survey's sample size was 4,000 respondents, 3,500 of
whom were chosen randomly as 'General Citizens' and the remaining 500 were selected from different
professional groups. They are referred to as 'Professionals'.
Citizens expressed satisfaction with the CTG reform efforts and free and fair parliamentary elections. They
are hopeful that the MPs and local government representatives will be able to work for citizens. Contrary to
general belief, the survey revealed that citizens seek help from their elected representatives when faced with
disputes/crimes. On the other hand, citizens perceive that political influence will continue to cripple the
institutions of accountability (e.g. Judiciary) and hamper service delivery (e.g law and order and social safety
nets).
Bangladeshi's also felt that the opposition parties will exercise negative political culture of boycotting the
Parliament and there will be a lack of political consensus among the ruling and opposition political parties
on important national issues.
While citizens largely supported the activities of the CTG, they remained dissatisfied with power sector, price
hikes of essential and existing state of unemployment. They also expressed dissatisfaction on the CTG
Chapter 6 Public Perceptions of Governance
xx
xxi
initiated anti-poor initiatives like closing down jute mills and evicting slums. Overall, citizens were optimistic
that CTG initiated reforms and fairly elected political government would bring some positive outcomes to
help the better functioning of democracy in Bangladesh.
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008 report has focused on the functioning of formal accountability
mechanisms particularly prior to 1/11 and has attempted to identify how comprehensive accountability
mechanisms can help ensure functional democracy in Bangladesh in the years to come. Specifically, it has
outlined the main gaps and weaknesses that have impaired the effectiveness of these accountability
mechanisms, assessed the extent to which the Caretaker Government-proposed reforms have addressed
those deficiencies, and discussed the importance and challenges of deepening these reforms under a
political government.
It is essential for the country to move from the existing 'winner takes all' culture to a new equilibrium that
will encourage both winner and losers to engage in rational negotiation instead of disruptive, if not violent,
conflict. The opportunity of the incumbent to monopolise the state apparatus for serving its partisan
interests must be limited, thereby reducing the stakes to a tolerable level. Critical to this process is the
establishment of credible mechanisms of accountability, for the parameters of the stakes are defined in large
part by such mechanisms. Such mechanisms, if placed properly, will provide checks on the natural
imperative of the Executive to monopolise control over state institutions. The agenda of political reforms
should be taken up by political parties and a stronger media and civil society must be built to create opinion
among the public against confrontational politics and the high costs of unhealthy political competition.
Chapter 7 Conclusions
Research for the State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008 was conducted over the period March 2008
to March 2009. The full report on the quantitative research on perceptions of governance is available
on the IGS website at www.igs-bracu.ac.bd.
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1.1 The Purpose
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
The
State of Governance in Bangladesh 2007
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
the State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
is the third annual report published by the Institute of
Governance Studies (IGS) at BRAC University. This report is the product of an ongoing long-term research
programme on governance in Bangladesh initiated by the Institute in 2006. The concept of governance is
viewed by IGS as the sum total of the institutions and processes by which society orders and conducts its
collective or common affairs. The mission of the Institute is to identify, promote and support effective,
transparent, accountable, equitable and citizen-friendly government in Bangladesh and South Asia. In
pursuit of this mission, the Institute is dedicated to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of
governance in Bangladesh and South Asia through research and academic pursuits.
portrayed the penetration of partisan politics in all aspects of
public life and how partisan interests eventually undermined the formal accountability mechanisms.
documented the reforms initiated by the Caretaker Government
(CTG) apparently claiming to bring an end to this partisan penetration in different institutions of the state.
The changes brought to legal frameworks, formal rules and procedures dictating practices of state affairs,
and restructured institutions were analysed in detail. The year 2007 also brought politics and political parties
under public scrutiny as never before. , designed as a
continuation of the two previous reports in the series, builds on their findings but narrows the perspective
to focus on reducing the high stakes of politics through an accountability framework.
This Report argues that effective checks and balances that strengthen accountability are the prerequisites
for a functional democracy, which is representative, responsive, transparent and accountable. In this light,
report focuses on the functioning of formal accountability
mechanisms particularly prior to 1/11 and identifies how comprehensive accountability mechanisms can
help ensure functional democracy in Bangladesh in the years to come. Specifically, it outlines the main gaps
and weaknesses that have impaired the effectiveness of these mechanisms, and discusses the importance
and challenges of overcoming these deficiencies.
The State of Governance in
Bangladesh 2008:
An Overview
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1.2 The Context
1.3 The Theoretical Framework
The political economy literature argues that democracies are most stable when the stakes in political
competition are sufficiently circumscribed: the losers can retain enough resources and influence to allow
them to compete another day. Formal accountability mechanisms are key to establishing and sustaining
stability; if functioning properly, they inhibit the incumbent government from manipulating the state
apparatus to silence if not obliterate the opposition and have its way however undesirable the
consequences may be for the public interest. In Bangladesh, democracy has been quite unstable. Though
the country has avoided the vicious cycle of coups and countercoups, politics has been highly
confrontational. Since democratic politics was re-established in 1991, there has been an increasing
tendency for the winning party 'to take it all', lock, stock, and barrel, with increasingly bolder attempts to
monopolise control over all key institutions of the State and funnel resources and rents to supporters to
solidify that control. Institutions meant to instil accountability in and of government, have been
systematically and increasingly impaired. Not surprisingly, the difference between winning and losing an
election has become enormous. As the payoff of winning and the costs of losing have become very high,
there is fierce competition among political actors. The incumbent, to try to ensure its continued dominance,
takes all possible actions to capture state institutions. The opposition, getting little or no payoff in the
process, tries to shorten the life span of the government by destabilising state affairs through mobilisation
politics. The situation that evolved on 1/11 is a glaring example of this. Although the incumbent Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) government had a two-thirds majority in the Eighth Parliament, its alleged electoral
engineering provoked the oppositions to mobilise violent street protests, culminating in the birth of an
unusually long-term military backed Caretaker Government.
One possible solution to this unstable political game is to reduce the stakes of political competition. If the
incumbent is unable to manipulate the state apparatus for serving its partisan interest and the opposition
has sufficient scope to effectively participate in the governance process, the stakes are likely to be reduced
to a tolerable limit. Critical to this process is the establishment of credible mechanisms of accountability, for
the parameters of the stakes are defined in large part by such mechanisms. Such mechanisms, if placed
properly, will provide checks on the natural imperative of the Executive to monopolise control over state
institutions.
It can, therefore, be argued that the establishment of accountability mechanisms, and particularly making
them work, is critical to enabling the country to move from the existing 'winner takes all' equilibrium to a
new equilibrium based on checks and balances that will encourage both winner and the losers to engage in
rational negotiation instead of disruptive, and often violent, conflict.
Following Levy and Spiller (1994), it can be argued that how government will behave other state
and non-state actors will depend upon the institutional endowment of a particular country. Institutional
endowment comprises five elements. , the Constitution and jurisdiction of the legislature and the
Executive and their relationship: the relationship and jurisdiction between them vary in presidential and
parliamentary systems. Again, bicameral legislature works in a different way than unicameral. In some
parliamentary systems, the Executive has substantial control over both legislative agenda and legislative
outcome. If the legislative and the executive power alternate between political parties that confront each
other violently, the ruling party might cause the opposition to be suppressed in the legislature. , the
Judiciary and other oversight institutions: they may be independent and effective to check undue Executive
vis-à-vis
First
Second
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dominance, or they may act as the supportive arm of the Executive. , prevailing culture and social
norms: culture and social norms may be collective and irrational or individualistic and rational. Whatever
they may be, these limit choices for Executive action. , the character of the contending social interests
and the balance between them: contending social interests may stand in balance in terms of resource
sharing, but may violently confront each other to win over more resources, or they may coexist through
rational compromise. In other case, some social interests may dominate others and thus may cause social
inequality and turmoil. , administrative capability of the country: some countries may have adequate
administrative capabilities and others may lack them.
These five elements are not independent of each other - rather together determine the nature of the
institutional endowment. As each element has many variations, interaction between them may produce
many a number of institutional endowments different in nature. For this research, the general condition of a
particular element (e.g. weak legislature or weak oversight institutions) as exists in Bangladesh and its
subsequent political consequence have been taken into consideration. The possible impact of political
behaviour over each element other than the first two, which are taken as given and difficult to intervene, has
also been considered. A model of confrontational politics has been designed as the theoretical framework
for the Report.
Third
Fourth
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Figure 1.1. Model of confrontational politics
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Political parties act as patrons and split
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State-capture by the ruling
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Paternalistic and elitist
Bureaucracy
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The model depicts that an institutional endowment characterised by hierarchical social norms and weak
oversight institutions, provides incentive for the Executive to capture all state institutions to serve its
partisan interests, leading to high stake politics that makes political parties to take a particular role and
course of behaviour. Such behaviour creates problems of collective action that is apparent in the form of
confrontational behaviour of political parties. Collective action being problematic makes reversal process of
high stake politics difficult. The model shows that political parties encapsulate almost all the elements and
therefore provide us with the notion that they are probably the most effective intervention point. The model
also depicts that bureaucracy is, among other elements, a direct beneficiary of high stake politics in the
sense that it has not been able to keep its institutional interest intact as with other institutions. This
highlights the necessity of keeping institutions outside the reach of partisanship/politicisation, which will in
tern check the dominance of the Executive and the latter's due influence over state institutions.
The Report seeks to analyse the existing institutional endowment leading to high stake politics and explore
ways of accountability mechanisms that will lead to a new institutional endowment characterised by checks
and balances. It attempts to explore ways of establishing accountability mechanisms that will lead to a new
equilibrium based on checks and balances. Organised around the basic institutions that can provide
effective checks and balances on the use or abuse of the Executive, the Report adopts a multidisciplinary
research strategy. Each chapter has been contextualised within the appropriate analytical framework, yet
applies a common methodological approach, identifying pathologies and the desirable institutional
arrangements/characteristics that make for a well functioning institution, the gaps between the two, and
recommendations for beginning to address the problems in the medium term - given realistic constraints.
In addition to this overview chapter, the Report has five chapters that present analyses and findings on:
Political Governance
Public Perceptions of Governance
As an integral part of the research methodology regarding the formulation of the
report, a national perception survey was conducted at the begining of 2009 to gauge
people's perception on various spectra of governance issues in Bangladesh. The survey was designed to
maximise geographical coverage and includes both citizens at large as well as respondents belonging to
selective occupational groups. An extensive literature review was done to develop the questionnaire for the
survey in late 2008. The survey's sample size was 4,000 respondents, 3,500 of whom were chosen randomly
as general citizens and the remaining 500 samples were selected from different professional groups. A
multistage cluster sampling method was used for the study. Fifty-one urban primary sampling units (PSU)
and 124 rural PSU were selected using 'probability proportional to size' (PPS) method. The survey effectively
complements the theoretical grounding of the SOG-2008 that the existing zero-sum game in Bangladesh
politics led to unilateral/overwhelming control over the state apparatus to control its resources and to
capture independent and effective institutions capable of imposing checks and balances.
The Report was prepared under guidelines and supervision of the Institute of Governance Studies. The
Institute's report team took overall responsibility for conducting a literature review on each chapter. The
report team on each chapter also conducted semi-structured key informant interviews as a means to
1.4 Report Structure and Methodology
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validate secondary data and explore new dimensions of the existing problems. Where the team's expertise
was not available, the Institute engaged external capacity. The nationwide perception survey was prepared
and implemented by the Institute's research team in consultation with SIRIUS Marketing and Social Research
Limited, a local marketing and social research firm. The preparation of survey questions and data analysis
has been an interactive and collaborative effort between the Institute and SIRIUS.
As mentioned before, analytical frameworks and research methods were selected to fit the objective of each
chapter. Among the methods applied are institutional analysis, a national quantitative perception survey,
and qualitative studies. Particular methodological approaches are discussed in each chapter.
It remains the Institute's intention to build its own research capacity, and the Report highlights the work of
the team of a new generation of Bangladeshi researchers who contributed to the dynamic debate over the
Report's shape and findings, as was the case last year. And it is the Institute's research team that takes full
responsibility for the contents of this Report.
The governance process has been analysed in this Report from the view-point of the game theory - how
payoffs are generated and distributed in the political game, which ultimately decide how political actors will
behave in a social setting. The focus is on searching for historical bias toward a particular set of rules of the
game over others, interface between the rules and the culture (beliefs, values, norms and attitudes of the
political actors) and its implication on the structure of the political organisations.
The political history of Bangladesh reveals the degree of control over public resources as the most critical
factor determining political behaviour of interacting political actors. While politics denotes the process of
making public decisions regarding control, allocation and distribution of public resources in all political
systems, a democratic political system requires that such public decisions be made in conformance with
public interest. Both the ruling and the opposition parties may have their own opinion about public interest,
but a “... successful democracy is conditioned by a value system allowing peaceful play of the political game
and the respect of the 'outs' to the decisions taken by the 'ins' and the acknowledgement of the 'ins'
regarding the rights of the outs”(Lipset 1959). Unfortunately the scenario in Bangladesh is the exact
opposite of this ideal - the 'ins' always try to establish their hegemonic control over the use public resources
to further their partisan interests (under the façade of public interest) at the expense of the 'outs'. This zero-
sum game is caused partly by the apparent absence of institutions that clearly demarcate between the
partisan and public interests and enforce conformity, partly by the absence of credible institutions that
facilitate communication between rival political actors, and partly by the strong presence of a political
culture characterised by patron-clientelism and social distrust. Thus, the political history of Bangladesh has
demonstrated a bias towards rules of the game that help establish greater control over public
resources.
While history endorses the importance of the degree of control over public resources as the dominant rule
of game, the political culture of the country characterised by patron-clientelism and social distrust reinforces
the dominance of this rule. The patron-clientelism culture has driven political parties in search of party
people who would distribute patronage instead of serving party ideology. Pervasive patronage penetrates
other political actors (bureaucracy, military, business interests, professional interest groups and oversight
institutions) in a bid to build a rent-seeking coalition between the political parties and those actors. Patron-
1.5 Themes
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clientelism thus generates excessive competition among the rival patrons and clients for more political
power and thereby more control over public resources. Social distrust, the other cultural variable, has also
transformed political competition into conflict by making communication and cooperation among rival
political actors difficult. Furthermore, lack of trust in political institutions weakens institutional cohesion as a
whole.
Both patron-clientelism and social distrust have also had a considerable impact on the structure of political
organisations that define intra-party dynamics (internal distribution of power) and inter-party relations.
Clientelist politics often deters institutionalisation of political parties as parties become more dependent on
the personal capacity of the patrons rather than organisational structure and discipline. Such personality
based politics encourages the rise of charismatic leaders who centralise power. The presence of strong
charismatic leaders discourages genuine intra-party democracy.
Parties, which are characterised by centralised power at the top, often lacks of institutional means to voice
dissent and within acts with the mindset of enemy discourse' externally with competing parties. The design
of the political institutions also facilitate the process through conferring unfettered power to the Executive
head, establishing Executive dominance over the legislature through constitutional means and providing
the marginal majority with the right to dominate all state apparatus through the single plurality electoral
system. Thus Bangladesh has developed a 'winner takes all' system in which the losing parties have little
stake to play the game in a cooperative manner.
In democracies, political parties remain the primary vehicles for the aggregation of societal interests and
exert major influences on the development of public policy. In Bangladesh, parties are not such vehicles, but
rather provide safety nets (based on patron-client relationships) for large parts of the population in the
absence of an effective state.
In Chapter Two, the Report identifies three main findings about the causes of poor political governance in
Bangladesh: (a) the design of the state and its institutions, (b) the clientelist nature of politics fuelled by
greed and (c) the nature of confrontational politics. IGS has consistently argued that these are the challenges
Bangladesh facing in governance and thereby the core concerns to deliver better governance. The following
measures have been proposed as ways of breaking out of this vicious cycle: deregulation of state functions
which will make the state 'pie' smaller which would reduce competition and at the same time, improve
efficiency of services; downsizing the government - both cabinet and civil service, as well as the PMO;
depoliticising the bureaucracy by making appointments, promotions and transfers in a uniform and
transparent manner under definite rules and regulations; building a stronger media and civil society to raise
awareness amongst masses and create public opinion against confrontational politics and the high costs of
unhealthy political competition.
Several factors - structural, behavioural and political - account for the deviant behaviour of political parties
and politicians. There is, however, no best way to overcome the dysfunctional consequences of the 'winner
takes all' system that has evolved in Bangladesh. What is needed most are measures to hold those exercising
political power accountable. The traditional mechanisms used to ensure accountability do not seem to work
properly, not because of numerous inherent defects, but mostly because of the absence of an 'enabling
environment' caused by different structural factors. There is an urgent need for major changes in the way(s)
power is acquired and exercised. The Report views the following as essential elements required to break the
1.6 Findings
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vicious cycle: qualitative changes in the electoral system, balance in Parliament-Executive relations,
strengthening/promoting intra-party accountability, democratisation of local government and making local
elections non-partisan, professionalisation of the bureaucracy, and depoliticisation.
Chapter Three explores how the Parliament in Bangladesh has consistently failed to hold the Executive
accountable and play the 'consensus-building' role. Thus, for a period of 15 years and three elected
governments, the nation witnessed an all-powerful prime minister, an unaccountable Executive, and a
dysfunctional Parliament. The role played by the political parties has a clear implication for Parliamentary
democracy. The mode of functioning of the political parties in Bangladesh has played a major role in
creating and sustaining the culture of confrontational politics. The lack of internal democracy within the
parties, the politics-business nexus, and the emphasis on considering politics as investment have facilitated
the development of a procedure where the winner of the election takes complete control of the public
resources, leaving the loser of the election with nothing. As a result of this confrontational culture of politics,
the political parties develop within themselves some informal practices which, to a large extent, dictate their
mode of functioning in the Parliament. For instance, due to lack of internal democracy, the Parliament
members always try to please their party heads as they know that the displeasure of the chief may cause
them the chance of being a partner in the 'winner takes all' system. Article 70 also prevents MPs from voting
according to their conscience. Besides, as politics is being considered as an investment, the MPs are often
reluctant to play an important role in the Parliament, as good performance in policy making or in holding
the Executive accountable might do more harm than good to their political careers.
These informal practices undermine Parliamentary procedures by allowing loopholes to be openly
exploited. For instance, the possibility of experienced or expert MPs' being appointed as committee
members or chairs is hampered as the Executive may not be too keen to ensure its own accountability, and
may award these posts to its party loyalists and clients. Most MPs, being active actors of the politics-business
nexus, are not interested in playing their designated function of legislators in the Parliament. Moreover, the
futility of the committee recommendations discourages many parliamentarians from seeking an active
committee role. The dynamics of the formal and informal rules and practices guarantee perpetuation of a
dysfunctional Parliament.
Chapter Four describes the demonstrable diminution amongst the political class of a commitment to the
idea of a self-restraining state. Analysing the Judiciary at length, the Chapter stresses that the Judiciary has
significant potential to check the other arms of Government, and has on occasion shown its preparedness to
act accordingly, most notably in cases where the central issue was whether Parliament's power of
constitutional amendment was complete and unrestrained. The Judiciary acts as the mediator of disputes
between the other major institutions of the state when it engages in its judicial review functions. It can
potentially restrain and hold to account the Executive, other state institutions including the Parliament, as
well as politically and economically powerful actors, and thus is fundamental to rule-based governance. The
Report suggests that the formal constitutional framework has little impact on judicial independence. It is
ultimately about the internalisation by state actors of the concept of the rule of law, of the notion of
restraints on power and the legitimacy of the courts amongst citizens as an arbiter of disputes over power.
In discussing judicial oversight, the Report has focused on the upper courts in its analysis because of the
focus in this year's report on moderating the high stakes of politics, and the role that the superior courts
potentially play in this process through judicial review. It suggests some possible factors that have
encouraged successive governments (both military and democratically elected) to curb the power and
undermine the authority of the Judiciary through an examination of how the incentives for ruling regimes of
interfering with judicial independence have changed. It has also explored the recent changes to the formal
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legal framework which has separated the Judiciary from the Executive, and has examined why these
changes have had little effect on increasing judicial independence or increasing the accountability of
political actors. The role of ancillary legal institutions and actors such as the Attorney General and Bar
Associations has also been analysed.
The Report highlights the fact that trust in the superior courts and in the quality of the justice they dispense
has fallen considerably, a trend which showed few signs of reversal during the CTG's tenure. There has been
a decline in both judicial integrity and quality, the latter the result of a drastic fall in the real and relative
value of judicial salaries and benefits and the failure to preserve non-material incentives (such as status and
prestige) for judicial service over decades. The superior courts have lost the legitimacy that they had until
relatively recently, when the Supreme Court was held in high esteem. In the most vivid recent example
where the courts were put to the test as the arbiter of a dispute that was simply about the grab for political
power, the constitutional challenge to President Iajuddin's Caretaker Government in October 2006, had
failed miserably.
As a follow-up to the nationwide perception survey conducted for the
report, a similar survey was conducted to explore public opinion on issues pertaining to service
delivery, corruption, politics, reforms, institutions, professions and professionals involved in the governance
process. This Report attempts to compare findings of the two surveys to draw some insightful comparisons.
Since the two years do not have a similar scenario, some of the issues surveyed in 2007 have not been
repeated. Certain new issues and topics relevant to 2008 have been included in the 2008 survey. This
deviation is unavoidable given the changed scenario in the political arena. The survey findings, as described
in Chapter 6, provide the public's view of the fundamental state institutions which are over-run by partisan
interests. There is little doubt in the public's mind that political stake management has been blatantly
manipulated by the winning party in Bangladesh in the post-1991 era. The Parliament and the Judiciary
were also subjected to public scrutiny under the survey. Public perception was also sought on the present
living standard, service delivery, and the law and order situation of the country. The qualitative research
findings of this Report are substantiated by the quantitative findings that have emerged from the
perception survey.
Constitutionally established oversight institutions play a significant role in providing checks and balances
within a democracy and therefore in enhancing the accountability of Government. In Chapter Five, the
Report analyses its findings on the efficacy of different institutions of accountability (e.g. the Bangladesh
Election Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Public Service Commission, and the Office of the
Comptroller and Auditor General) under four themes: independence, accountability, efficiency and
effectiveness. The Report has found that despite constitutional and statutory independence, poor leadership
quality, lack of fiscal autonomy and influence from the Executive are curbing the independent status of
these institutions. It can be argued that the appointment process is the source of politicisation of these
institutions. The accountability issue has been looked at under three dimensions - to the president, internal
accountability and to the citizens. The efficiency issue of these oversight institutions has been viewed from
two perspectives - organisational structure and human resources. The organisational structure of these
bodies is challenged by lack of coordination and internal politics while at the same time being dominated by
hierarchy. A lack of clarity in human resource management policy, inadequacy of management staff and
competition between the personnel on deputation and the institutions' own staff make the situation worse.
With regard to effective functioning of these institutions, the Report has found that political will of the ruling
party is a pre-requisite. Due support from the media and civil society are also required to ensure effective
functioning as well as increase their credibility.
State of Governance in Bangladesh
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1.7 Conclusion
The stakes of politics in Bangladesh remain high as the Executive, as the winner for five years, takes control
over all the public resources and strips the opposition of all its functions and rights. This allows the
confrontational culture of politics to continue in a vicious circle. On the other hand, if the nature of political
culture were different, either that would ensure the following of the formal rules or the informal practices
would have little importance. As a result, the political parties would need to take corrective measures so that
the system contains no loopholes or they would proscribe themselves from exploiting these loopholes. In
either of the cases, the Parliament will work as an effective institution of accountability, which will play its
role in lowering the stake of politics. 'Winner takes all' system/practice is not conductive to Parliamentary
democracy. Intra-party demo is a better option to adopt.
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
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2.1 Introduction
Governance encompasses performance of the government including public and private sectors, global and
local arrangements, formal structures and informal norms and practices, spontaneous and intentional
systems of control. In the simplest sense, governance means the process of decision-making and the process
by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). In the empirical analysis of public policies,
governance is considered to include all aspects of the exercise of authority in the management of the
resource endowment of a state and the manner in which the power is exercised. The quality of governance is
determined by the impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by the citizens.
Political governance refers to a country's voice and accountability, political stability and government
effectiveness. Political governance is essentially about managing the state and establishing a practice of
accountability to the people, which includes the process of electing leaders to office, the interface between
the political and bureaucratic arms of government, the strength of oversight bodies and the role of civil
society in influencing the quality of governance (Political Governance, Commonwealth of Australia 2005).
Politics is the prime mover of political governance.
However, politics alone cannot manage the state affairs. Politicians and bureaucrats jointly compose 'state
power,' which competes and cooperates with or controls other social organisations (Migdal 1988, Evans,
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985). Bureaucracy also has certain resources (information, expertise,
permanence), which makes the nexus between politics and bureaucracy imperative for political governance.
But when this interdependence is abused by establishing political monopoly over bureaucracy and through
it other state institutions, the motive behind this is negated. The nature of politics in Bangladesh, which is
confrontational in nature, breeds monopoly of the ruling party over bureaucracy along with other state
institutions, which causes erosion of formal accountability mechanisms and affects political governance.
This Chapter examines the impact of confrontational party politics on governance in Bangladesh. It
describes the structure, ideologies and leadership of political parties, the roles and stakes of both the party
in power and opposition parties, and the nature of monopolisation of state resources by the ruling party. To
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Political Governance
get a clearer picture about the “winner takes all” approach of the ruling party, monopolisation of
bureaucracy and the local government by the ruling party has been examined, and the impact on the
accountability has been assessed. Besides the introduction, this Chapter has six more sections. Section 2.2
analyses the nature of confrontational politics in Bangladesh. Section 2.3 examines the politics-bureaucracy
nexus. Section 2.4 describes the gradual politicisation of local government. Section 2.5 identifies the factors
which allow the ruling party to establish monopoly over state resources. Section 2.6 examines the reform
initiatives undertaken by the Caretaker Government in an attempt to bring accountability in the political
game. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes with some practical recommendations.
This Chapter builds on the research conducted for two previous State of Governance in Bangladesh reports
(2006 and 2007) and conveys a clear yet devastating message about the state of political governance in
Bangladesh in 2008. An extensive literature review was carried out to situate its findings in the broader
context of analyses on state and institutions, as well as development - albeit in a more limited manner. The
Chapter draws extensively on a background paper for which data was collected from both primary and
secondary sources. Mid to senior level bureaucrats and senior politicians - from three major political parties,
were interviewed as part of the primary research.
Bangladesh politics has in recent years evolved into a highly confrontational game which generates
unhealthy competition between the winning and losing party instead of constructive engagements. This
causes severe damage to the state institutions. Broadly, the confrontational politics in Bangladesh can be
explained in terms of (a) ideological conflict, (b) conflict over a desperate bid to capture power or show off
strength and (c) conflicts arising from personal interests of the political elements. Of these three aspects,
confrontational politics centres around the latter two while the first plays a less significant role.
Confrontational politics in Bangladesh could be generally described through the frameworks of patron-
client relationship and mobilisation politics. The winning party uses patronage to establish a relationship of
loyalty and allegiance with the state institutions and within the party itself. On the other hand, mobilisation
politics - usually a tool for protests - has been the strategy of the losing party. As a result, the party in power
searches for loyalists within the bureaucracy and other state institutions to counterbalance the impact of the
mobilisation organised by the opposition party. This, again, leads to massive politicisation of state
institutions, especially the bureaucracy. When a change occurs in the composition of the political leadership,
it invariably leads to the reshuffling of civil service. It is the nexus between politics and bureaucracy that
ultimately shapes up the process of governance.
As in other South Asian countries, political parties in Bangladesh have not been created within legislatures;
they have extra-Parliamentary origins. Among more than 150 political parties in Bangladesh, the major
ones can be grouped into two categories: parties of the state and parties of the civil society. One of the best
examples of the latter is the Awami League (AL) as evinced by its origin and growth in pre-independent
Bangladesh; while both Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jatiya Party (JP) originated as parties of the
state. Another party the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) can also claim to have its origin in civil society. The
leftist parties have apparently become 'parties of the past' as none of them can claim any support worth
mentioning mainly because of the decline of leftist politics world-wide and the chronic factionalism that
characterises these parties in Bangladesh.
2.2 Confrontational Politics and Political Parties
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Hague and Harrop (1982) have identified two pure forms of party factions. One form is the patron-client
type in which relationships of obligation and service develop between a high-status leader (the patron) and
dependent followers (or clients) of lower strata. The other form consists of groups of party members whose
common bond lies in shared ideology. This type of faction is less dependent on particular leaders, rather is
more often organised in a formal manner with its own membership rules and is not restricted to the limits
on size to which patron-client factions, with their essentially personal character, are subject (Ibid). Such
factions often provide an important means by which oligarchic tendencies of leadership in mass parties are,
to some extent, restrained. In stable democracies, the second type of faction is more evident than the
patron-client type of politics. Bangladesh, however, has parties displaying the patron-client variation.
The parties in Bangladesh draw support from a variety of sources, and the sharp polarisation amongst them
is clear. There are also distinct differences among the sources of support of the main parties. For example,
the BNP initially drew its support from the army, the bureaucracy, the urban and rural rich, large
industrialists and traders. Over the years, it has succeeded in broadening its support base by initiating some
populist policies. The AL was pretty bourgeoisie in origin. Those who provided the main support base of the
party included the rural middle class, small town lawyers, college/school teachers, and small traders and
businessmen. However, since the beginning of the democratic era, the social base of the AL has changed
considerably. Big businesses, the bureaucracy, and the military now have better representation in the AL
than in the past. The influence of lower/middle class in AL politics has considerably declined. The social
composition of the Parliaments elected since the early 1990s show that the majority of lawmakers
belonging to the BNP and AL share similar backgrounds and personality traits. In recent years, business and
politics in Bangladesh have become closely intertwined.
These major parties, however, share a number of common characteristics. First, as suffrage was expanded,
each party created external parties in order to mobilise voters, and links were created between legislative
and external parties (Jewell 1973). Second, most parties in the country are personality-centred. Third, there
is a tendency in each party toward concentration of power at the top. Local branches of parties do not enjoy
much autonomy (Ahmed 2009a).
These major parties share yet another common characteristic: their organisational hierarchy parallels the
administrative hierarchy of the government. Most parties have organisational units at division, district and
levels; but only a few, however, have organisational units at the grassroots level. The central party
exercises direct control over the way party units at sub-national levels (as well as different fronts/associate
organisations) carry out their activities, although the extent to which such control remains effective can not
always be known. All major parties except JP have different front organisations, of which the student front
deserves special mention. The linkage between national student organisations and political parties has
become so strong that the top leaders of political parties now hand-pick the student leadership, instead of
the student leaders being democratically chosen in national conventions as used to be the norm. The rent-
seeking behaviour of student organisations is also partly due to their close links with political leaders.
These four parties (AL, BNP, JP and JIB) together have won the majority of seats in all parliamentary elections
held since 1991. Together they claim the support of more than 90 percent of the electorate. It can thus be
argued with relative certainty that the future of Bangladesh democracy will largely depend on the ways
these parties, particularly the AL and the BNP, behave (Ahmed 2009a). Inter-party relationship, however, is
often governed more by the 'politics of convenience' than by ideological affinities. Thus, despite differences
in ideological orientation and background, the various parties have often agreed to cooperate with each
other to confront the ruling party. Conflict thus becomes inevitable.
thana
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Politics is by nature confrontational as it involves conflicts of interests, views and ideologies. Hence,
arguments, debates and disagreements are an integral part of politics. However, confrontation by itself is not
a problem rather the problem is its manifestation. Several factors account for widespread political party
confrontation in Bangladesh, of which the enemy discourse appears to be the most important. Enemy
discourse has polarised Bangladesh society since independence. The entire society has become divided into
two large factions along the lines of the two major political parties: the AL and the BNP, which have trapped
themselves in the clutches of enmity. Misinterpretation of the history of the war of independence, lack of
mutual respect, high degrees of intolerance, and the role the parties themselves have played in the post-
independence period all fuel the flames of confrontation. Further issues that have generated enmity
between these two parties include: AL's embeddedness in 'Bengali nationalism' versus BNP's 'Bangladeshi
Nationalism'; AL's stance in favour of secularism and BNP's alliance with an Islamic party; AL (once) favouring
the one-party system as opposed to that of BNP's multiparty system etc. It is interesting to note that for all
their enmity, there is little ideological difference between the two parties. Both parties support capitalism,
uphold the free market economy and pursue a near-identical foreign policy. It appears that personal
differences over issues between the two leaders of AL and BNP are the main reasons for all kinds of
confrontation.
The enemy discourse has intensified both patron-clientelism and mobilisation politics in Bangladesh, as it
requires clients everywhere and mobilisation across the social space (Islam 2002). These clients get engaged
in deposing the opponent. Success in their endeavours results in rewards by the patrons. This tends to move
in a cyclic manner.
The party in power has four major stakes for opting for clientelist politics. First of all, it obtains political
benefit through creating beneficiary groups or clients by giving jobs to the student leaders, giving
businesses to party supporters, promotion to the bureaucrats - which will ensure their support (political,
administrative and also financial) in the next election. Using state machinery they create support groups in
every sphere/strata/institution. Benefits are distributed at all levels. The second stake is to obtain financial
benefits through illegal and unethical way. The party in power expects to obtain an 'undue' share of public
money. An increase in the size of the ADP for example has thrown parties into a frenzy, competing for a slice
of the pie. Monopolisation of governmental projects and all financial transactions of the state bring
immediate benefit for the party as it is distributed in favour of the party leaders and workers. The third major
stake is greed for power. The winning party thinks that they have won the election battle through a huge
investment which have to be recouped as fast as possible, and significant returns made on the 'investment'.
The fourth stake is counterbalancing the opposition. The party in power wants to subdue the opposition
instead of moving forward to work together.
On the other hand, the opposition pursues the politics of mobilisation for three reasons. First mobilisation
politics has been a crucial factor in the political history of Bangladesh from the days of colonialism (Islam
2002) to the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Thus, mobilisation politics has acquired in
the eyes of the opposition. Second the opposition opts for mobilisation politics because they are never
given their dues either inside or outside the Parliament. In Parliament the opposition is not allowed
sufficient time to raise issues. Moreover, political jealousy, personal rancour and parochial attitudes are
expressed in the behaviour of the treasury bench. As there is no institutional mechanism for redress and no
formal mechanism is operational, no alternative is left to the opposition other than going for street
mobilisation. Outside of Parliament the opposition is deprived from getting development funds for its
constituencies. The third reason is greed for a share of state resources. Being barred from getting a return on
2
,
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,
2 One claims itself to be the pro-liberation force led by Bangabandhu while the other is blamed to be 'anti-liberation' or 'pro-Pakistani'
force.
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their elections 'investments' the opposition opts for agitation, and often becomes destructive to topple the
government at any cost. In a bid to capture power the opposition opts for protests and mobilisation politics
- the only way they consider to be open to them in trying to attain equilibrium in the political game.
Notwithstanding differences in age, orientation and ideology, the two main parties - AL and BNP - have
mostly followed a similar policy, especially to secure state power and to survive in it. Both have deliberately
followed a policy of politicising almost all state institutions that matter in the governing process. The next
two sections explore the way(s) the AL and the BNP have politicised the bureaucracy and local government
for party political purposes.
The Public Sector in Bangladesh currently employs around one million people. Around 300,000 are
employed in public enterprises while approximately 700,000 are employed in various ministries,
departments and other government offices (Kim and Monem 2008). This latter group is termed the 'Civil
Service'. These officers staff 35 ministries, 15 administrative divisions and the offices of the President and the
Prime Minister. The Bangladesh Civil Service is structured horizontally into four classes: Class I being the
professional or officer class (numbering about 40,000) and three other classes performing a variety of
supporting functions. Seventy percent of Class I officers are recruited into cadres, whilst the rest work in
functional non-cadre areas. Some non-cadre posts and hierarchies have existed for decades and, for those in
these positions, their status is a cause for much dissatisfaction and frustration. On average, between 1,200
and 1,800 Class I officers are recruited each year. There are 28 cadres each comprising officers with particular
skills or qualifications.
IGS research has extensively documented the state of public administration in Bangladesh (IGS 2006, 2007,
2008). In the years since independence, the Bangladesh polity has seen many changes, resulting in its
current form: a multiparty, aggressively competitive democracy. Yet the essential character of the
bureaucracy has altered little over that time, except to increase in size (Ahmed 2002c). However, the context
in which the civil administration operates has unquestionably been transformed. Efforts to politicise the
bureaucracy by successive regimes have had the most direct impact on the service, particularly after the
crucial movement initiated by civil servants against the ruling Government in 1996. Subsequent political
parties in power have worked hard to prevent a recurrence of this by installing party supporters in key
positions. The greater legitimacy of the democratically elected Executive compared to authoritarian
predecessors has also had the effect of making the bureaucracy relatively less powerful in comparison to the
more powerful political class.
The lack of progress in administrative governance has been made more acute by the failure of successive
governments to pursue the reform agenda. The Public Administration Reform Commission (2000) and
several other studies have identified areas that undermine the efficiency of the bureaucracy, amongst which
politicisation and external influence feature prominently.
The literature on politicisation of bureaucracy (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; Aberbach and
Rockman 1987; Hojnacki 1996; Ingraham 1996; Ingraham and Peters 1988) refers to the levels and types of
political activities undertaken by the bureaucrats, as well as to the political influence on bureaucrats by
politicians and citizens. The second feature is politician-driven politicisation, which is the central concern of
this section. As a , both elected politicians in democratic countries and party leaders in communist
countries are engaged in controlling their , such as bureaucrats and administrative systems.
2.3 Political Parties and Bureaucracy
principle
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Politicisation of the bureaucracy has been an ever present threat in Bangladesh, proceeding in waves over
the history of the country, rising on the back of successive periods of military rule and reform efforts (IGS
2006). At times, proximity to political forces has increased the autonomy and power of the bureaucracy,
while at others, including the present day, it has left the bureaucracy weakened and dependent on its
political masters. The return to democracy in 1991 was a period of vulnerability for the bureaucracy, during
which political patronage and favouritism began to chip away at its cohesiveness and unity. The
bureaucratic response was to abandon its traditional values of public service neutrality and embrace
partisan alignment (Haque and Rahman 2003).
On the other hand, it can be argued that the assumption that politicisation of the administration is always
motivated by partisan concerns has given it strongly negative overtones. It is also plausible that motivations
may have included appointing more committed and able individuals to expedite priority policies. Similarly,
reshuffles, transfers and promotions should not be seen exclusively as a system of partisan punishment and
reward. The level of contractual appointments may be a better and more neutral way of measuring the
extent of politicisation. With all officers required to begin their civil service career at the entry level, there is
limited scope for contractual appointments within the civil service. Thus, a contractual appointment after a
civil servant's career ends is invariably used as a political tool.
Two distinctive features of the Bangladeshi bureaucracy map its negotiated and compromising nexus with
politicians: (a) Elitism is now non-existent in Bangladesh civil service since all the services are
unified at present. In an effort to eliminate elitism from the bureaucracy and by liberalising the system of
recruitment as component of administrative reform, the charm of the service has faded away. The low salary,
uncertain promotional scope, politicisation of promotion and transfer decisions, and rampant corrupt
practices have made the civil service a lacklustre option to the educated upper middle-class; (b)
The entire bureaucracy in Bangladesh is plagued with deep-seated factionalism and waning
. The sharpest and pernicious form of factionalism in civil service manifests itself as the conflict
between the specialists and the generalists. To this principal configuration, one can add at least seven lesser
strains of factionalism (Rahman 2002). This conflict has led to total demoralisation, utter negligence of work,
ugly acrimony and serious tension in bureaucracy (Siddiqui 1996). This factionalism has weakened the
bureaucracy as an institution.
Politicians want to build their own 'force' in bureaucracy mainly to maintain their regime and to get support
for activities which may not be entirely legal. As a first step towards consolidating its rule it shuffles and
reshuffles the entire administrative apparatus repeatedly in search of party sympathisers to install them in
key positions of administration. In fact, both politicians and bureaucrats have stakes in politicisation. Their
mutual interests create a 'win-win' situation. Politicians have both political and financial stakes behind
politicisation. Firstly, they want to build their 'own' force in administration to materialise their own agenda
(to counter political rivals, to implement their own decisions) and second, their financial motives are served
with the help of this 'force'. On the other hand, politicisation of bureaucracy rewards the subservient
bureaucrats through foreign travel, speedy promotion and better postings. They also enjoy power and
prestige for being allied to the party in power.
Decay of Elitism:
Factionalism
in Bureaucracy:
esprit de corps
2.3.1 The  Politicisation Strategy
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2.3.2 Weaknesses in the Bureaucracy
The bureaucracy in Bangladesh has a number of inherent weaknesses that allow and indeed encourage
politicisation:
A number of structural weaknesses encourage its politicisation. First, increasing the number of cadres to 29
during the Zia regime intensified conflict and competition in bureaucracy for limited scope of promotion. To
survive in the competition, the officials engaged themselves in seeking assistance of politicians for career
advancement.
Second, certain discriminations in the service rules encourage politicisation. In case of promotion to the
Deputy Secretary level there is a policy of filling up 75 percent of the posts by the Administration Cadre
officials and the rest from the other cadres. By virtue of this rule junior officials of Administration Cadre
occupying lower positions in the gradation list may also get promotion through political influence.
Dissatisfaction arises as a consequence and remedies are sought from the political masters.
Third, lack of confidence among the officials is another contributing factor behind politicisation. Due to a
lack of definite career planning, officials are found lacking in confidence. This lack of confidence does not
permit any bold moves to counter politicisation.
Fourth, lack of a transparent transfer and posting policy is yet another weakness that plagues the
Bangladesh bureaucracy. According to the service rules, an officer has to work in one place for three years
but it is not followed all the time. Nobody has any idea about his/her future posting. This uncertainly causes
officers to become opportunists and look for political blessings. Political leaders gladly take this advantage.
Fifth, lack of transparent promotion policy creates another scope for politicisation. As performance is not the
criteria for promotion, officials are more concerned about establishing extra-legal relationship with the
politically influential persons than being a good performer. One bureaucrat, during interview, argued: “We
are not informed why we were not promoted. In promotion race, always corrupt, clever people win, as they
are more adept in socialising and networking. Usually efficient, honest people are a bit lonely and
marginalised”.
Sixth, bureaucrats often work under insecure and unprotected conditions. The system makes it difficult for
them to turn down any political moves. Furthermore, the senior bureaucrats do not protect the junior
officials from undue political influences. There is no Civil Service Act to protect the interests of the
bureaucrats. Although an Act was drafted for this purpose during the Fakhruddin-led caretaker regime, but
it was not finalised/approved by the Cabinet.
The Civil Servants' Retirement Act of 1974 creates scope for politicisation. It requires that public servants
retire from service at the age of 57. Rules made under the Act state that after the completion of 25 years
service at any time, government, for the sake of public interest, can give retirement to a public servant
without showing any reason. Another provision of this rule reads, “The President, for the sake of public
interest, can appoint a retired civil servant on contractual basis if he deems fit”. By virtue of this law civil
Structural factors
Legal factors
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servants, whom the party in power do not consider as their own men, have to retire voluntarily after 25 years
of service or they are often sent on forced retirement. Bureaucrats are not usually ready to retire at the age of
57. Politicians take advantage of this opportunity by promising extensions or contractual appointments.
Thus bureaucrats being in policy making positions at the fag end of their career, become vulnerable in fear
of termination of job. To retain their job or to prolong their career, they cannot oppose the decisions of the
politicians. Sometimes they even get engaged in frantic race of getting contractual appointments.
Bureaucracy has a mixed reaction to politicisation. A very small number of officials accept politicisation
wholeheartedly because of the perks mentioned before, while the large majority does not like this irregular
practice but accepts it as a 'risk aversion' measure. Favour for politicisation is found more at the higher levels
in bureaucracy. Describing the aspirations of bureaucrats, a senior official said, “ Out of ten aspirations of civil
servants, around seven are related to promotion and transfer i.e. to get posting at Dhaka”. To meet these
aspirations the civil servants try to show loyalty to the ruling party. The post of Secretary (the highest rank in
bureaucracy) is a very competitive and extremely lucrative position. The aspired candidates sometimes
become desperate to show loyalty to the ruling party to serve their own interests. Bureaucrats have also
been known to get engaged in a frantic race for attaining the approval of the ruling party for mid-ranking
positions.
One thing, however, to be stressed here is that the majority of the bureaucrats are still apolitical. “Only 10-15
percent of the civil servants are political or the die-hard supporters of political parties”, said a bureaucrat.
These neutral persons accept politicisation as they don't want to be victimised by politics, through bad
postings, humiliation or deprivation. As a result, bureaucrats remain tactful and if necessary work against the
interests of the public - the masters of the Republic. Bureaucracy also accepts politicisation due to a lack
of unity: individual resistances cause individual loss. However, certain aspects of politicisation are intensely
disliked by the bureaucracy: e.g. making officials Officer on Special Duty (OSD), giving promotions
superseding the seniors and award of contractual appointments bypassing serving officers.
There are two forms of bureaucratic accountability: internal and external. Internal accountability refers to
the hierarchical accountability while external accountability is the accountability to the political Executive
and through it to Parliament. Bureaucrats also have indirect accountability to the people as their clients.
Internal accountability is ensured through a hierarchical chain of command. There are more than 4000 rules
and regulations relating to accountability in the bureaucracy. Rules of Business 1996, Allocation of Business,
Secretariat Instructions, and Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1979 are some of the major guiding rules
for ensuring accountability. For instance, the Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1985
reads, “disobeying the legal orders of the superior officer, sheer negligence of duty, reluctance in carrying
out a government order or instruction without any reasonable excuse are considered as the misbehaviour of
civil servants”. The Public Employees Discipline (Punctual Attendance) Ordinance, 1982 reads, “If a public
servant goes on leave or remains absent from office or leaves office without prior permission of the superior
authority, for the delay in office one day's basic salary will be deducted for each case of violation”. In
enforcing this rule, the supervisor is the final authority, as it does not require any consultation with the
Public Service Commission (PSC) for this purpose. Thus officials are directly accountable to their superior
officers as per the hierarchy.
2.3.3 Bureaucratic Response to Politicisation
2.3.4 Effect of Politicisation on Bureaucratic Accountability
real
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The formal accountability mechanism is unfortunately not followed in practice. For example, the Secretariat
instruction 2004 clearly specifies how long a file can remain with an official but the officials openly disregard
this. Ministerial coordination meetings are held regularly every month, officials are not held accountable for
their negligence of duties in these meetings. In practice, officials are mostly assessed on the basis of the
personal interactions or relationship with the superior officials. Officials will not be in the good book of their
superior officers if they don't maintain a 'good' personal relationship with them (the superior officers).
Insubordination or disloyalty (not carrying out the orders of superiors) is strictly dealt with while negligence
of duty is rarely punished. Disloyalty is usually punished through a negative report in the Annual
Confidential Report (ACR) of the offending officer.
Politicisation of recruitment also shatters the internal accountability mechanism. Officials appointed on
political grounds are likely to serve their political masters even at the cost of public interest, because they
believe that they owe their allegiance and indeed their job to the person or the party which got them
appointed and not to the Republic whose employees they actually are and to which they really owe
allegiance. Due to political influence the chain of command is often broken and violated. Politicisation often
leads to the placement of incompetent persons to a position. Irregular promotion through politicisation
affects internal accountability mechanisms. Moreover, as party loyalty becomes the criteria for selecting the
officials for promotion, officials become more concerned about establishing extra-legal relationship with the
political masters rather than being accountable to the superior authority for better performance.
Accountability of bureaucrats to the Parliament through the Ministers is also largely ineffective due to the
absence of functional Parliamentary Standing Committees. Parliamentary Committees cannot be effective in
making the bureaucracy accountable as the politically chosen Secretaries, considering the Committee
members fellow 'party men', respond poorly to the queries and in implementing recommendations of the
Committee. On the other hand, the Committee members also hesitate to take any stern action against them
for similar 'fellow-feelings'. Accountability of bureaucrats to the people is even more ineffective. When the
officials follow the instructions of political masters they fail to be responsive to the people. The effectiveness
of accountability mechanisms is thus affected by politicisation in a pervasive way.
The preceding discussion explains the dynamics and the intricate relationship between the politicians and
bureaucracy in Bangladesh. The ruling politicians can wield complete control over the bureaucrats by
regulating recruitment, transfer and promotion. Even more alarming is the fact that several reform measures
have been undertaken and are underway during this decade to make the bureaucrats formally accountable
to their political masters. Furthermore, bureaucracy itself is plagued with its own poly-faceted factionalism.
Its prior position and authority are waning and being challenged. All these initiatives have prompted the
bureaucracy to build a symbiotic and compromising trade off with the politicians. Politicians are now firmly
in the driver's seat and bureaucrats are no longer treated as the final arbitrator of governing the country.
There is almost total absence between bureaucratic performance and reward - throughout the duration of
civil servants' career. Civil servants are recruited in a way so that the civil service can become a 'loyal' force of
the incumbent government. The party in power often opts for drastic measures to recruit members of its
student wing into the civil service. It has been - the norm since the birth of the nation to recruit political
cadres into civil service but since the restoration of democracy in 1991 it has intensified. Since the
restoration of democracy, political interference has also been playing havoc with bureaucracy and the
careers of government officials at the senior levels. The dominant criteria for promotion of civil servants are
political connections and affinity with the ruling class, and closeness to the Chief Executive rather than merit
2.3.5 Consequences of Politicisation
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and competency. Strategic positions are always filled up by officials handpicked by the party in power. In
Bangladesh Civil Service, only one promotion at the earliest stage of the career i.e. promotion from Assistant
Secretary to Senior Assistant Secretary generally takes place without any kind of external interference. The
promotion policy, which is confidential, keeps changing for the convenience of individuals.
Promotions of some services like postal service, information, audit, and taxation - are not overly politicised.
But promotions of some cadres, e.g. administration is very much politicised, especially at the senior levels, as
the party in power has to depend on these cadres to effectively rule the country. According to the Civil
Service Recruitment Rule, promotion is based on seniority and merit as per the gradation list prepared by
the PSC during recruitment but it is very often violated. As per the rules, educational qualification, the ACR
containing the information regarding experience and performance of the candidate are the only criteria for
promotion. The rules also stipulate that an officer must score more than 80 percent in the ACR to be
considered for promotion. But this ACR grade is very often manipulated. To cite an example, the ACR is
written by the immediate senior officers for Joint Secretary to Additional Secretary levels but it must be
countersigned by the concerned Minister. This creates scope for manipulation and political influence over
promotion in civil service. As there is no transparent, definite career planning, political influence in
promotion is massive.
The absence of transfer/posting policies creates further scope for politicisation. Officials not loyal to the
party in power are usually given bad postings while those who curry favour with the incumbent
government get better postings. Consent of the political masters is considered an important factor for
transfer.
Perhaps it is not surprising that under the prevailing situation, incentives to perform within the service are
distorted in favour of demonstrating political support over professional performance. There is no doubt that
politicisation has been instrumental in distorting the professional incentives of bureaucrats. The major
problem surrounds the imposition of political affiliation upon permanent members of the bureaucracy who
have been recruited and formally operate under an entirely different set of rules. Good performance of the
public institutions depends on the bureaucratic personnel facing a set of stable incentives which are shaped
by the assumption of political neutrality in personnel management decisions, such as transfer and
promotion. Instead there is uncertainty, and incentives are oriented towards pleasing political masters rather
than professional performance (see also Mukherjee 2001).
The post-1991 democratic era in Bangladesh has witnessed a massive push towards greater politicisation.
This has primarily involved greater interference by politicians in the everyday work of the bureaucrats,
frequently having to divert resources or to use influence for corrupt purposes. The major thrust in the
politicisation of the bureaucracy since 1991 has involved recruiting 'party men bureaucrats'. The first five
years of democracy (1991-1996) under the BNP Government witnessed politicisation in various forms: party
loyalists were placed in important civil service positions and attempts were made to manipulate the
recruitment process, including through appointment of student party leaders (Zafarullah 1998). For
example, in 1992, 654 allegedly partisan officials were promoted, and in 1996, civil servants were compelled
to retire prematurely without a specific reason (Karim 1996).
After coming to power in 1996, the AL continued the process of politicisation. A number of senior civil
servants had been directly involved in the movement which forced the BNP to resign for a re-election under
a constitutionally guaranteed Caretaker Government (CTG) in 1996. On winning the election that followed,
the AL rewarded those civil servants with promotions (Haque and Rahman 2003).
et al
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The return to power of the BNP-led coalition in 2001 continued to strengthen political interference in the
bureaucracy. A record 978 officials were appointed as 'Officer on Special Duty'. This is a position that is used
as a punishment; in essence it means being a civil servant without a post. Within the civil service, decisions
regarding promotions were no longer believed to be made according to seniority or merit. Rather,
importance was given to party loyalty. Such practice was damaging to civil service morale. The rising
number of contractual appointments and contractual extensions at the upper levels of the service were also
seen to be made on the basis of political allegiance. Towards the end of the second BNP regime, the Superior
Selection Board had been rendered dysfunctional and acted as a mere rubber stamp, with decisions made
by the Prime Minister's Office.
Apart from the impact on morale, performance and human resource management, particularly at the senior
levels, the introduction of political considerations into bureaucratic procedure has severely undermined the
credibility of the rules and regulations that govern the civil service, especially the Government Servants
(Conduct) Rules, 1979 which regulates the terms and conditions of service and clearly rules against partisan
affiliation or support. The situation was further complicated by the involvement of contractual appointees in
active politics, including as candidates for public office. Rules forbid civil servants from involvement in
politics, but in recent years, the increasing number of contractual appointments has superseded these rules.
Local government has always played a significant role in the social system of Bangladesh. Reaching into the
remotest rural areas, local government acts as a bridge between the people and the government through
implementation of different government development projects and public welfare programmes. The
Constitution of Bangladesh categorically emphasises the need for establishing local government with a
representative character (Article 59). It also implies direct participation of the people in constituting the local
body and in managing the affairs of such bodies. Article 59 in particular highlights the role of local
government bodies in the preparation and implementation of plans relating to public services and
economic development. Article 60 stresses the need for local government bodies to have the power to
impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets and to maintain funds. The inclusion of such
stipulations within the Constitution underlines the significant role that is anticipated from local government
as an institution.
Local government councils now exist in both urban and rural areas. At the top of the three-tier rural local
government structure lies the Zila Parishad (ZP), and at the base, the Union Parishad (UP). The middle tier is
called the Upazila Parishad (UZP) and was first introduced in the 1980s. Most of the urban local bodies are
called municipalities, although those in the six divisional headquarters - Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna,
Rajshahi, Sylhet and Barisal - have been granted the status of city corporations. All these urban and rural
local councils except the ZP are now composed of directly elected representatives.
Rural and urban local government bodies are entrusted with a large number of functions and
responsibilities relating to civic and community welfare as well as local development. It is perhaps therefore
not surprising that local government is yet another focal point where the successive ruling parties- have
tried- to establish their monopoly as a mechanism for strengthening their support base at the local level. In
a bid to establish control over the local government, party Secretary Generals have invariably been made
the local government minister. Control over local government is established in four ways: first, through
establishing bureaucratic control over local government, second, through influencing local elections, third,
by disbursing insufficient funds to the areas led by the opposition and fourth, by preventing opposition MPs
from attending local level meetings.
2.4 Politicisation of Local Government
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Establishing bureaucratic control over local government
Influencing the local government election
Development projects at the local level: monopoly over fund disbursement
Preventing opposition MPs from attending local level meetings
The Union Parishad is the only tier of local rural government which has long retained its representative
character. The other units of local government, especially the ZP, have remained under total control of the
central government since independence. In 1983 the government of Ershad (1982-90) introduced the
system which at least in theory established the supremacy of local representatives at the level
- over local administration. After the overthrow of Ershad, the BNP regime (1991-96) abolished the
system and reinstated the previous council administered by the central government. The second AL
regime (1996-2001) attempted to reintroduce the system headed by a directly elected chairperson,
but failed due to the opposition of their own MPs as they viewed these local leaders as threats to their
power at the local level. Central control over the and also district level continued as before and the
third BNP regime (2001-2006) did not do anything to strengthen democratic control over the bureaucracy at
the local level. Thus every successive government since the restoration of democracy kept the local
government institutions under its direct control with the help of bureaucracy. Explaining this attitude of the
ruling party a political leader, during interview with the researchers, said, “Ruling party feels safe if it has full
control over the local level institutions which is not always possible to attain through the elected
representatives. It is much easier to establish central control over local bodies through the bureaucratic
machinery”. The UZP has been reintroduced recently.
The winning party very often tries to win the local level elections by excluding the opposition from the
game at all cost mainly through intimidation, and election rigging if an opposition leader wins the election,
s/he subsequently finds it very difficult to work, or some misfortune strikes like false cases. Moreover, these
UP chairmen fail to obtain development funds, which obstruct development activities in their areas.
An effective way of controlling the local government is by controlling fund disbursement. Insufficient funds
are allocated to local government institutions led by the opposition party. In the 2001-2006 BNP-regime it
was found that Khulna, Barisal and Rajshahi city corporations led by the ruling BNP backed leaders were
allocated more funds than those of Chittagong and Sylhet led by the opposition backed leaders. This
monopoly begins from the allocation of development funds at the local level through MPs - most
development projects are awarded to ruling party MPs. Food for Work ( ), VGF, VGD
cards, old age pension etc are also common instruments of exercising power at the local level. Money and
material are thus pumped through development projects at the local level to reward the grassroots level
workers who took part in the election activities for the winning party.
Preventing opposition MPs from attending local level meetings is yet another instrument of controlling the
local government. For example, an opposition MP is seldom invited to take part in the Thana Development
Coordination Council (TDCC) meeting, of which MPs are advisors. Invitations to attend the disciplinary
meetings at the DC office are often sent barely hours before the meeting is scheduled to begin. These
examples demonstrate the 'irrational' motive of the politicised administration to obstruct the participation
of the opposition MPs in local administration.
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Consequences of monopolization of local government
Monopoly of the ruling party over local government tremendously reduces the significance of
representative character of local government. According to Article 9 and 59 of the Constitution (Bangladesh
2004) local government institutions should be composed of representatives of the areas concerned. But
representativeness looses its meaning and sense by vote rigging, intimidation of voters and election
manipulation by the ruling party. On the other hand, the tendency of exerting central control either through
bureaucratic machinery or by the MPs local government looses its autonomy and fails to act or think
independently. As a result, the core purpose of the local government i.e. making the local people
empowered to decide their own priorities remain a far cry. More dangerously, the tendency of grabbing all
development funds for the local level by the ruling party leads to an imbalanced development at the local
level. It also affects the sustainability or continuity of projects as with the regime change projects/programs
also die.
During the course of our research we have attempted to unearth the reasons why the ruling party wishes to
establish its monopoly over state resources and institutions and how it achieves this. The findings
demonstrate that a number of factors contribute to the 'winner takes all' approach of the ruling party,
prominent amongst them the history of the emergence of Bangladesh, lack of internal party democracy,
certain legal provisions and some social factors.
Since the colonial period, the middle class considered involvement with the state machinery as the most
effective means of surplus extraction. During the Pakistani regime, the AL became the focal point for
attempts by the Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie to share power in the national polity and to use it as a means to
divert resources and jobs to those who backed their class (Sobhan and Ahmed 1980). The support base of AL
was also largely drawn from the middle classes or bourgeoisie and as a result the regime led by AL after
independence in 1971 supported the growth of public enterprise as a source of patronage in jobs - trading
privileges and consolidating state power. Later, from the political changeover in 1975 until 1990, the country
was ruled by two military regimes that shared power mainly with the civil bureaucracy and powerful vested
economic interest groups such as industrialists, traders, businessmen and the rural rich (Monem 2006). This
composition of the regimes promoted the interests of gaining directly or indirectly from the state resources.
Undemocratic practices within political parties contribute significantly to the arbitrary attitudes of the ruling
party. Political parties as public institutions should be subject to accountability and should be governed by
the laws of the land. The prevailing internal organisational structure and management system of political
parties are not congenial to hold the party leaders accountable. The party chief enjoys absolute power in
taking all important decisions. There is no scope for dissidence and perhaps most important, there is no
transparency in financial transactions. These factors have allowed the party leaders to become authoritarian.
The decision making structures and financial transactions of three major political parties of the country -
BNP, AL and JP - bear striking similarities.
2.5 Monopoly over State Resources
2.5.1 Historical Factors
2.5.2 Lack of Internal Party Democracy
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There is also a tendency toward dynastic rule in the two main parties. Jahan (2007) observes, “… the trend
toward dynastic succession is rapidly spreading from top to mid to lower level of political leadership.
Nominations to parliamentary seats are being increasingly given to people with dynastic connections: wives
succeeding husbands, sons succeeding fathers in different constituencies. Women's reserved seats at various
levels from Parliament to local bodies are being used for favouring candidates with familial connections.”
Despite having local level committees, political party decisions are invariably taken at the top, and imposed
upon the rank and file. Advisory Body, Working Committee, Standing Committee and Council members are
selected rather than elected. Grassroots level committees are absent or dysfunctional. The party constitution
is largely ignored in the day-to-day activities of the party (Osman 2009). Meetings are irregular and when
held, only endorse the decisions of the party leader. Internal party dynamics also prevent party workers from
enjoying freedom of speech. Dissent with the party leader leads to loss of position or membership.
Theoretically, internal hierarchy creates a system of accountability within the party. However, there is no
oversight and hence very limited hierarchical accountability, except to the party leader. The party leader is
not accountable to anyone and is able to take unilateral decisions. Although in terms of structure it is seen
that AL is more democratic than other parties but in practice it is less than democratic. BNP, despite
proclaiming that financial irregularities of any kind will be dealt with by expelling the person from the party,
in practice turn a blind eye to such matters.
Financial transactions of the parties are totally non-transparent and are often shady and ambiguous. Again,
party leadership is not accountable to anyone for their financial transactions. There is no clarity regarding
the source of party financing. Fund allocation also remains a mystery. This non-transparency encourages the
arbitrary attitudes of the party leaders. Parties create beneficiary groups among the businessmen for
mobilisation of funds who are again rewarded through grabbing state resources. This creates a vicious cycle.
It is customary for political parties everywhere in the world to receive donations. It should be on record and
done within set rules, which are generally acceptable to the people. Political parties in Bangladesh receive
donations of their party men and their supporters from both within the country and abroad. Contributions,
kept secret, are usually made expecting a return in kind when the party goes into power. To manage
business for these supporters or party loyalists or donors, the winning party needs to have complete control
over the state machinery.
The Constitution has awarded considerable power to the Prime Minister as the Chief Executive of the
country. For instance, Article 55 stipulates, “There shall be a Cabinet in Bangladesh led by the Prime Minister
and this Cabinet will be comprised of other ministers as designated by the Prime Minister from time to time”.
The parliamentary system of democracy wanes in the face of such huge discretionary power to the Chief
Executive. The state in Bangladesh is also involved in a lot of sectors - from garbage disposal to selling
energy. Such increased role of the state affects efficiency of services and also leads to the increase of state
resources the party in power may avail of.
Decision-making structure and internal accountability mechanisms
Financial management and mobilisation of financial resources through patronage
2.5.3 Legal Factors
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Article 70 of the Constitution that prevents the elected Members of Parliament from playing their due role
freely in the Parliament encourages or facilitates the dictatorship of the party leader. Moreover, the provision
of appointment of a 'partisan' Speaker and also the removal of Speaker by the majority members of the
Parliament (Article 74) severely affects the independent and neutral functioning of Parliament. By virtue of
these provisions Parliament appears to function in favour of the ruling party (for having three-fourth
majority), which in effect, institutionalises the monopolistic attitude of the ruling party.
The societal characteristics that influence the attractiveness of clientelist and monopolistic political
strategies include per capita income, the number of youth as a percentage of the population, and the
number of rural population. Poor voters are more subject to clientelist promises (Dixit and Londregan 1996)
and that young, rural voters pose different challenges to political competitors seeking to mobilise support.
Bangladesh society is very much seeped in this phenomenon. The country's per capita income is low
(US$460), nearly about 45 percent of the population are young and more than 75 percent of the population
live in rural areas.
Almost half of the population of Bangladesh lives below the poverty line. Scarcity of resources contributes to
the wish to monopolise all available resources. People live amidst resource scarcities. Lands are scarce,
resources are scarce, and the population is huge. A large part of the population has been in a lifelong
struggle merely for day-to-day survival. The uncertain conditions these people live under are manifested in
competition and confrontation. Parties lure the poor into getting involved in the monopolisation process
through lucrative promises and material and financial benefits. To survive in the competition the poor assist
the parties in exchange of benefits - thus becoming an instrument of politics. As Bangladesh society is
underdeveloped, those not caught in the poverty trap also collude with parties with the hope of gaining
more resources and power - thus assisting the ruling party to establish its monopoly over state resources.
Feudalistic culture is one of the dominant factors leading to monopolisation of state resources by the
winning party. Political culture is very much guided by feudalistic norms. “One group will always rule while
others will always be ruled. Those who are ruled will never be the ruler” has become the norm ingrained in
the society (Osman 2009). Balance of power between the ruler and the ruled is almost absent. It is also
accepted by the society that the ruler while ruling will engage in corruption, and will commit wrongdoings,
but will protect his/her supporters in one form or another. This feudalistic outlook encourages the rulers to
engage in what is expected of them.
Bangladesh society is moderately fractionalised as a result of which it encounters polarisation - two large
politically opponent groups. A society characterised by two equally large and discordant groups is more
polarized than a society characterised by many small and discordant groups (Keefer 2005). Bipolarisation in
the society is another factor intensifying political competition and confrontation as the entire society is
divided into two groups along these two major political parties. There is hardly any class which is not
partisan. These groups being the clients assist the ruling party to become the patrons and also assist the
opposition for mobilisation politics.
2.5.4 Social Factors
Poverty
Feudalistic society
Bipolarisation
de facto
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Social expectations
Massive social expectations of ministers are yet another factor responsible for monopolisation of state
resources. The minister is considered to be highly powerful, someone who can do whatever s/he wishes.
Consequently they are faced with all kinds of personal, official and social requests. Out of social
accountability, the minister feels a sense of compulsion to attend to the requests.
Politics denotes the process of making public decisions regarding control, allocation and distribution of
public resources in all political systems, and a democratic political system requires that such public decisions
be made in conformance with public interest. In Bangladesh, this had not been the case since the 'return to
democracy' in 1991. Structural, behavioral and political factors together account for the deviant behavior of
political parties and politicians. Traditional mechanisms used to ensure formal accountability have not
seemed to work properly, not because of numerous inherent defects, but mostly because of the absence of
an 'enabling environment' caused by different structural factors.
Following the political impasse over the Chief Adviser of the Caretaker Government at the end of 2006, a
was declared in January 2007 amidst political deadlock and prolonged violence over
electoral reforms. An army-supported Caretaker Government (CTG) headed by former Bangladesh Bank
Governor Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed was appointed on 12 January 2007, and ran the country for almost two
years. The CTG during its extended tenure launched a broad-based governance reform programme aimed at
strengthening/promoting intra-party accountability, democratisation of local government,
professionalisation of the bureaucracy, and depoliticisation of the entire system as a whole.
The CTG demonstrated its earnest desire to rid the Bangladeshi political system of undemocratic elements
by launching an ambitious anti-corruption drive and targeting several high-profile personalities who were
blamed for the dysfunctional governance in certain aspects of the country's economy, service delivery, and
law and order sectors. Reforms of public institutions and initiatives to bring accountability and transparency
to the government were met with broad support, if not cautious optimism, from all quarters of society.
In Bangladesh where democracy is still nascent and politicians have not yet fully learnt to respect
democratic norms, those holding the reins of power have spared no means to neutralise their rivals and in
civil servants they have found an effective means towards that end. Use of administrative machinery to
harass political rivals, deny them political rights and implicate them in fabricated cases has become
endemic. This is the situation that was inherited by the CTG in 2007. The previous
report has carefully recorded the chronology of events in the 'year of change'.
There is little doubt that administrative reform is a continuous process that should translate the changing
needs of the citizens and the environment into policies and service delivery mechanisms. With the best of
intentions, Bangladesh embarked on administrative reform initiatives shortly after its independence in 1971.
Sadly, the recent history of public administration reforms has little more to show apart from a sequence of
reform studies and proposals, with little evidence of real change. Furthermore, reform efforts undertaken to
date have typically tried to provide technical solutions but neglected the socio-political dimensions of the
problems. A recent Asian Development Bank (ADB) Report (2007) succinctly sums up the problems in the
2.6 Attempts to Bring Accountability: Developments of 2008
State of Emergency
State of Governance in
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2.6.1. Bureaucratic Reforms
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following manner: (a) outside interference in administrative decision making; (b) politicisation of the civil
service; (c) nepotism and favouritism; (d) a lack of delegated authority by mid-level and local level public
officials; (e) a lack of public scrutiny of public administration; and (f ) a paucity of citizen demand for
improvements in public administration.
Given the pervasive politicisation of the bureaucracy, lack of political commitment from the party leadership
and increasing dissatisfaction of citizens that civil servants do not play a pro-service-delivery role (IGS
2007a), the CTG in 2008 undertook certain measures to address the lack of significant progress in
administrative governance which was exacerbated by the failure of successive political governments and
the civil service itself, to pursue the reform agenda.
The CTG felt strongly that the rigid, hierarchical bureaucratic form of civil service which has predominated
for the last few decades should be changed to a flexible, people and service oriented, market-responsive
one. This should not be seen as simply a matter of reform or minor change in management style, but a
change in the role of government in society as a whole, the relationship between government, civil service
and citizenry. It expressed its wish to take immediate measures for improving efficiency, accountability,
transparency and dynamism in all levels of civil service. It tried in earnest to restructure public institutions to
restore and sustain their images and effectiveness by bringing about fundamental qualitative changes and
also proposed necessary regulatory and legal reform measures. The proposed measures included, in
addition to public sector policy and structural changes, a strengthening of civil society, private sector and
other key governance participants.
Citizen's Charters were introduced into ministries and departments with a view to making civil servants truly
responsive to the needs and demands of the citizens, and to change their mind-sets in a way that they serve
citizens as citizens wish to be served rather than the way the civil servants want to serve them.
The Public Service Commission was restructured during May-July 2007 with a view to reducing political
interference at the recruitment phase. The number of PSC members was reduced from 11 to eight, while six
new members were appointed, including the Chairman. This initiative is expected to restore the credibility
of the Commission. The restructured Commission is expected to give force to reforms aiming at increasing
accountability, efficiency and transparency. The Public Service Commission Secretariat (Officers and Staff )
Recruitment Rules 2008 was promulgated on 22 June 2008. This intends to address the problems of
promotion and filling the vacant positions. The Rules however do not have any provision to enhance the
quality of human resources.
The new team in PSC has so far taken a number of initiatives to bring reform both within the PSC and in the
existing Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) examination system. The BCS (Age, Qualification and Examination for
Direct Recruitment) Rules 1982 has been amended. The examination policies and procedures have been
amended and streamlined. And in a hitherto unprecedented step, the Commission has also decided to form
expert viva boards comprising newspaper editors, bureaucrats, teachers of both public and private
universities and heads of corporate organisations. The most notable feature of the reform efforts initiated by
the PSC is that they have been initiated by the PSC, not the CTG. However, reform efforts undertaken so far
by the PSC have been viewed as bureaucrat-friendly and cast doubt as to whether they will bring any real
change to the existing bureaucratic structure.
CTG undertook an attempt to depoliticise bureaucracy although finally, it didn't see the light. It took an
attempt to modify the Public Servants (Retirement) Act 1974 through abolishing its article 2 of section 9,
which empowers the government to ask the officials to take retirement after the completion of 25 years of
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service without showing any reason. Despite accomplishing various legal steps to abolish this provision,
finally, CTG failed to formalise it. There is a real paradox with the situation regarding administrative reform in
Bangladesh. Despite widespread recognition that administrative reform is a priority task for the nation, such
reforms are not carried out in earnest. This Report recommends that the following measures may be
adopted to address the cumulative problems of poor administration in Bangladesh arising from
politicisation and inherent systemic weaknesses of the bureaucracy: (a) enactment of a comprehensive law
to streamline service conditions, recruitment, promotion and transfer of civil servants, taking into
consideration skill, capacity and merit, (b) enforcement of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules at all
levels and ensuring accountability, and (c) rightsizing the civil service (through attrition) and providing
adequate salary/benefits.
From the developments of 2008, it is obvious that administrative reform in Bangladesh must be carried out
under the democratic conditions of competitive politics. Proposing reform measures is not enough. It is
necessary to mobilise popular support for the proposed reform, so that the reform does not hurt electoral
prospects of the party in power. Alternatively, consensus has to be built around the proposed reform
amongst the polity. However, given the nature of Bangladesh politics, consensus building is not an easy task.
Yet it can be argued that in order to carry out reform measures, a strong political will is a critical factor. In
order to effectively carry out administrative reforms, the political government will need a well-articulated
strategy. This change management strategy needs to build on a political process that will legitimise first a
desired change among the stakeholders and then to build a supportive constituency - a political will to
implement.
The CTG was very much aware of the need to address the issue of strengthening local government. The CTG
promulgated the Local Government Commission Ordinance, 2008 on 13 May 2008. According to the
Ordinance, the Local Government Commission will be an advisory body comprising of a chairman and two
members. The Commission was expected to, among others, make recommendations to the local
government division on financial self-sufficiency, administrative efficiency, service and manpower structure
of the Local Government Institutions (LGIs), on taxes, fees and tolls that LGIs can impose on the public, to
monitor financial and administrative activities of the LGIs, and to ensure timely financial audit of LGIs. The
Commission was also charged with recommending to the government on fiscal transfer and to periodically
review laws and rules and circulars about local government and recommend necessary modifications to the
government.
In an attempt to reduce the control of central government over LGIs, the independent LGC was given special
authority. Provisions for consultation with the LGC by the Ministry of LGRD was made before issuing any
instruction or before formulating rules regarding functions of LGIs, removal of a mayor or a councilor, for
establishing new city corporations or municipalities, and for demarcating the jurisdictions of the existing
ones. These would prevent central government from slapping numerous unwarranted restrictions on local
government administrations by issuing frequent orders and directives and also limit the control of the
former over the latter.
CTG also undertook an attempt to depoliticise local government by introducing an electoral reform to
remove political identity of the local leaders. The reform required that the persons having political affiliation
elected to a local body, will have to resign from the party posts after the election. Accordingly, after the city
3
2.6.2 Local Government Reforms
3 Daily Jugantar, 'Sarkari Karmakartader aar baddhyo tamulok oboshor deya hobena (Government officials will no more be given force
retirement), 26 Nov, 2008.
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corporation elections held in 2008 although the elected mayors resigned from their party posts but the
political parties didn't accept their resignation that time and after the take over of power by the political
government the provision has been repealed. The CTG also sought to withdraw the control of local MPs
over UZPs by repealing the provision for seeking their advice (by UZP) before undertaking any activity.
Establishing an effective local government for better public service delivery, local development planning
and accountability should be a top priority for any political government. In this regard, this Report makes
the following recommendations with a view to preventing partisan capture of LGIs and for an optimally
functioning local government: (a) there should be a need-based manpower structure under a formal service
structure for local government, (b) there should be a properly functioning local government commission to
monitor performance of LGIs and mediate between central and local government, (c) measures should be
adopted to improve capacity of the local government to deliver services in an inclusive, participative,
accountable and transparent manner, and (d) policy reforms should be introduced which address pro-poor
issues and create favourable conditions for broad participation of different stakeholders. Finally, the political
leadership must be able to realise the actual problems of the local government, and undertake reform
measures to establish a strong, democratic and functional local government.
Political parties in Bangladesh have not undergone any change for a long time, providing a serious
constraint to the efficient working of government. Political parties have not addressed the deficiencies in
their respective intra-party democracy and accountability. During the last fifteen years no reform took place
in major political parties. Parties ran as per the directives of the top leaders. The only legal provision for
political parties in their electoral role was the Representation of the People Order (RPO) 1972, although it did
not contain any provision for registration of political parties. Representation of the People (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2001 introduced a provision for the registration of political parties with the EC. However in the
face of serious objection raised by the main parties against this provision, the government made the
requirement optional. The RPO also initially empowered the EC to cancel the candidatures for gross violation
of electoral laws and misconduct by candidates. But the move to this end fell flat in the face of strong
opposition from political parties.
Internal reform of the parties had been given priority by the Fakhruddin-led CTG. It considered the
'irresponsible' behaviour of the dominant political forces as the root of political violence and adopted
several measures to reform the 'political' sector, particularly the political parties to make them 'more'
responsible and responsive to public needs and priorities. It is obvious that if democracy cannot be
practiced within the parties themselves, then it remains doubtful that they will be able to dispense
democratic principles if and when they are elected to government.
The CTG considered the lack of democratisation in different parties as the root of political violence and
found the top leaders of the AL and BNP as the main obstacle to party reform. As a first step toward what
can be called cleansing politics, the CTG sought to force the two leaders to go into political exile, failing
which it interned them and tried to undertake reforms keeping them in jail. It used a carrot and stick policy
to reform the parties. Those who agreed to work as protagonists of reform were spared of being sent to jail,
while the party loyalists (anti-reformists) were charged with corruption and, in many cases, harassed. Some
mid-ranking and senior leaders of the two main parties responded to this government policy, demanding
that party leaders at different levels be chosen in a democratic manner and not by the whim of the party
President. Some of them openly criticised their party chiefs for behaving in an autocratic manner. They
alleged that the party leaders did not hold elections to different party forums mainly to retain their
2.6.3 Political Party Reforms: Unwillingness All Around
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leadership positions. An important proposal that the reformists in both BNP and AL advanced was to adopt
measures to limit the discretionary power of the party chief.
The CTG amended the Representation of People Order (RPO), 1972 in accordance with suggestions made by
the EC to provide measures to make the elections free, fair and credible. A series of regulations were
proposed by the CTG to make registration of political parties with the EC mandatory - as reflected in the
amended RPO - in a bid to ensure financial transparency and accountability of the major parties. In order to
qualify for registration, a party was required, among others, to severe relations with their front organisations
and dissolve overseas party units, to allow grassroots party units to have a say in the nomination of
parliamentary candidates, to hold party elections on a regular basis and to allow women to fill one-third of
party positions at different levels. The amended RPO also required candidates to provide information on a
number of personal matters such as educational qualification, profession, criminal record (if any), sources of
income, and loan received from any bank. A provision was also introduced in the RPO for holding re-election
in a constituency if half of the voters cast 'no' votes, implying that no candidate is eligible to get elected. The
amended RPO also empowered the BEC to cancel the candidature of any candidate at any time, even after
s/he is elected, for certain irregularities. It disqualified those resigning and/or retiring from the service of the
republic or of any statutory authority or of the defence service unless a period of three years has elapsed
since the date of their resignation or retirement. In the event of removal or dismissal or compulsory
retirement, a civil or military bureaucrat would have to wait for five years since the termination of job to
contest the polls. The amended law also disqualified loan and utility bill defaulters from contesting the
elections. The proposed reforms tried to ensure that the internal organisation of parties conform to
democratic norms and practices.
Many of these reforms were long overdue but could not be introduced because of the resistance of the
mainstream parties. The main parties remained seriously opposed to many reforms proposed in the
amended RPO. But the Fakhruddin-led CTG proposed reforms brought the political parties on the verge of
initiating major changes in their party constitutions in order to make themselves more 'democratic'. The
parties contesting the ninth parliamentary elections held on 29 December 2008 generally followed the rules
made by the BEC in accordance with the provisions of the amended RPO. The new provisions were made to
make the parties rule-bound. Although it is unlikely that there will be any change in the top leadership of
any of the major parties as the reform efforts paradoxically made the two leaders stronger than before,
neither is it expected that parties will be able to remain unreformed for a long time. The exigencies of
circumstance will encourage the parties to reform themselves in the future.
The concentration of political power in the two major parties has helped to form governments with large
stable majorities, but this has also resulted in a system in which winners in elections take all and the losers
have difficulty in reconciling themselves to their loss. The result is a dysfunctional Parliament and highly
confrontational politics. There is little democratic practice within the major parties, which are run by
authoritarian control from the top; this is a reflection of the personalised and patron-client relationships
pervading the Bangladeshi society at large. The above structure of governance provides an ideal breeding
ground for corruption through the exercise of large discretionary powers with little accountability. Spoils
and privileges are parcelled out to different clientele groups as an essential tool of political management. On
top of this, a large part of the bureaucracy is seen to be corrupt and incompetent, which further feeds this
vicious cycle of poor governance. Economic liberalisation has no doubt contributed to reducing the scope of
rent-seeking, such as from the import licensing system, but this has been increasingly replaced by other
2.7 Conclusion: Towards Responsible Party Politics in Bangladesh
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means of patronage politics. The overall evidence suggests that if there is a demand in the political system
for illegal incomes and rent-seeking, economic reforms alone will not be the remedy.
The Report identifies three main findings about the causes of poor political governance in Bangladesh: (a)
the design of the state and its institutions, (b) the clientelist nature of politics fuelled by greed and (c) the
nature of confrontational politics. IGS has consistently argued that these are the sources of Bangladesh's
problems and the challenges to overcome.
Confrontational politics leading to unhealthy political competition drives the ruling party towards
monopolisation of state resources on the one hand, and on the other, it leads the opposition towards
mobilisation politics. The ruling party seeks to gain more power and more resources, cutting the opposition
out completely. All key state institutions are brought under their sway for regime maintenance and to create
a beneficiary group through the distribution of favour (from state resources). Bureaucracy becomes the first
victim of such political control. Politicisation breaks its chain of command, hierarchy and weakens the formal
accountability mechanisms. Local government institutions are similarly monopolised through intimidation,
influence over the local election, partisan control of funds etc. The Report has identified a number of reasons
for such monopoly of which lack of internal party democracy appears to be dominant. Political parties are
highly autocratic in decision making, in managing financial resources and consequently, no accountability
mechanism works. These arbitrary, autocratic attitudes of the party leaders are reflected while ruling the
country.
The Report has noted earlier that several factors - structural, behavioural and political - account for the
deviant behaviour of political parties and politicians. In exploring the best way to overcome the
dysfunctional consequences of the 'winner takes all' system that has evolved in Bangladesh, the Report sees
the urgent need for measures to hold those exercising political power accountable. As described in detail in
this Chapter and in other Chapters, traditional mechanisms of ensuring accountability do not seem to work
properly due to the absence of an 'enabling environment'. The Report views the following as essential
elements required to break the vicious cycle and bring about qualitative changes in the electoral system:
balance in Parliament-Executive relations, strengthening/promoting intra-party accountability,
democratisation of local government and making local elections non-partisan, professionalisation of the
bureaucracy, and depoliticisation. Deregulation of state functions would make the state 'pie' smaller which
in turn would reduce competition and at the same time, improve efficiency of services. Efficiency can also be
improved through downsizing the government and depoliticisation of the bureaucracy by making
appointments, promotions and transfers in a uniform and transparent manner under definite rules and
regulations. And finally, a stronger media and civil society are needed to play both a vigilant watchdog role
and also to raise awareness amongst masses and create public opinion against confrontational politics and
the high costs of unhealthy political competition.
Since the return to democracy in 1991, democratic practices in Bangladesh have been largely limited to the
holding of regular elections. Despite regular elections, a largely independent media and civil society,
democracy in Bangladesh is still shallow. A centralised, winner-takes-all political system has developed.
Politics has become increasingly violent, polarised and punctuated by protests and boycotts of Parliament.
Elections are increasingly influenced by political control, vote buying, violence and intimidation. The
people's disillusionment with this system of 'Two Party' politics is growing daily. The Fakhruddin-led CTG
focused on reforms of the key institutions of accountability, but also restricted political freedoms. Reforms
have been successful in some areas, but there remain key areas where governance is weak, with serious
implications for poverty reduction in this fragile state. Future reform will depend on the political will of the
elected government to respect the independence of key democratic institutions. The main challenge, for
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government and civil society, and the core issue for state capability-accountability-responsiveness, is the
need to create a political system that delivers development for all people.
Developments of recent months clearly demonstrate that reforms need to be achieved through a political
process, not a bureaucratic one. Furthermore, reforms need to focus on systems as well as individuals, and
need to be sustained through continuous political mobilisation of support. Although civil society and media
will advocate and mobilise support for the reforms, the political parties will have to take leadership of the
reform agenda. Political parties need to be responsive to the demands for political reforms, develop the
understanding about the necessity of reforms, and need to make a commitment to carry the reform agenda
forward. Reforms under a political government should focus on bringing about sustainable systemic
changes through a process in which players both within and outside the government play constructive and
complementary roles. The agenda of political reforms should therefore be taken up by political parties, civil
society, and media with the ultimate goal of ameliorating the dysfunctional political system.
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
3.1 Introduction
The Parliament is the supreme law-making and oversight institution in Bangladesh. The country's experience
and experiment with the institution of Parliament dates back to the 19 century when the Legislative
Council of Bengal was established in 1861. Later, the Government of India Act, 1935 declared the beginning
of a representative government in Bengal (Ahmed 2001). Despite an early introduction, the practice of this
particular form of government has had to face a number of obstacles during both the British and the
Pakistan periods (Ahmed 2001; Chowdhury 2000).
After achieving independence in 1971, Bangladesh opted for a parliamentary democracy. The framers of the
1972 Constitution followed the Indian parliamentary system (Jahan 1987) and attempted to create a balance
between the two distinctive roles of the Parliament: and . The
expectations of the Constitution framers were threefold. First, Parliament would be the supreme body to
discuss, analyse and if need be, modify issues of national concern; second, Parliament would make laws to
meet the demand of the day; and third, Parliament would be the place where political commitment for the
greater good would be established. However, in contemporary Bangladesh, despite its constitutional
position, the Parliament has become merely the 'law approving body'. The initial attempt of the framers of
the 1972 Constitution to provide adequate checks on the Executive through the legislative institution was
marred due to the political turmoil, amendments to the Constitution, and changes in political dimension
and actors. Consequently, the Parliament has turned into an institution which has failed to hold the
Executive accountable and play the 'consensus-building' role.
Since early 1991, some reforms have been brought into the formal arrangements of the Parliament in
general and into the committee system in particular. These include broadening the jurisdictions of standing
committees to deal with legislation and oversight simultaneously, replacing ministers by backbenchers as
committee chairs, establishing an independent parliamentary secretariat and an Institute of Parliamentary
Studies (IPS) for research support, introducing the Prime Minister's Question Hour, and broadcasting the
proceedings of the Parliament on the national TV and radio.
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Parliamentary Accountability
However, despite these efforts to make the Parliament an effective institution of accountability, due to long
boycotts of the Parliament by the opposition, the refusal of the ruling party to give enough opportunity to
the opposition to criticise the government and the inadequacies of the parliamentary committees
transformed the Parliament into a rubber stamp institution (TIB 2007). Thus, for a period of 15 years and
through the reign of three elected governments, the nation witnessed an all-powerful Prime Minister, an
unaccountable Executive, and a mostly dysfunctional Parliament.
Against this backdrop, the prime objective of this Chapter is to make a critical review of the performance of
contemporary Parliaments in Bangladesh in performing their key functions in general and the role of
parliamentary sessions and committees in holding the government accountable in particular. Section 3.2
briefly discusses public accountability of Parliament. Section 3.3 examines the formal rules of parliamentary
accountability. Section 3.4 critically analyses the outcomes of the different constitutional provisions and
rules on the effectiveness of parliamentary accountability. Section 3.5 looks at the failure of formal rules in
ensuring effective parliamentary accountability and section 3.6 explores new rules of the game. The Chapter
concludes in section 3.7. Through an analysis of the formal rules and identification of the informal norms, the
Chapter makes an effort to explore how the combination of these two has generated an entirely new rule of
the game which governs the activities of the Members of Parliament (MPs) both in the plenary session and
standing committees of the Parliament. This new rule of the game, in fact, determines the effectiveness of
the institution in holding the Executive accountable. The Chapter draws largely on the available secondary
literature on parliament and governance. However, qualitative data derived from open-ended interviews
with MPs of the Seventh and Eighth Parliament has been used to supplement secondary reviews and
materials.
Public accountability generally refers to the obligation to account for performance and to accept oversight
and direction on the part of the Executive, which in turn, ensures the monitoring and controlling of
government conduct and preventing Executive abuses (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000). In Westminster
system, the chain of ministerial responsibility through the departmental hierarchy to ministers, Parliament
and ultimately the voters remains the central avenue of accountability (Mulgan 2008). This is how
government is accountable to the Parliament between elections and to the people at elections (Aldons
2001). In fact, accountability is seen as a two-way traffic suggesting that in addition to bureaucracies being
held accountable by the elected officials, those same elected officials also should be held accountable for
their direction of the bureaucracy (Wood and Walterman 1994; Mulgan 2000; Pyper 1996).
The whole notion of parliamentary accountability revolves around the concept of checks on the Executive.
Various means are used to this end, including the authorisation of the budget, the scrutiny of government
expenditure and the questioning of the government in the Parliament to account for its actions. One
channel of ensuring such parliamentary accountability is the mechanism of ministerial responsibility where
ministers answer questions in the plenary sessions of the Parliament. Another channel is the functioning of
the parliamentary committees which aim to undertake detailed scrutiny of government financial estimates
and reports and direct questioning of government officials (Nethercote 1982; Reid and Forrest 1989; Uhr
1998).
3.2 Public Accountability and Parliament
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3.3 Formal Rules of Parliamentary Accountability
3.3.1 Constitutional Provisions
The current parliamentary form of government of Bangladesh is entrenched in the 1972 Constitution.
Provisions were incorporated in the Constitution with the aim of making the institution completely
sovereign. However, the 1972 Constitution provided an option, which reflected the mistrust existing in the
political arena (Khan 1997). Article 70 stipulated that a Member of the Parliament would vacate his seat if he
voted against the party that nominated him (GoB 1972; Chowdhury 2000; Khan 1997; Jahan 1987).
It is ironic that the very political party which attempted to establish the Parliament as the supreme law
making body in the aftermath of the War of Independence, later took steps to curb its authority with the
introduction and passage of the 4 amendment of the Constitution Bill on January 25, 1975 which
overnight transformed the parliamentary system into a one party monolith (Khan 2006). The Parliament
became quite ineffective and turned into an acquiescent tool in the hand of the President. All Executive,
Legislative and Judicial powers were given to the President and he himself virtually the state.
However, while poised on the brink of this 'New Beginning', the government was overthrown by a military
coup. From then on until 1990, Bangladesh went through an autocratic era in the form of a semi-
parliamentary package. Certain amendments were made in the Constitution which had considerable impact
on Parliament's effectiveness:
Some of the discretionary powers granted to the President through the 4 amendment were
withdrawn by the 5 amendment and the one-party system was scrapped.
Supremacy of the Executive over the Legislative was ensured through a number of articles.
The Parliament was exploited as an institution to legitimise the activities of the military governments.
The 5 and 7 amendments were made to ratify all actions taken during the period when the
provisions under the Constitution were suspended.
During this period, the Parliament had hand-picked 'lame and tame' legislators and the institution
became a 'rubber stamp' one (Chowdhury 2000; Khan 2006).
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1 Some important provisions made for the Parliament in 1972 Constitution are:
According to Article 55 (3),  the cabinet was held collectively responsible to the Parliament
Article 65 specified that all legislative power should be vested with the Parliament known as 'Jatiya Sangsad'
Article 72 specified that 'a period exceeding sixty days shall not intervene between the end of one session and the firs sitting
of Parliament in the next session'
Article 80 and 82 of the Constitution laid the basic provisions to be followed in case of passing and enacting bills
Article 76(1) created the provision for the Parliament to have parliamentary committees
Article 77 stipulated that Parliament might have an office of ombudsman to ensure accountability of the Executive
Article 79 provided for the establishment of a Parliamentary secretariat for the efficient working of the Parliament
Article 93 specified, “At any time when the Parliament is not in session', the President might make and promulgate
ordinances which would have 'the like force of law as an Act of Parliament'
2 Article 92A curtailed legislature's authority over money matters and the President was allowed to spend public money from
consolidated fund
Article 145A curtailed Parliament's authority over foreign affairs as all international treaties were submitted to the President
and he had the authority not to lay any treaty if he thought that against national interest
The provision of cabinet's responsibility to Parliament was withdrawn and in reality, the cabinet's accountability lies to the
President.
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The restoration of democracy in 1991 brought back the parliamentary form of government to Bangladesh.
The 12 amendment reintroduced the concept of a sovereign Parliament. It also brought about the
following changes in the Constitution:
Reinstalling the rule making power of the Parliament
Reducing time gap between two sessions of the Parliament
Forming standing committees
Establishing a Parliamentary Secretariat (Khan and Husain 1996; Khan 2006; Ahmed 2001)
However, several provisions in the Constitution continued to affect the optimum functioning of the
Parliament. These are:
The continuation of Article 70
The continuation of Article 76(1) in its modified form (TIB 2006)
Continuation of President's ordinance to sidestep the Parliament (Khan 2006; Hasanuzzaman 1998)
Inadequate role of Select Committee in case of scrutinizing bills (Ahmed 2001)
When the Constitution was framed in 1972, the politicians were willing to establish an effective
parliamentary system, which would ensure both the collective responsibility of the cabinet and individual
responsibility of the ministers. In line with this vision, the Rules of Procedures provided a detailed guideline
to make the accountability mechanisms effective. However, the political changes during the period of 1975-
1990 led to numerous amendments of the Constitution in such a way that the Parliament failed to fulfil this
vision. After the 12 amendment, although the notion of parliamentary democracy was re-introduced, the
presence of aforementioned controversial articles in the Constitution allowed doubt to remain whether the
Parliament in practice will be effective.
In the ideal Westminster parliamentary system, the Parliament oversees and acts as an effective check on the
Executive by questioning ministers, exposing matters which affect public perception of the government,
and questioning and amending bills sponsored by the government. MPs and their staff examine proposed
bills, formulate opinions based on their policy preferences, and express these views through floor debates,
committee discussions, motions and voting. They make use of oversight mechanisms such as
to hold ministers and ministries accountable. Under this system, the ruling party
also communicates and explains its actions both directly and indirectly to the Parliament.
Formally, there are many opportunities for MPs in Bangladesh to question ministers or the government as a
whole during the plenary sessions. MPs may direct questions to ministers under the procedure laid out in
Rules 41-58 of the Parliament Rules of Procedure, or under Rule 59 for short notice questions (questions
raised with notice shorter than 15 days). MPs may request discussions, either for half-hour discussion (Rule
60), adjournment on a matter of public importance (Rules 61-7), or discussion on matters of urgent public
importance for short duration (Rules 68-70). An MP may make statements on matters of public importance,
which then force the concerned ministers to respond and may result in the matter being referred to the
concerned Standing Committee (Rule 71). As the ultimate sign of disapproval, MPs may also raise motions
of no-confidence in ministers (Rule 159).
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3.3.2 Plenary and Parliamentary Committees in Bangladesh
Plenary
Prime
Minister's Question Time
3 According to 1972's constitution, this article stated, “At its First meeting in each session, Parliament shall appoint from among its
members the following standing committees…” the 4 amendment deleted the first part, i.e., “At its First meeting in each session”.
When the 12 amendment was passed it remained in the same format thus made the Parliament to wait for a long period before
having any standing committee.
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MPs also have many opportunities to scrutinise and amend bills at every stage in the process. When the bill
is first moved, MPs can participate in discussion over the principles of the bill under Rule 78. If the bill is
referred to a Standing Committee or Select Committee under Rule 77, then MPs may discuss the bills in
those committees and document their opinions in the reports of those committees (Rule 209). After the
report of the Committee is submitted, MPs once again have an opportunity to discuss the substance of the
report (Rule 81). Once a bill is taken under consideration, MPs may move amendments (Rules 82-7). When a
motion that a bill be passed is under consideration, MPs may make statements either supporting or
rejecting the bill (rule 91). Finally, as a last resort, MPs may vote against the bill (Rule 90). Aside from bills,
MPs may also discuss the budget (Rule 115). MPs also have many opportunities to state their own opinions
or advance their own policy proposals. They may submit private members' bills under Rules 72-4. They may
also move resolutions, declaring an opinion or recommendation, under Rules 130-145.
Due to the ever widening scope of jurisdictions and complex nature of activities, it becomes difficult to
ensure the accountability of the government only through plenary sessions. Parliamentary standing
committees are thus considered one of the most significant internal organisational features of modern
parliaments (Mattson and Strøm 1995). Like other legislative areas, a legislative committee is designed to
promote majority rule and at the same time protect minority rights. In this way, committees are microcosms
of the larger assembly (Ibid). Most committees are also vehicles for specialisation that essentially meet the
professionalism and expertise critical for the legislative phase of policy making process involving complex
policy issues. Detailed scrutiny of government activities only occurs at committee level. Public officials
attend hearings and answer questions about their performances and policy intentions in front of
committees. Committees also ensure government accountability through inquires, investigation and
financial reviews. All committee devices are ultimately geared towards securing government accountability.
Article 76 of the Bangladesh Constitution has created a provision for the Parliament to have a number of
standing committees. According to this Article, the Parliament has to set up a Public Accounts Committee
(PAC), a Privilege Committee and also as many standing committees as the Parliament deems necessary.
Clause 2 of the same article stipulates the functions and limits of authority of the other committees.
The Rule of Procedure of the Parliament (rules 187- 266) further specifies the nature, functions and role of
the committees. In general, the committees can be categorised in three groups: , i.e.
committees usually appointed by the House/the Speaker for the full term of the Parliament;
, i.e. committees established to examine bills referred to it and report to the Parliament,
although it ceases to exist as soon as it submits a report to the House; , i.e. committees to
meet the demand of emergency situations. The standing committees can further be divided into various
types. For instance, in the Eighth Parliament, there were 48 standing committees. The committees
Parliamentary committees
4
5
Standing committees
Select
Committees on Bill
Special Committees
ad hoc
4 As per Clause 2, these committees are authorized to-
- to examine draft bills and other legislative proposals
- to propose measures of enforcing of laws and to review the enforcement
- to investigate any matter of public importance as referred to it by the Parliament
- to furnish through an authorized representative, relevant information and to answer questions, orally or in writing
- to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents (GoB 2000)
5 Of them, 37 were of different ministries, the other 11 standing committees were- 1 Business Advisory Committee, 1 House
Committee, 1 Committee on Rules of Procedure, 1 Library Committee, 1 Public Accounts Committee, 1 Public Undertakings
Committee, 1 Committee on Estimates, 1 Petition Committee, 1 Committee on Government Assurances, 1 Committee on Private
Members' Bills and Resolutions and 1 Committee on Privileges.
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are basically formed according to the necessity of the Parliament (www.parliamentofbangladesh.org;
Ahmed 2001; Ahmed 2006).
Most standing committees have 10 members, however, the Business Advisory Committee (BAC) and the
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) have 15 each and the Rules Committee and the House Committee have 12
members each. The Library committee has eight members in total.
The Rules of Procedure of the Parliament do not specify the appointment procedure of the committee
members. Conventionally, the members of the committee are appointed by the Parliament on a motion
moved either by the Leader of the House himself/herself or by any other parliamentary leader on his/her
behalf. Generally, the members of the committees are selected by the Party Heads and a minister works as
an ex-officio member of a ministerial committee. Even if the minister is not a member of the Parliament, s/he
can still attend the meetings and participate in the proceedings but does not have the right to vote.
Members in each committee are selected based on proportional representation of the parties in the House.
The same convention however does not apply to distribution of committee chair positions, who are
by the Parliament. Since the Seventh Parliament, a minister cannot be the chair of any
parliamentary committee. In all previous parliaments, all the committee chair positions were held by the
ruling party/alliance (Ahmed 2001; TIB 2006). In the Ninth Parliament, chairs of two standing committees on
Ministries (Ministry of Environment and Fisheries) have been given to the opposition. Even though the
theory of proportional representation has not been followed in this regard, this is an improvement over the
system of the past. Unlike other democracies (including India and Sri Lanka), the powerful PAC in
Bangladesh is still headed by a treasury bench MP. The Secretary of the Parliament is the ex-officio secretary
of all committees and sub-committees authorise any officer of the secretariat to act in his/her (the
Secretary's) stead.
The meetings of the committee are held in private in Bangladesh. The deliberation of the meeting is, as per
the rules, confined exclusively to committee members and officers of the Parliament Secretariat. However, in
the meetings of ministerial and financial committees, officials including the secretary of concerned
ministries and relevant public bodies remain present to clarify, explain and account for specific issues.
Evidence, oral or written reports, and proceedings of the committees remain confidential until it is placed to
the House. The committee enjoys the authority to summon government officials for hearings or other
purposes. Ministers also can be requested to attend and usually they acquiesce with such requests.
However, if someone fails to comply with the directives/requests without prior notice and reasonable
explanation, s/he can be charged with contempt of Parliament and hence be liable for prosecution. But
government may decline to produce a document on the ground that its disclosure would be prejudicial to
the interest or security of the state. The quorum to hold the sitting of a committee is as near as one-third of
the total members of the committee. The final decision regarding any issue in the committee is determined
by simple majority of votes of the members present and voting.
Appointment of committee members
Chair and staff of committees
Committee meetings
nominated
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The Parliamentary Select Committee has restricted power regarding the scrutiny of a bill. The committee
members can make amendments to a bill but its acceptance or rejection is solely contingent upon the
House where the ruling party is the majority (IPU 1986). In a committee, the bills are decided by majority
votes. If any member does not agree with the decision of the majority members of the committee s/he may
record a note of dissent that is included in a single minute. Before 1996, bills were seldom sent to the
committee after its first reading in the House. “The opposition members routinely demanded the referral of
bills to either select or standing committees, although without much success” (Ahmed 2003). Since the
Seventh Parliament, most of the bills were sent to the committee for consideration but no major changes
were made.
In the absence of any precise provisions in the rules, a committee is not obliged to report to the House on
matters other than those referred to it by the House. According to the Rules of Procedure, if the House does
not set any specific time limit for the presentation of the report by the committee, the committee is
supposed to present the same within one month of which reference to the committee was made. However,
the House can extend the time period for the submission of the report by bringing a motion. Hence,
submission of reports to the House has, in practice, become irregular and largely optional. There remains
virtually no provisions for deliberation over the reports after its submission to the House.
The features of Parliamentary committee system in Bangladesh are prominently modelled on the British
Westminster system. They are permanent, decide on majority approach, meet in private, and ask for papers,
persons and documents with the exception that the incumbent government may decline to provide
documents where state security may be threatened. Furthermore they consider legislative bills referred by
the House and do not have any role in budget allocation and demands for grants. The institutional
arrangements of the committee system in Bangladesh places the government (the majority party) in a
vantage position to be the ultimate arbiter on any issue. Thus, it can be surmised that institutionally
Bangladesh has a weak committee system with marginal scope in ensuring bureaucratic accountability.
The consequences of all these rules discussed above are related to the issue of overall parliamentary
accountability. This section critically analyses the outcomes of the different constitutional provisions and
rules on the effectiveness of parliamentary accountability.
3.4 The Outcome
3.4.1 Executive Dominance over the Legislature in Plenary
The overall impact of all the aforesaid provisions is the continuity of Executive dominance which started in
1975 through the 4 amendment of the Constitution. The Rules of Business has allowed the Executive to
have almost complete control over the law making procedure and policy decisions (GoB 1996). At the initial
stage, laws are prepared, processed and drafted by the Executive branch, legislative initiatives are taken by
the cabinet and arrangements for a bill-to-be-drafted are undertaken by the drafting section of the Ministry
of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. The draft bill is then placed before the Parliament (Murphy 2006).
The draft bill is supposed to be scrutinised by the Select Committee and face debate and possible
amendments at the Plenary, except for the Fifth Parliament (with a relatively proactive opposition) and
Seventh Parliament (with a relatively active Select Committee), bills are passed immediately. Eventually, due
to Article 70, the members of the ruling party cannot vote against the bill.
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Box 3.1 Misuse of Article 93 (1) to bypass the Parliament
According to Article 93 (1), “At any time when Parliament stands dissolved or is not in session, if the President
is satisfied that circumstances exist which render immediate action necessary, he may make and promulgate
such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require, and any Ordinance so made shall, as from its
promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act of Parliament”. This allows the President to have ordinance
making power and although there is no doubt this is essential for the effective functioning of the
government, this provision has often been abused by the party in power to bypass the Parliament. In the
Fifth Parliament 40 percent of the laws were passed in this manner. The problem with these ordinances arise
from the fact that once they are promulgated, the government does not deem it necessary to discuss the
content of the laws and they are simply placed before the Parliament for necessary validation. In case of
these bills, the tendency to rush them in a hurry, short-circuiting the rules, have also been noticed. In the
Seventh Parliament 16 bills were placed in this manner and all these bills were hastily passed. Due to the
anti-defection law (Article 70), the government parliamentarians have no option but to support the bills.
Very often, when ordinance-turned-into-bills are placed before the Parliament; they are not put under
scrutiny of the parliamentary standing committees. One example was the passing of the Anti-Terrorist Bill
by the Fifth Parliament. This Bill was passed while under the scrutiny and consideration of a special
parliamentary committee. Although Article 76 (2) (a) states that it is the duty of the standing committee to
examine the draft bills and other legislative proposals, in case of these bills, the constitutional provisions are
not properly followed.
Source: Khan 2006; Hasanuzzaman 1998
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Because of the process mentioned above, the Executive often tends to control the legislative agenda. We
have seen a reflection of this during the tenure of the last three elected governments, whence the Prime
Minister, the cabinet and the bureaucracy initiated a large number of bills (Murphy 2006; Khan 2006;
Hasanuzzaman 1998). Up to the Fifth Parliament, the bills placed before the Parliament were not referred to
the standing committee (with the Second Parliament being an exception which sent half of the bills to
committees). Even though the situation changed in the Seventh Parliament (Ahmed 2001), it failed to create
substantial impact. Besides, according to Article 76 (2) (a), only draft bills should be referred to the standing
committee. There were opinions among the opposition MPs during the tenure of the Fifth Parliament that
“…the practice of introducing bills in the legislature before the examination of committees could not be
accepted as a proper method” (Hasanuzzaman 1998). However, it is important to mention that examining
bills by the committee before introducing it at the Plenary is contrary to the Commonwealth Parliamentary
norms.
The insignificant number of passing of Private Members Bill is yet another indication of Executive
dominance. In the last three Parliaments, only two Private Members Bills were accepted (Bangladesh Jatiya
Sangsad 2006). More interestingly, during the tenure of the last Parliament, the Government decided to
impose a restriction on the ruling BNP lawmakers, asking them to take permission from the Leader of the
House or the party's parliamentary wing before placing a Private Member's Bill in the Parliament. These
practices further strengthened Executive dominance.
Moreover, both the Fifth and Seventh Parliaments have seen a number of bills to be passed as President's
Ordinance, which has allowed little scope for the parliamentarians to play a role. For instance, out of the first
94 bills accepted by the Fifth Parliament, only four were placed in the bill format and the rest were first
promulgated as President's Ordinance and later simply raised in the Parliament for necessary approval
(Hasanuzzaman 1998).
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Executive dominance is closely related to the power and position of the Chief Executive, i.e., the Prime
Minister. In reality, the transfer from presidential to parliamentary form of government has to a large extent
merely meant the transfer of the absolute authority from the President to the Prime Minister. The 12
amendment of the Constitution, despite restoring parliamentary democracy, has been severely criticised as
it allowed “incomplete adjustment from a presidential to a parliamentary system” (WB 1996). The position of
the Prime Minister since restoration of democracy has become extremely powerful. One scholar has noted,
“concentration of enormous power in the hands of the Prime Minister has made it difficult for the legislature
to keep vigil on the government” (Khan 2006). Parliamentary accountability mechanisms have also failed to
work properly. It has been further noted that major policy decisions are taken not only outside of the
Parliament but also that these are rarely discussed in the Parliament.
An effective Parliament is a necessary precondition for checking Executive dominance, maintaining regime
continuation, building up the consensus among political parties and so on. Executive dominance has
persisted in Bangladesh through both formal and informal means - resulting in unproductive parliaments
with detrimental consequences for the country. First, it resulted in a 'parliamentary autocracy' where ruling
parties did not take into account the contribution of the opposition. Second, lack of control on Executive
function turned the role of the legislators undemocratic. Third, as policy decisions were taken by the cabinet
and only passed as law by the Parliament, the politicians failed to interpret the law properly. Fourth, this
Executive dominance culminated in deep political tension where the opposition clearly displayed their
inertia in joining parliamentary sessions, thus giving rise to confrontational politics. Finally, an ineffective
Parliament has allowed the donors to exert undue influence on the policy decisions of the government.
Article 55 (3) of the Constitution states that, “the Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to the Parliament”
(GoB 2000). Besides, the Rules of Procedures have also prescribed the measure to ensure individual
responsibility of ministers through questions, call-attention motions, half-hour discussions, adjourned
motions, the formation of standing committees etc. (www.parliamentofbangladesh.org).
This collective responsibility can best be defined as, “…its (the cabinet's) duty to submit its policy to and
defend its policy before the House…and to resign if defeated on issue of confidence” (Marshall and Modie
1971). In Bangladesh, because of Executive dominance over the parliamentary process, the government has
hardly had to defend its policies in front of a functioning Parliament. However, there are glimmers of hope in
case of ensuring accountability of the Cabinet. It has been observed that it is possible to build up an
effective coalition between the government backbenchers and the opposition that can largely influence the
government's policy decisions. The Fifth Parliament is an example of such a coalition.
th
3.4.2 Collective and Individual Responsibility: Constitutional and other Provision and the Real
Picture
Box 3.2   Coalition between ruling party back-benchers and opposition
The Fifth Parliament is a brilliant example of backbencher-opposition coalition. During this period, the
Parliament saw a highly active opposition which even raised a motion of no confidence against the
government, the only one in the history of Bangladesh. Quite curiously, this opposition succeeded in
building a partnership with the government backbenchers and was able to exert considerable influence on
policy decisions. During this period, the country saw a parliament where the government and the
opposition jointly elected a person as Deputy Speaker. Besides, it was the opposition's enthusiasm that
actually forced the government to embrace the parliamentary form of government.
Source: Hasanuzzaman 1998
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The mechanisms to ensure individual accountability of the ministers are also not beyond controversy. In
general the MPs, by asking questions, seek information from the minister on various issues. However, these
questions often overlook critical dimensions of the existing administrative system and are merely
'informative and explanatory' (Aminuzzaman 1996). Moreover, the MPs seldom ask any questions related to
“critical issues and problems that affect public life” (Rahman 2007).
Motions are a significant instrument of accountability which draw attention to administrative failures or
policy lapses but in practice, discussion on motions (e.g. call attention motion, short discussion) has
remained insignificant and marginal. In fact, no adjournment motions were accepted and no half-hour
discussions took place in the Seventh and Eighth Parliaments, which "indicates a real failure in the methods”
(Rahman 2007). However, the ineffectiveness of motions is mainly due to problems related to the Rules of
Procedure. According to existing rules, motions require the Speaker's consent before being placed to the
House for discussion (Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad 2001). Besides, an MP cannot compel a minister to answer
a question. As one scholar noted, “The ultimate fate of a question depends greatly on both the Speaker's
satisfaction and the minister's consent to address it” (Rahman 2007).
An individual minister's accountability can be analysed from various points of views. As Weller stated,
“Ministers play many roles simultaneously as they deal with Parliament, cabinet and their department”
(Weller 1996). Therefore, an individual minister is accountable lies to the Parliament, to the cabinet and to
the department s/he heads. However, it has been noticed that in almost every instance, ministers are not
being held responsible or accountable for their actions and activities. In last 16 years experience of
parliamentary democracy, even though a number of ministers have resigned, they did so only when the
Prime Minister asked them to do so. The standing committee is supposed to hold an individual minister
accountable, although ultimately, a minister's accountability lies to the Prime Minister.
However, quite interestingly, the nature of regime has not had any impact on the role played by the
parliamentary committees. Existing literature shows that the effectiveness of parliamentary committees
depends on the following:
frequency of committee meetings held
regularity of members' attendance
number and quality of reports prepared
the scope for the members in case of agenda setting
the fate of the recommendations made by the committee (Ahmed 2001)
Based on these indicators, the following table attempts to compare the effectiveness of the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC) during the tenure of the Seventh and Eighth Parliaments.
3.4.3 Functioning of Committee System and its Implications in Holding the Government to Account
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7 A minister is held responsible to the Parliament through the standing committee. Article 76 (2) (c) allows a standing committee to
investigate or inquire into the activities or administration of a ministry if referred to it by the Parliament (GoB 2000). Rule 248 of
Rules of Procedure empower committees to undertake inquiries suo moto. The Seventh Parliament played a significant role in
this regard. However, the Eight Parliament performance in case of holding an individual ministry accountable is quite awful. An
individual minister can also be held responsible by questions or short notice questions.
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Table 3.1 Activities of Public Accounts Committees in Seventh and Eighth Parliaments
Indicators Seventh Parliament Eighth Parliament
Beginning of Parliamentary Session
Date of Constitution of Standing Committees
Number of Meetings Held
Average Meetings Per Year
Attendance of  Members (Average)
Number of Reports Submitted
14th July 1996
12th May 1998
103
22
7.2
5
28th October 2001
17th March 2004
46
9
8.7
1
Source: Ahmed 2006; TIB 2006
The above table highlights a number of issues. First, in both cases, it took two to three years to set up the
parliamentary standing committees. Both Parliaments also took advantage of the 4 amendment of the
Constitution. The 1972 Constitution clearly stated that the standing committees were to be formed within
the Parliament's first meeting in each session. However, the 4 amendment omitted the part “at its first
meeting in each session”. Quite interestingly, the 12 amendment which restored parliamentary democracy
did not reinstate this certain phrase. The consequence has been the late formation of committees. Second,
in case of holding meetings, the Eighth Parliament was more irregular as compared to the Seventh.
Although average attendance was higher for the Eighth Parliament than that of the Seventh Parliament, the
fact remains that the former's PAC succeeded in producing only one report. This single report is based on
the first 25 meetings of the committee. The last 21 meetings of the committee failed to produce any output.
Third, the influence of the Seventh Parliament's PAC on Executive was much more visible than that of the
Eighth Parliament.
Another useful mechanism adopted and utilised by the Parliament to hold the Executive accountable is the
standing committee on ministries. In the Eighth Parliament, there were 37 such committees. During the
Seventh Parliament, a provision was made to refer the ministry-related bills to the concerned standing
committee for scrutiny. The Eighth Parliament's performance regarding the effectiveness of these
committees has been less satisfactory in terms of contributing to scrutinising and revising these bills. It
showed a number of symptoms which indicated that something went wrong with this accountability
process. First, the rules of procedure were not followed in proceedings of the meetings. A recent study
showed that only 13.20 percent meeting were held as per Rules of Procedure. Second, these
ministerial standing committees failed to produce reports. Of the 37 standing committees, six did not
submit any report, 30 committees submitted only one report and only one committee submitted three
reports. Third, in cases where committees tried to perform their responsibilities they failed to do so. In a
number of cases, the standing committees decided to investigate or raise questions about the ministers'
activities. However at the end of the day, the committees could not carry out the investigation in an effective
and efficient manner. For instance, “The Standing Ministerial Committee (SMC) on the Ministry of
Communication discussed allegations of corruption in imports and distribution of Compressed Natural Gas
(CNG) auto rickshaws. The committee took a tough stance on the issue and formed a four-member
subcommittee. The subcommittee was given one month to submit its report. Unfortunately, it failed to
submit a report by the end of the Eighth JS” ( Rahman 2007; TIB 2007).
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Box 3.3 Relatively effective committees in the Seventh Parliament
During the tenure of the Seventh Parliament, the standing committees on ministries played quite an
important role. For instance, the Standing Committee on the Ministry of Health and Population Control
identified 'huge irregularities and massive corruption' in procurement of medical equipments. The standing
committee formed a subcommittee to investigate this incident and later brought charges against a number
of ministry officials and civil surgeons. Following the recommendation of the committee, a number of civil
surgeons and ministry employees were transferred. The Standing Committee on Defense Ministry also
investigated the issue of at that time. The Committee summoned the navy chief, the
secretary of the Defense Ministry and later asked them to submit all documents to the Committee.
Contrary to the performance of the Seventh Parliament, the Eighth Parliament was not that effective with
regard to committees. For instance, the Standing Committee on Ministry of Communication decided to form
two subcommittees to investigate the allegation of corruption against the concerned minister. In two years
the subcommittee failed to submit its report. Similar subcommittees were formed to investigate corruption
charges against Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of Power, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and
Ministry of Science and Information and Communication Technology. However, none of these
subcommittees submitted any report.
Frigate Purchase
Source: Ahmed 2001; TIB 2006
Another major problem which continues to dog the effectiveness of the parliamentary committees has been
the fate of the recommendations made by the committees. Formally, there is no compulsion for the
production and presentation of committee reports. However, on the matter of submission of reports to the
Parliament, the available data elicits a dismal scenario of committee performance. In the Fifth Parliament,
the highest number (49) of committee reports was submitted while the corresponding figure is the lowest in
the Seventh Parliament (only 28). The frequency of report submission by each committee during the full
term (usually five years) of the Parliament in Bangladesh ranges between 0.61 and 1.07. This data indicate a
very poor performance of the committee system in Bangladesh at the implementation stage (TIB 2007;
Rahman 2007).
Table 3.2 Performance of the Standing Committees in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Parliaments
(JS: Jatiya Sangsad)
Performance Indicators Fifth JS Seventh JS Eighth JS Ninth JS
Committee formed
Total committee meetings
Average meeting (per committee, per year)
Reports submitted
Average number of Reports submitted (per committee)
Committees that did not produce any report
46
1388
6.03
49
1.07
30
46
1485
6.46
28
0.61
29
48
1242
8.63
47
0.98
10
46
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Source: Rahaman 2008
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Deliberation on committee reports at the Plenary level enables Members of Parliaments (who are not
members of that committee) to know the activities of committees and provide constructive suggestions on
the issues under deliberation. Deliberation on the major recommendations in the reports also helps in
exposing the malfeasance and mal-administration of public organisations. As the plenary sessions are
public, the deliberations would expedite the pace of implementation of the recommendations by creating
collective pressure (by the Parliament, civil society and media) on the relevant bodies to comply with
recommendations. No discussion or debate however, has taken place on those very few committee reports
submitted to the House. For instance, no deliberation took place on three committee reports submitted by
PAC to the SeventhParliament along with a large number of important recommendations.
The composition of committees is crucial in ensuring government accountability. Opposition members in
Bangladesh are invariably more inclined than the Treasury Bench MPs to dig out the irregularities by the
bureaucrats. The position of the Chair of a committee is very significant. S/he calls meetings, influences the
agenda and exercises the deciding vote in the case of a tie on any issue. If all committee chairs and most
members (including the ministers) are from the ruling party, it becomes difficult to hold the government
accountable against the will of the ruling party. The reluctance of the ruling party in Bangladesh to expose
the Government's failure/malfeasance is easily understandable because it can adversely affect them in the
next parliamentary elections.
As described in the previous section, the Parliament and the parliamentary committees in Bangladesh have
so far failed to perform as an effective institution of accountability. Executive dominance in the Parliament
has allowed the ruling party to have control over public resources and institutions. This Report believes that
the following loopholes in the existing structure of the parliamentary standing committees are mainly
responsible for this failure:
There are no selection criteria in cases of appointment of the committee members. As a result,
competent parliamentarians may not be selected as members of important committees.
The insignificance of the committee reports and the apathy of the government to implement the
recommendations suggested by the committees fail to generate enthusiasm in the minds of the
committee members to work in an effective and efficient manner.
The opposition members, in most cases, have a trivial role to play in the committee meetings. The
number of the opposition members in the committees is determined in proportion to their seats in the
Parliament which in effect allows the ruling party to take control of the committees. Moreover, no
proper method has been developed so far to ensure the appointment of the opposition party members
as Chair of the standing committees.
Political parties have cleverly exploited these loopholes in the formal rules and provisions. Through primary
research, an effort has been taken to identify the informal practices that help the political parties to exploit
the loopholes. The next section provides a summary of the findings.
In Bangladesh, the party chief selects the members and Chair of a standing committee. In absence of any
selection criteria, this selection is entirely at the discretion of the party chief. This Report has identified the
3.5 Failure of Formal Rules in Ensuring Effective Parliamentary Accountability



Role of political party chiefs
8
8 One politician said, “Committee appointments depend upon the discretion of the leader of the House. Sometimes, s/he considers
experience. Most of the time, lobbying dominates the process”
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following informal criteria for nominating committee chairs/members (i) face value; (ii) lobbying; (iii)
experience; and (iv) expertise.
According to these informal criteria, the party leader chooses someone according to his/her liking. It is not at
all surprising that party members invest their time and energy to please the party head. One veteran
politician suggested, “lobbying is the informal means; our country runs on lobbying,”and pointed out that
effective lobbying can, in most cases, ensure the prize - the position of chair or member of a committee. The
third and fourth criteria are rarely taken into consideration in the selection.
Whenever the party head appoints committee members who are neither experienced nor expert, it
undermines the effectiveness of committees. In such cases, it is not surprising to find members who do not
have adequate understanding of the subject matter. At the same time, as these members are being selected
by leader's choice, they always try to satisfy the leader instead of performing their responsibilities.
However, the interview findings also suggest that during the tenure of the present government, some
efforts have been taken to include experienced and expert MPs in the committees.
Law makers and the Executive (Minister and bureaucrats) can communicate directly in the committee
meetings. This is a more direct method of holding the Executive accountable. At the same time, while
considering a bill, the MPs should have knowledge about the technical considerations relevant to the bill.
Moreover, there are a number of mechanisms to oppose or propose a bill which MPs need to know in order
to effectively participate in the legislative process.
However, the setback is, in most cases, MPs lack the necessary knowledge to perform these accountability
functions. As one politician said, “interestingly, most of the MPs are not aware about their party mottos and
political manifestos let alone parliamentary procedures. What they do in the Parliament is try to please their
leaders so that they can stay in their good book”. It is obvious therefore that a considerable number of MPs
fail to make the parliamentary committees or parliamentary sessions productive.
According to several interviewees, MPs in general, are not interested in playing their part in the Parliament.
There are basically two reasons behind this apathy. First, there are no structured norms which might
motivate the MPs to play certain roles. As a result, inexperienced MPs are confused in defining their role in
the Parliament. Political parties are also not concerned with parliamentary procedures and therefore do not
adequately guide their MPs to play constructive roles in Parliament. Second, research findings confirmed
that the Government does not believe that it has to be accountable to the Parliament. At the same time,
opposition parties do not believe that the Parliament can be the best possible place to oppose the
government and build public opinion. Consequently, meetings of the parliamentary committees of the
9
10
11
Inexperience of MPs/lack of training
Lack of incentive
9 For a veteran politician, the criteria of selection is very simple- “To put it concisely, on face value or assumed knowledge on the
area of work.”
10 According to one political leader, “The composition lies at the discretion of party hierarchy. It is often the case that the right
person with expertise is not nominated in proper committees. Hence, it is not surprising to find members who do not have
adequate understanding of the subject matter.
11 According to one MP of BNP- “This time committee formation seems more rational. Senior members like Suranjit Sen, Tofail or
Abdur Razzak can ensure accountability of the concerned ministers. Actually, chairman of the committee should be appointed
from the experienced and knowledgeable MPs and this time this has been done.”
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political parties themselves are not held regularly. Even the parties' standing committee and/or permanent
committee meetings and council meetings are not held regularly. The norm within the major political
parties to bypass their internal democratic practices in turn affect their performance in the Parliament.
The Parliament Secretariat provides the meeting agenda and the required reading materials to the
committee members. However, sometimes, these documents are provided only a day or so before the
meeting, with the inevitable result that most parliamentarians join the standing committee meeting without
having done any ground work on the issue. The research identified three crucial issues which leave MPs
unprepared regarding the issue of the standing committee meeting. These are as follows: (i) MPs do not feel
interested as committee meeting do not provide them with concrete benefits, (ii) they are reluctant to make
enemies with the ministers, and (iii) they have neither the time nor the capacity to adequately prepare for
committee meetings. However, there are some MPs who diligently do their homework before attending any
meeting.
Another issue which leads to a dysfunctional Parliament arises from the fact that the performance of the
MPs in parliamentary deliberations and activities is rarely reviewed. In fact, political parties do not consider
framing indicators through which the performance of the MPs can be measured as they are not too serious
about parliamentary activities.
The fact remains that Parliament in Bangladesh is far from being a forum for constructive debate, ensuring
executive accountability, or sharing opinion on relevant national issues among the ruling and opposition
parties. This opinion was voiced by the majority of the respondents in the nationwide perception survey
carried out for this Report (see Chapter Six). Respondents also felt that the onus is on the ruling party to play
a more constructive role in the Parliament by ensuring voice of the opposition MPs. It is unfortunate, agreed
our respondents that most of the time the ruling party MPs dominate the proceedings and engage in
debates on issues seemingly irrelevant in terms of the national interest.
An effective Parliament plays a pivotal role in holding the government accountable. This, at the same time,
focuses on the Parliament's command of political resources for the purpose of influencing public policy
(Edelman and Zelniker 1973). The strength of the legislature's policy-making role is most frequently
connected to its capacity to resist or modify policy initiatives emanating from the Executive branch (Polsby
1975). When the legislature lacks such capacity, its policy-making role becomes weak. In contrast,
legislatures with strong policy-making roles can say to the Executive and stand by what they have said.
An essential point to remember while studying the strengths/weaknesses of Parliament is that it cannot be
insulated from the effects of wider social, economic and political contexts. In a democracy, the functioning
Lack of preparation
Lack of performance review
12
3.6 Developing Rules of the Game
'no'
12 According to one politician, “Parties do not review performance of their MPs in the Parliament. Before reviewing, parties must have
some performance indicators. They are not that serious with the Parliament. They are not willing to make MPs accountable to the
party. Actually, they are very much tame to the party. So question of answerability does not arise at all. Government does not
believe that it has to be accountable to the Parliament. Opposition parties do not believe that Parliament can be the best possible
place to oppose the government and build public opinion.”
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of Parliament is inexorably linked with the functioning of other key institutions (Rahaman 2008), as
described in Chapter Five. It is the interplay of political and social factors that determine the place of
legislature in the political system - whether it is in Mezey's (1979) categorisation, an active, reactive,
vulnerable, marginal or minimal legislature. The political context in which a legislature operates
predominantly matters in order to measure the strength of Parliament to restrain the Executive.
Thus, in analysing the reasons behind the dysfunctional Parliament of Bangladesh, the changing nature and
structure of the polity has to be kept in mind. Earlier sections of this Chapter have highlighted aspects of
formal rules of the Parliament, explored the extent of influence of the informal practices and reflected how
these informal practices are being exploited by the ruling party, which at the end of the day created the
dysfunctional Parliament. The question remains as to why political parties use the informal practices to
exploit the loopholes of the existing formal rules. The answer to this question demands a brief depiction of
the role played by the political parties in developing the existing political culture of Bangladesh. This has
been discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.
The political parties are supposed to play the most important role in order to establish, institutionalise and
sustain democracy. However, a simple overview of the activities of the parties in Bangladesh reveals the
harsh reality that their role is not at all helpful for a well-functioning democracy.
First, there is an unlikely consensus between the major parties regarding the policy they follow in case of
determining their economic and development objectives. This ideological consensus actually has a two-fold
meaning: a) the basic ideologies of each party have hardly been practiced and modification is permitted
provided it helps the party to come in power; b) almost all parties lack internal democracy. One of the major
parties, the BNP, did not form a council in 14 years. In both the major parties, the AL and the BNP, the
Executive power is vested in the Chairperson; whatever decision she takes is immediately implemented. A
number of leaders have been forced to leave the parties as they intended to protest against the decisions
taken by the party chiefs (Ahmed 2003). Second, there has been a recent trend within major party leaders to
give more importance to businessmen rather than the long-time veterans of politics. One example is the
appointment of a particular businessman as the Private Sector Advisor of Sheikh Hasina. The person had
allegedly maintained no connection with the party between 2001 and 2006, when it went through various
troubles but was able to get a central position when the situation improved for the party (The Daily
Jugantor, January 21, 2007), yet another example of the politics-business nexus as described in Chapter Two.
Third, yet another significant point of concern is the way the parties nominate their candidates for the
general election. It has been alleged that a large amount of money is paid by the nomination seekers in
order to get nomination. The impact of these factors, i.e., lack of internal democracy and prevalence of a
non-transparent procedure of selecting party candidates and unmitigated power of central leaders is
significant in case of assessing the performance of the political parties in the political arena and thereby in
the whole democratic process (Hasan unpub).
These characteristics of political parties of Bangladesh have created a situation where party activists do not
feel it necessary to understand, realise and internalise the ideologies of the party. Rather, politics is viewed
as a profession which they use to gain power. Politics has, as described earlier, become an area of investment
where the activists expect to make profit if their party comes into power. Therefore, regardless of the party
affiliation of the local MP, the activists of the party in power tend to take control of the public institutions
any
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and organise control over the local distribution of public resources. Public perception regarding this
matter has been described in Chapter Six.
This negative role played by the political parties has a clear implication for parliamentary democracy. As the
parties are more concerned about taking control over all the institutions and utilising public resources for
party loyalists, they tend to neglect the role of the Parliament. On the contrary, a dysfunctional Parliament is
what suits their purpose, because when the Executive is working to ensure the smooth-functioning of a
'winner takes all' system, any check on the Executive's activities would ultimately hurt the ruling party in
realising their objective. Thus, instead of bringing positive changes through the parliamentary framework,
political parties were more eager to exploit the existing loopholes of the parliamentary procedure through
informal norms - the outcome of the culture of confrontational politics. This in turn rendered parliamentary
sessions and standing committees ineffective, and diminished the interest of MPs to regularly join
parliamentary sessions or attend standing committee meetings.
Figure 3.1 attempted to explain this argument further. The figure shows that the mode of functioning of
political parties in Bangladesh has played a major role in creating and sustaining the culture of
confrontational politics. The lack of internal democracy within the parties, the politics-business nexus, the
emphasis on considering politics as an investment have all facilitated the development of a system where
the winner of the election takes complete control of public resources and while doing so makes sure that
the loser (of the election) ends up getting nothing. As a result of this confrontational culture of politics, the
political parties develop within themselves certain informal practices and behavioural norms which, to a
large extent, dictate their mode of functioning in the Parliament. For instance, due to lack of internal
democracy, the MPs always try to please their party heads as they know that the displeasure of the chief
might lose them the chance of being a partner in the 'winner-takes-all' system. Besides, as politics is
considered an investment, MPs are often reluctant to play any significant role in the Parliament. They realise
that their good performance in policy-making or in holding the Executive accountable will not do them any
good. Rather by emphasising too much on accountability they will jeopardise their careers.
13
13 A study conducted by CGS in 2006 in two found the following trends of local party control over public life:
- The ruling party takes control over resources regardless of the party affiliation of the local MP; at the same time, although the post
of (District) Minister has been removed, there is informal influence exerted over the distribution of resources in the district
The Upazila Development Committee is a critical point of control. The Committee is attended by Union Parishad chairmen with
the MP acting as advisor. The Committee coordinates all development work in the , including the allocation of resources
and projects to unions
Ward and union level party activists support implementation of development activities, and control preparation of recipient lists
for the distribution of relief (VGF, VGD)
Ruling party leaders, principally of the main BNP party and , currently hold government contracts for construction and repair of
public infrastructure, including schools, culverts and roads
Parties retain formal and informal relationships with the administration and elected local government, in effect creating structures
that parallel the official system
All 22 Union Parishad Chairmen were aligned to parties in the two
upazilas
upazila
upazilas
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Figure 3.1 Rule of the game
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existing system
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The combined dynamics of weak formal rules and thriving informal practices guarantee that parliamentary
procedures are thoroughly undermined. For instance, the absolute control of the party chiefs over party
structure/activities, the significance of his/her pleasure or displeasure and the importance of lobbying
significantly reduce the experienced MPs' possibility of being appointed as committee members or chairs.
There remains the chance that if the Executive is not too keen to ensure its own accountability, it may award
these crucial posts to its party loyalists so that the reward-receiver, in exchange, may allow continuation of
Executive dominance. Similarly, the MPs, being active actors of the politics-business nexus, are not
interested in playing their designated function of legislators in the Parliament. Moreover, the insignificance
of the committee recommendations discourages many of the parliamentarians. Thus, in the absence of an
effective Parliament, the Executive remains virtually unaccountable and the stakes of politics remain high as
the Executive, the winner for five years, strips the opposition of all its rights and totally ignores all its
demands. This allows the confrontational culture of politics to continue, to the detriment of democratic
norms, values and practices. On the other hand, a different nature of political culture would either ensure
that formal rules would be followed or would allow little impact of the informal practices. Political parties
would need to take corrective measures so that the system has no loopholes or they would proscribe
themselves from exploiting such loopholes if they existed. In either of the latter cases, the Parliament would
function as an effective institution of accountability, which would in turn play a role in lowering the high
stakes of politics. Consequently, a 'winner takes all' system would not be allowed to develop and the
opposition would have the opportunity and the incentive to play an effective role in the legislative process.
The initial experiment with parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh did not work, coming to an abrupt end
in 1975. After experiencing over one and a half decades of military and semi-authoritarian rule, Bangladesh
again embarked on a painstaking journey towards democratisation in 1991. Since then, four parliamentary
elections have been held which have been largely considered to be free and fair with high voter turnouts (55
percent in 1991, 75 percent in 1996, 76 percent in 2001 and 87 percent in 2008). However, free and fair
elections cannot alone guarantee the continuity of stable democratic governance and sustainable
development. This must be complemented by other functional institutions including parliament, judiciary,
media, civil society and others.
During the tenure of the last Caretaker Government, a number of efforts were taken to bring about
qualitative changes in the functioning of the political parties. Amendment of the Representation of People
Order (RPO), 1972 allowed important measures to ensure free, fair and credible elections, including
mandatory registration of the political parties intending to contest elections, and disclosure of certain
information by candidates. The changes in electoral laws had a positive impact as candidates with
comparatively cleaner images were selected by the political parties. This positive momentum has continued
during the first session of the Ninth Parliament. For the first time in the history of parliamentary democracy
in Bangladesh, all standing committees have been formed within the first session of the Parliament and with
two chairman positions (of standing committees on ministries) being held by opposition party members.
This 'empowerment' of the opposition in the parliamentary procedure is a very welcome change and
hopefully marks the change in the hitherto displayed authoritarian attitude of the ruling party. This may in
the long run pave the way for positive change in the existing culture of confrontational politics. However,
the present Parliament has some in-built problems as the ruling party/coalition enjoys an overwhelming
majority. “The tiny minority (opposition) will not have any real chance to confront the majority. If the
government/ ruling party even agrees to follow a proportional principle in the distribution of committee
positions, the opposition will have at most one member in a ten-member committee. The scope of
3.7 Conclusion
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opposition scrutiny of government measures will thus be remote” (Ahmed 2009b). At the same time, an
effective Parliament requires the presence of pro-active government backbenchers. The point is, when the
government is assured of victory of its proposals in the Parliament, it does not deem it necessary to
compromise with the opposition. However, if a coalition is formed between the government backbenchers
and opposition members which makes certain demands, the government would have to respond positively.
The experience of the Fifth Parliament (regarding the introduction of parliamentary democracy) can be cited
as an example of this (Ahmed 1997, 2009b; Hasanuzzaman 1998). Thus, a few good practices may not result
in an effective Parliament, unless and until, all political parties come to a consensus in bringing about
significant change in the Rules of Procedure, e.g., the introduction of opposition days or the provision for
regular unscheduled debates to subject the government policies and activities to more effective
parliamentary scrutiny, which will in turn allow the opposition a better opportunity to be pro-active.
Therefore, the focus should be on reforming the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure to facilitate the forming of
the coalition, which in turn will ensure the accountability of the Executive.
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
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“Power vested in the state is potentially and often actually coercive…because the state and not the polity
controls military and economic resources. Civil institutions exist at the behest of such power and exercise
their own authority because the state allows it.”
“…a social context where relations are highly personalized and where personal loyalties are valued more
highly than the 'rules' of the organization. This requires a conscious decision by the political and
bureaucratic leadership to establish clear institutional rules (even though these will depart from current
norms within a traditional patrimonial society) and then abide by them.”
“Every country has a constitution, but this does not necessarily imply that every country in the world is
endowed with a constitutional government or the practice of constitutionalism”.
(Greenberg 1995)
(WB 2002)
(Choudhury 1994)
4.1 Introduction
The courts are possibly the most fundamental site where power is contested in a constitutional democracy,
at least in the common law tradition. The liberal notion of the rule of law involves limiting the state's
authority by subjecting it to a set of transparent and universal rules: all power must find an ultimate source
in law; the ruler and the ruled are governed by the same law. The “absence of arbitrariness, personal will or
caprice” (Choudhury 1994) is its defining feature. The concept is inherently dependent upon a functioning
and independent judiciary that applies the law impartially. The judiciary can potentially restrain and hold to
account executive government, other state institutions including the legislature (by striking down laws
which violate the Constitution), as well as politically and economically powerful actors, and thus is
fundamental to rule-based governance. The judiciary acts as the mediator of disputes between the other
institutions of the state, as well as disputes between state and citizen, when it engages in its judicial review
functions.
Judicial Oversight
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While this chapter has many references to the Constitution, laws and appointment procedures, the formal
constitutional framework has little impact on judicial independence. Any formal provision can be reversed -
or indirectly subverted - by government. It is ultimately about the internalisation by state actors of concept
of the rule of law, of the notion of restraints on power and the legitimacy of the courts amongst citizens as
an arbiter of disputes over power.
The growth of the 'patriarchy' since 1991 in particular (described in
) has had profound implications for the judiciary's capacity to perform its role as the guardian of the
rule of law and in enforcing horizontal accountability. Partisan politics gradually permeated all aspects of
collective social life, and neo-patrimonial structures developed alongside the rational bureaucratic
structures of the state. The period witnessed the ascendancy of the political class, and its cultivation of the
judiciary, the bureaucracy, and other public office holders as client groups. Control of the lower courts and
law enforcement agencies became the mechanism for denying the opposition space in the political realm,
4.2 The Context
The narrative of the judiciary in the independent Bangladesh is very much the other side of the story of
constitutionalism. While democracy requires the development of a constitutional culture, “…which teaches
state actors that the legal bounds of the system cannot be transgressed for the achievement of partisan
political gains” (Larkins 1996), Bangladesh did not have a period of democratic or national consolidation
upon its independence when such a principle became entrenched (see A: appendix 1). The gradual
evolution of the courts and other political institutions of the country were interrupted by the imposition of
authoritarian rule in 1975, the series of coups and counter coups between 15 August and 7 November 1975,
and the imposition of martial law in 1975 and 1982. As in much of the developing world emerging from
liberation struggles, neither the practice of democratic politics nor its institutional framework were
entrenched, there were no political figures who 'set the tone' in terms of the relationship between the
judiciary and executive, who saw an independent judiciary as an inherent part of consolidating the nation-
building enterprise and who “rejected the idea of a packed court of individuals of the government's liking
for getting decisions in its own favour” (see B: appendix 1). Over time there have been numerous attempts
to amend the Constitution for political ends, (Choudhury 1994) including the dilution of the Constitution's
capacity to limit executive discretion (see C: appendix 1) by regimes of all hues, from martial law
governments to those that were democratically elected (Halim 2003). The Constitution became a document
which was increasingly adhered to only in the letter, if that, but was flouted in spirit.
As has been highlighted elsewhere in this Report, there has been a demonstrable diminution amongst the
political class of a commitment to the idea of a self-restraining state. The judiciary has significant potential
to check the other arms of government, and had on occasion shown its preparedness to do so, most
notably in cases where the central issue was whether Parliament's power of constitutional amendment was
complete and unrestrained (see D: appendix 1). As the stakes of political power increased with the quantum
of resources that were potentially the spoils of office, and the risk of access to rents being closed when
losing office, there were strong incentives for incumbent governments to hamper judicial independence
and few restraints preventing them from doing so.
1
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1 The Bangladesh Constitution originally had no provisions for preventive detention or a state of emergency. But as early as 1974,
as the reality of governing hit the country's first government, emergency provisions were added and the Constitution came to
resemble the Pakistani Constitution more closely.
2 During the first two decades of the country's existence, judicial activism was ad hoc and piecemeal
3 Refer to the discussion in Chapter Two
4 Center for Governance Studies, State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, BRAC University
while the drive to control the superior courts came from a desire to curb their potential as a restraint on
Executive power. The institutional autonomy of the judiciary and the personal independence of judges were
subverted in a number of ways, often to further the interests of the ruling party, as political actors sought to
consolidate political and economic power:
(Jahan 2007)
Another incentive to interfere with judicial independence came in 1996, with a constitutional amendment
introducing the Caretaker Government (CTG) mechanism, which mandates the last retired Chief Justice for
the position of its 'Chief Adviser'. His or her partisan loyalty towards the incumbent government could
potentially be very advantageous in engineering an election victory, something that became more crucial in
a 'patriarchy' context, where the losing party and its associates essentially lost control of resources during
the period out of office.
At the same time, this is not only a story about politicians and the contest for power but about the
composition of the judiciary and its relationship with the broader society. While there remain a number of
judges on the High Court and Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court of competence and integrity, trust
in the superior courts and in the quality of the justice they dispense has fallen considerably, a trend which
showed few signs of reversal during the CTG's tenure. The decline in both judicial integrity and quality have
been aided by a drastic fall in the real and relative value of judicial salaries and benefits and the failure to
preserve non-material incentives (such as status and prestige) for judicial service over decades. The superior
courts have lost the legitimacy that they had even ten years ago, when the Supreme Court was held in high
esteem (WB 2002; 1996). In the most vivid recent example where the courts were put to the test as the
arbiter of a dispute that was simply about the grab for political power, the constitutional challenge to the
Iajuddin-led Caretaker Government in October 2006 (see E: appendix 1),  they failed.
After the belated implementation of the judgment in in November
2007, the Judiciary in Bangladesh has been formally separated from Executive government. While there was
an expectation amongst some quarters that separation would help to facilitate greater integrity and
independence, especially in light of the absence of more traditional partisan political pressures during the
Caretaker Government period, the Judiciary performed little better during the CTG's tenure and the formal
legal changes appear to have had little impact to reverse the longer-term decline in judicial integrity.
Judicial rulings generally followed the political script of the period. For instance, when the anti-corruption
drive was at its height, few courts were willing to grant bail. Once deals were being cut by the CTG with
political parties, bail was granted in abundance, and there was anecdotal evidence of large bribes being
paid in order to secure hearings and bail. In August 2008, a bench of the High Court Division issued orders
in some 298 cases in 315 minutes. Generally speaking, judges did not rule against the vital interests of the
CTG or military. Once the new Government took office, almost all cases against politicians were dismissed,
withdrawn or the accused have been given extended bail.
Ministry of Finance v Md. Masdar Hossain5
6
7
“Over the years, democratically elected political leaders started behaving in an autocratic manner,
using state power to reward political supporters and punish and repress the political opposition.
The rule of law started breaking down as successive elected governments began to misuse state
power for partisan and personal gain. Increasingly the judiciary, particularly the lower judiciary, civil
bureaucracy, police and other institutions of government began to lose their autonomy as they
were also brought under partisan political pressure by successive governments. ”
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6 Ain-o-Shalish Kendro, , chapter 1
7 Ibid
Human Rights in Bangladesh 2008
This Chapter focuses on the superior courts in its analysis because the theme of this Report is that of
moderating the high stakes of politics, and the superior courts potentially play a key role in this process
through judicial review. The Chapter suggests some possible factors that have encouraged successive
governments (both military and democratically elected) to curb the power and undermine the authority of
the Judiciary through an examination of how the incentives for ruling regimes of interfering with judicial
independence have changed. Second, it explores the recent changes to the formal legal framework which
has separated the Judiciary from the Executive, and examines why these changes have had little effect on
increasing judicial independence or increasing the accountability of political actors. Apart from a literature
review, this Chapter has drawn extensively upon an empirical study which involved 25 key informant
interviews of present and former judges of the Supreme Court, district judges, newly appointed assistant
judges, high court advocates, journalists, academics and officials from the Ministry of Law, Justice and
Parliamentary Affairs (IGS 2009a).
After setting out the context of judicial oversight in Section 4.2, the Chapter goes on to analyse the role of an
independent judiciary in a constitutional democracy in Section 4.3. The next section (Section 4.4) discusses
the formal legal framework of the judiciary in Bangladesh, whereas Section 4.5 analyses the rules
that have evolved. Section 4.6 discusses the stakes of politics. Section 4.7 concludes with some practical
recommendations.
The constraints on the development of an independent judiciary discussed in this chapter have severely
circumscribed citizens' access to the formal court system. At the same time, it needs to be understood that
an independent judiciary is the ultimate indicium of the impersonalisation of power -- much of the literature
on the relationship between governance and development notes that the Judiciary is often the last
institution to develop in a country's development trajectory. (Tamanaha 2004; North, Wallis, and Weingast
2009; Khan 2003; Jensen 2003).
The separation of powers doctrine has been considered the “ ” of a modern state: the
Legislature makes the law, the Executive implements the law and the Judiciary interprets and enforces it. Its
rationale is to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch of government. Although the
line of separation blurs while analysing the legislative-executive interaction in Westminster-style
democracies, the Judiciary is vital in establishing and maintaining the self-restraining state. The Judiciary
resolves conflict between political actors, organs of the state and also protects the rights of the individual
through restraining the government from exercising its power in an arbitrary fashion. Thus, an independent
Judiciary is inherent in the notion of the rule of law.
Judicial independence has a number of fundamental facets. First is the impartiality of judicial decisions, the
“idea that judges will base their decisions on the law and facts, not on any predilections towards one of the
litigants” or by the judge's personal interest in the outcome of the case. This 'party detachment' gains more
significance when the government becomes a party to the dispute. Some analysts incorporate into
'impartiality' the idea that judges are not selected primarily because of their political views but on the basis
of merit. Second, judicial independence entails that the Judiciary is free from interference. Parties to a case
or others with an interest in its outcome (including the government) cannot influence the judge's decision.
Judges should enjoy complete freedom in reaching decisions that are unpopular. In practice, it means
protecting judges from corruption and coercion:
de facto
conditio sine qua non
4.3 Role of an Independent Judiciary in a Constitutional Democracy
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8 In resolving conflict, justice will be delivered by a neutral third party who has no relation to the litigants and has no direct interest
in the outcome of the case. See further, (Fiss 1993), (Shapiro 1981)
“It is important that judges not be subject to control by the regime, and that they be shielded from
any threats, interference, or manipulation which may either force them to unjustly favour the state
or subject themselves to punishment for not doing so”.
“Judges should not be used to further political aims nor punished for preventing their realization. ...
[I]nsularity is believed to result from certain formal and structural safeguards which give judges life
tenure, provide significant checks and balances in their appointment and protect their salary
against diminution whilst in office.”
“The scope of the Judiciary's authority as an institution or, in other words, the relationship of the
courts to other parts of the political system and society, and the extent to which they are
collectively seen as the legitimate body for the determination of right, wrong, legal and illegal.”
(Larkins 1996)
Insulating judges from officials of other branches of government is often taken to be the most important
aspect of ensuring judicial independence. The executive poses the most serious threat to judicial
independence for two reasons: it has a potential interest in the outcome of a myriad of cases (as one of the
parties to the case), and it has potential power over judges in the terms and conditions of employment. The
idea is elaborated upon by Larkins:
(Larkins 1996)
Implicit in the concept is also the idea that the Judiciary has authority over other parts of the political system
and that once rendered, judicial decisions will be respected. Either the parties to the case must comply
voluntarily with the decision, or those with the authority to coerce compliance must be willing to use this
power if compliance is not forthcoming:
(Larkins 1996)
Many of the principles outlined here are also enshrined in internationally accepted standards such as the
United Nations . Tenure of office as well as the terms and
conditions of office should be protected, as should the method of appointment. An independent judiciary
should be free from administrative interference and enjoy financial autonomy. Financial autonomy enables
the judiciary to provide its members with adequate pay and facilities and attract competent personnel in the
service, who will, in absence of executive interference be able to base their decisions on impartial
application of the law to the facts. In such conditions, judges are in a position to conduct judicial
proceedings fairly, which will in turn maintain public confidence in the institution and adds to its authority
and legitimacy. However, the sustainability of public confidence to a large extent depends on the
accountability of the Judiciary, which requires that any charge against a judge regarding his integrity or
capacity will be dealt with through an appropriate procedure; if his/her lack of capacity or misbehaviour is
proved, a judge will become subject to suspension or removal. The subsequent sections will discuss the
issue of judicial independence in Bangladesh following this conceptual framework.
Bangladesh's Constitution came into effect in December 1972, and attempted to establish an independent
judiciary through enshrining the separation of the judiciary from the “executive organs of the state”
in Article 22. The Judiciary is vested with the judicial power of the Republic, with the Supreme Court at the
apex (Case: Mujibur Rahman v. Bangladesh: Islam 1995). Part VI of the Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice and other judges appointed by the President (see F: appendix 1).
The Court is divided into two Divisions: the Chief Justice and other judges appointed to the Appellate
Division sit in that Division whereas the remaining judges sit in the High Court Division. While the Supreme
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
4.4 The Judiciary in Bangladesh: The Legal Framework
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Court in its current form came into existence upon Bangladesh's independence with the High Court of
Bangladesh Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 5 of 1972), it has a long history --- the court's predecessors
were the High Court of East Bengal (1774-1947) (see G: appendix 1) and the High Court of East Pakistan
(1947-1971).
The Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Appellate Divisions. The High Court hears
appeals from orders, decrees and judgments of subordinate courts and tribunals. It has original jurisdiction
to hear writ applications under article 102 of the Constitution a mechanism for ensuring the enjoyment and
enforcement of fundamental rights of citizens. The Court also has powers and jurisdiction to hear and
dispose of cases as the court of first instance under article 101 of the Constitution. Although there is no
explicit grant of judicial review over laws that contravene constitutional provisions other than fundamental
rights, articles 102 and 7 read together suggest that the Supreme Court has the power to declare void laws
that are inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution (Islam 1995).
As mentioned, the High Court has the power to issue orders to prevent public functionaries from exceeding
their power through the prerogative writs. The writ of prohibition stops public officials from doing things
s/he is not permitted to do (Art. 102(2)(a)(i)) and the writ of mandamus directs a public official to do things
which s/he is required by law to do so long as the public official has a definite legal duty to the applicant
(Islam 1995). The High Court may also declare that an action taken by a public official (whether s/he is
performing judicial or administrative functions) (Islam 1995) has no effect because it was taken without
lawful authority (writ of certiorari) (Art. 102(2) (a) (ii)). Finally, the High Court may require that a person
holding public office show under what authority he claims to hold that office (writ of ) (Art.
102(2)(b)(ii) ). This writ ensures that no one can hold any public office without having a valid claim on that
office (Islam 1995). Through all of these various writs, the High Court has the power to check the excesses of
public officials in exercising executive power.
The Appellate Division provides the ultimate check on executive power. First, it hears appeals from
judgments, decrees, orders or sentences of the High Court Division, (Art. 103) including cases relating to the
abovementioned writs. On paper, it has the power to issue advisory opinions, as requested by the President,
on questions of law which are of such nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain an
opinion. This advisory jurisdiction has occasionally been used in Bangladesh except once in 1996, whereas
in India it was used as early as 1950 (Austin 2003) the fact that this practice of obtaining opinion has been
used sparsely, give some indication of the failure amongst the political class to internalise the idea of
constitutionalism. The Court also enjoys rule making power for regulating the practice and procedure of
each division and of any Court subordinate to it.
The 1972 Constitution barely had time to entrench itself before the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
established an authoritarian state in 1975, and included major changes to Part IV of the Constitution. While
Ziaur Rahman's regime removed some of the undemocratic elements introduced by the Fourth
Amendment, many of these elements remain in place today (Choudhury 1994).
While Article 95 of the original 1972 Constitution gave the power to appoint the Chief Justice to the
President and provided that judges of the Supreme Court would be appointed by the President “…
after consultation with the Chief Justice”, this constitutional requirement of consultation was removed in
1975 and remains absent today. The power of appointment is today effectively exercised by the Prime
9
quo warranto
10
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9 Id. Mandamus writs may issue upon any person holding public office and performing functions in connection with the affairs of
the Republic or of a local authority
10 Art. 106. Though these advisory opinions are non-binding, the Executive likely finds it highly embarrassing politically to ignore
advisory opinions issued by the Appellate Division
Minister (PM), since the President acts in accordance with the PM's advice under Article 48(3) of the
Constitution (Bangladesh Constitution Art. 48(3), although a very recent decision of the Appellate Division
has re-asserted (see H: appendix 1) the requirement that consultation with the Chief Justice (CJ) is necessary,
and that non-compliance with the CJ's recommendations is a violation of the Constitution. The most recent
Caretaker Government established a body for making appointments to the High Court and the Appellate
Divisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Judicial Commission operated from January 2008 until
February 2009, when the Ordinance which provided for its establishment lapsed.
Article 95 (2) also states that for being appointed as a Supreme Court judge, a person has to be a citizen of
Bangladesh and has to be either a Supreme Court advocate having at least ten years standing or a judicial
officer who held judicial office for a period not less than ten years. Initially, judges held office until they had
attained the age of 62. The 7 amendment extended this age limit to 65 and the 14 amendment further
extended this age limit to 67 (Current Art. 96).
Under the 1972 Constitution, the removal of a judge from his/her position required a resolution of the
Parliament supported by two-thirds of MPs (Original Art. 96). The resolution could only be passed on the
basis of two grounds proven misbehaviour or incapacity. The 4 amendment removed those safeguards
and permitted the President to remove any judge on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity after
providing a 'show-cause' notice against the action. The current provision, introduced in 1977, involves an ad-
hoc Supreme Judicial Council (consisting of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, and the two next senior Judges)
as a disciplinary body which is supposed to:
(a) prescribe a Code of Conduct to be observed by judges; and
(b) inquire into the capacity or conduct of a judge or of any other functionary who is not removable from
office except in like manner as a judge.
The body has the power to make recommendations about the misconduct of any judge and then the
President alone could remove the judge.
Article 114 of the Constitution provides for courts subordinate to the Supreme Court (see I: appendix 1). The
1972 constitution also placed the sub-ordinate Judiciary under the control of the Supreme Court and
provided certain provisions to ensure the separation of the Judiciary from the Executive (see J: appendix 1).
However, the 4 amendment of 1975 brought the subordinate Judiciary under the control of the executive.
The amended Article 115 of the Constitution permitted appointments of officers exercising judicial
functions without the recommendation of the Supreme Court. The amended Article 116 transferred control
of sub-ordinate judicial officers and magistrates to the President “in consultation with the Supreme Court”
(see K: appendix 1).
Until the recent changes to the legal framework by the Caretaker Government in 2007, appointments of
officers in the judicial service and magistrates exercising judicial functions were decided by the President in
accordance with the Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules, 1981 (see L: appendix 1). Assistant Judges
to civil courts were appointed on the basis of a recommendation of the Public Service Commission (PSC),
after a competitive examination amongst law graduates. Officers appointed in the Administration Cadre of
the civil service were vested with the power of magistracy, usually appointed as a magistrate of the third
class and gradually rising to that of the first class with experience (see M: appendix 1). Magistrates
performed judicial as well as administrative functions; control over posting, promotion and leave was
exercised by the Executive .
th th
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4.4.3 The Masdar Hossain Judgment and Its Aftermath
While the focus of this Chapter is on the superior courts, it would be incomplete if it did not discuss the
resistance of successive governments to the separation principle and to judicial independence more
generally. For decades, there have been promises from all sides of politics to separate the Judiciary from the
Executive. Prior to the 1991 election, both the major parties made an election pledge that the Judiciary
would be separated from the Executive. However, during the BNP and Awami League tenures from 1991-
2006, this pledge remained unfulfilled (Ashrafuzzaman 2006). A major shift came with the Appellate
Division judgment in (1999) (see N: appendix 1), which condemned the
'mixing up or tying together of the judicial service with other civil administrative services' as a
The decision affirmed that the judicial service is “functionally and structurally distinct and separate service
from the civil, executive and administrative services of the Republic” (see O: appendix 1). The creation of
Bangladesh Civil Service (Judicial) cadre by the Bangladesh Civil Service (Reorganization) Order, 1980 was
held to be the Constitution and the Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules 1981 inapplicable
to the judicial service. The court provided a number of directives for the government, which sought to give
control of the subordinate judiciary to the Supreme Court and provide for greater judicial independence.
After the Awami League government failed to implement the judgment in its last year of
office in 2000, the Caretaker Government of 2001 drafted a number of ordinances and rules to comply with
the decision. However, both of the major political parties objected to this effort by pointing out that the
CTG was not constitutionally authorised to take any policy decisions. Yet, after coming to power in 2001, the
BNP Government was again reluctant to implement the decision, as it repeatedly sought stays of execution
on the judgment. As one commentator writes:
(Ashrafuzzaman 2006)
11
12
Md. Masdar Hossain v the State
ultra vires
Masdar Hossain
“monumental constitutional blunder …… the harmful legacy of which is the dogged and
headstrong denial of the proper and rightful institutional status of the members of the judicial
service and of magistrates exercising judicial functions at the implementations stage.”
“After its order to separate the Judiciary from the Executive branch, the government began
applying for extensions. Like a schoolboy coming to class with one implausible excuse after the
next about why he could not do his homework, it applied for more time on no less than 23
occasions. Finally, the Supreme Court lost its patience. On 5 January 2006 it rejected the
government's latest request for an extension, and said that it would not entertain any more.”
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11 The Daily Star, August 22, 2004
12 The directives include the following:
A Judicial Service Commission for recruitment to the judicial service is to be established with the majority of members from
the senior judiciary.
Law or rules shall be enacted separately for the judicial service relating to posting, promotion, grant of leave, discipline, pay,
allowance and other terms and conditions of service consistent with Article 116 and 116A.
Establish a separate Judicial Pay Commission.
In the control and discipline of persons employed in the judicial service and magistrates exercising judicial functions under
Article 116 the views and opinion of the Supreme Court shall have primacy over those of the Executive.
The conditions of judicial independence in Article 116A namely, (i) security of tenure (ii) security of salary and other benefits
and pension and (iii) Constitutional independence from the Parliament and the Executive shall be secured in the law or Rules
made under Article 113 or in the Executive orders having the force of Rules.
The Executive government shall not require the Supreme Court of Bangladesh to seek their approval to incur any
expenditure on any items from the fund, allocated to the Supreme Court.



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4.4.4 Effect of Legal Changes Brought by the Caretaker Government
4.5.1 Appointment of Supreme Court Judges: Politicisation and the Changing Profile of Judges
The Caretaker Government which took office in January 2007 attempted an ambitious governance and
institutional reform effort, which included the implementation of the judgment. On January
16, 2007, the process began with gazette notifications of four sets of rules (see P: appendix 1). With the
passage of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code on November 1, 2007, the Judiciary was said to be
formally separated from the Executive. A number of commentators did, however, point out that this
separation was incomplete, possibly reflecting the government's accommodation with those in the civil
service resistant to full separation and the views of subordinate judges themselves. Since the Awami
League Government took office after winning the December 2008 election, it appears prepared to return
some of the powers to Executive magistrates (see Q: appendix 1).
Historically, the consultative role of the Chief Justice (CJ) in all judicial appointments was a major safeguard
against political and expedient appointments. The idea was that judges of the higher courts are best suited
to competently adjudge the candidature, since the appointments are to be made from amongst those
functioning in the Judiciary and the Bar. The CJ's opinion should thus have the primacy in the event of
conflict and where the Executive fails to convince the CJ otherwise. This consultative process has been
followed so consistently since British rule in India, that even in the absence of any legal requirement; it has
become a constitutional convention in the sub-continent (Greenberg 1995). The convention of appointing
judges on the basis of seniority from the High Court to the Appellate Division and to the Chief Justice's
position again provided a bulwark against expedient appointments.
The original Constitution of 1972 gave power to appoint the Chief Justice to the President, and it provided
that judges of the Supreme Court would be appointed by the President “…after consultation with the Chief
Justice.” Despite the sweeping legal changes brought by the Fourth Amendment, and the power of
appointment being explicitly given to the President, the convention of consultation with the CJ continued
for almost two decades through military regimes of various hues due to the strength of the convention.
Though consultation with the Chief Justice was not mandatory on the face of this provision, governments
continued to consult.
Since the Parliamentary form of government was reintroduced in Bangladesh in 1991, the President
appoints judges in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. In 1994, the BNP Government ignored
for the first time the constitutional convention by appointing nine judges to the High Court Division without
consulting the Chief Justice, and faced a backlash. The-then Chief Justice objected with this break from a
practice that was seen as pivotal to ensuring the independent functioning of the Judiciary and was
supported by the Bar Association. While the government maintained that it was not mandatory for it to
consult with the Chief Justice, it eventually relented after strong pressure; the appointments were cancelled,
followed by consultation with the CJ leading to seven out of nine appointments. The convention of
consultation continued until 2002. During the period of 1999-2001, 14 additional judges were appointed to
the High Court Division by the-then Awami League Government. After two years of a 'probation' period, the
Chief Justice found their performance satisfactory and recommended their permanent appointment. The
BNP Government decided not to confirm their jobs (for detail see Q: appendix 1) mainly because they were
appointed by the previous government (see R: appendix 1).
Masdar Hossain
4.5 How the Formal Framework Operates in Practice: RulesDe Facto
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Since 2002, “…the practice started to be adhered more in breach than in observance leading to protests
from the members of the bar” (Hoque 2003). By 2008, the convention was all but dead, although there are
hopes for its revival due to a recent Appellate Division judgment which has re-asserted a role for
consultation with the Chief Justice (see S: appendix 1). In any event, it must be noted that the consultation
requirement only gains meaning in the context of a relatively strong judiciary - the appointment of a
partisan to the position of Chief Justice renders the consultation safeguard ineffective; a weak or pliable
Chief Justice may also simply endorse the government's decisions. During 90s, the government interference
started for the first time with the convention of appointing by seniority to the Appellate Division from the
High Court Division.
In January 2008, a nine member Supreme Judicial Commission (SJC) was formed by ordinance, headed by
the Chief Justice and a number of ex officio appointees, with the Law Secretary as member secretary. The
SJC was designed to provide a process for appointments to the High Court Division of the Supreme Court
and promotions to the Appellate Division, in order to reduce the extent of politicisation. Examining its short
life does provide some insights into the pathologies of the appointments process, as it appears that the
Commission has been ineffective in reducing the extent of politicisation or improving the quality of judges.
The pivotal role of the Law Ministry in preparing an initial list of nominees for the Commission's
consideration and its control of the process raised some controversy - a lot of the power was in the hands of
the Law Advisor (Minister) rather than the Chief Justice. Furthermore, the government could by-pass the
recommendation of the Commission. There were also some controversies around the competence and
integrity of a number of the appointments made by the SJC, such as that of one district court judge who had
been charged with corruption and suspended from service. According to several judges and observers, the
process remained open to both Executive manipulation and personal political and other influences (see T:
appendix 1). By the end of 2008, seven new judges had been recommended for appointment to the High
Court by the SJC, and six had taken office. The Ordinance establishing the Supreme Judicial Commission
lapsed in February 2009. It remains to be seen whether the new government will comply with a High Court
judgment last year which re-asserted a consultative role for the Chief Justice in the appointment process.
Article 95 (2) states that, in order to be eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court, a person has to be a
citizen of Bangladesh and either a Supreme Court advocate having at least ten years standing or a judicial
officer who held judicial office for a period of not less than ten years. Though the Article provides that
Parliament could determine other qualifications through legislation, so far no such law has been enacted.
This provision is very loose; experience refers to years of being admitted to practice at the bar, not
necessarily of dealing with complex legal matters. It provides little protection against egregious
appointments of partisans without the requisite competencies, especially in the absence of any collegiate
assessment process by other judges.
There was broad agreement amongst interviewees from all stakeholder groups that political affiliation has
played an increasingly large influence in appointments. As the appointment of partisans has gathered pace,
there has been a distinct decline in overall quality of judges and judgments, and an undermining of judges'
impartiality. One journalist who has followed the courts described a 'vicious cycle' regarding appointments
to the High Court Division, something that was disputed by sitting judges but met the concurrence of an ex-
judge: some senior advocates of the Supreme Court who are politically affiliated with the government of
the day recommend their juniors as judges, which in turn helps those senior lawyers to influence judgments
in cases where they appear before the judge's bench.
13
13 The Daily Star, November 17, 2008
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Another significant channel through which political influence can be exerted is Article 98 of the
Constitution, which provides for the appointment of Additional Judges to the High Court for a period not
exceeding two years. In its first four years of office during its most recent term (2001-2005), the BNP led four-
party alliance government recruited 55 additional judges for the High Court, and the method followed for
these appointments created severe controversy both inside and outside the Judiciary. It was said that 19 of
these judges were affiliated with the parties in power including one BNP lawmaker of the sixth Parliament
and a number of lawyers who contested the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) election in the ruling
party's ticket. The competence of these judges was questioned; as an eminent jurist of the country
remarked, 'A man who can't write a single English sentence correctly has been made a judge'. At the same
time specific allegations were raised regarding the authenticity of the (LLB) certificate of one of these
judges, Justice Faisal Mahmud Faizee, which threatened the image and dignity of the higher courts. Later,
despite the protest of the lawyers, the government appointed Faizee as a permanent judge to the HC
although the Chief Justice had not recommended his confirmation at the end of his two year term as an
additional High Court judge.
Traditionally, a third of Supreme Court judges are being recruited from the judicial service and two-thirds
from the Bar Association. Most of the criticisms of those recruited for political reasons are directed towards
the members of the bar; due to the political interference in the appointment procedure, many of these
judges have poor academic records and had little 'stature' before joining the bench. In fact, presumably this
is part of the reasons is why the judges were chosen by the ruling party concerned and why they accepted
the offer - they are far less likely to transcend the political patrons who appointed them. Judges of the
subordinate courts are of the opinion that their contribution and competence is not valued, and that they
make far better superior court judges because they have some considerable work experience before being
considered for appointment to the High Court Division (see U: appendix 1). On the other hand, subordinate
judges have a limitation in so far as they are not accustomed to dealing with constitutional and public law
cases but with regular civil and criminal cases, and those coming from the Bar are better suited to preparing
well-reasoned judgments drawing upon precedent because of their training as advocates. A High Court
Division Judge coming from the bar opined:
As the status of the Judiciary has fallen, so has the lure of judicial office. As greater politicisation has resulted
in a fall in quality and less consistency amongst judges, this acts as a further deterrent for those of integrity
and ability joining the bench. There has been a shift in the background profiles of upper court judges,
especially in the last decade in their levels of educational attainment, their class backgrounds, and their links
with the politicians who appoint them. In a number of other countries, the homogeneity in the class
backgrounds of the bench, while keeping the Judiciary a conservative profession, also instils a strong
adherence to professional ethics and codes of behaviour, and a fear of departing from the collective social
and professional norms, something that is now near absent in Bangladesh (Griffith 1997).
Even where the Judiciary is not monolithic in its political orientation or quality, and has a considerable
number of judges of ability and integrity, case allocation is the mechanism through which partisan
appointments can be used to favour the ruling regime. During 2006, we saw how this process worked in a
way that undermined any greater accountability of the executive. The Chief Justice was close to the ruling
regime and allocated cases to regime-friendly benches, who would dispose of them accordingly. Even in
“It is true that not all the judges are of the highest quality, but I do not think that it is right to give a
wholesale comment. The number of political appointments has increased. Whereas in the past
good lawyers were eager to join the Judiciary, the situation has changed. Not so competent lawyers
with inadequate experience are being appointed to the bench.”
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instances where the High Court Division had delivered a favourable verdict for those who were seeking to
extract accountability of the executive (for instance, rulings on voters' lists, High Court ruling on asset
disclosure and other disclosures for politicians), weak enforcement undermined accountability. At the time,
the Attorney-General was very closely aligned to the ruling party and would immediately appeal the
judgment or seek a stay of execution as in the numerous stays sought with the separation
judgment.
Compensation is seen by many as going to the 'heart of the matter' in public administration (WB 1996). The
remuneration and privileges of superior court judges are regulated by the provisions of the Supreme Court
Judges (Remuneration and Privileges) Ordinance, 1978 (see V: appendix 1). Despite the fringe benefits, the
salary received by superior court judges has fallen drastically over the last 100 years in relative terms, and
especially in the last 50 years (WB 1996), and are also low in terms of both the market comparators. The pay
is too low to attract the brightest lawyers from the Bar, except those who many have independent sources of
wealth or family wealth behind them to make such a choice, (see W: appendix 1) and for whom the non-
material incentives -- such as prestige, status, a family history in the bench or in the law and the positive
potential to influence the shape of public policy and the exercise of power are attractive. One High Court
judge remarked:
Low emoluments are considered to be a main driver of corruption in the government, including the
Judiciary. In the lower courts, the pay remains extremely poor (see X: appendix 1). The recent effort to recruit
judicial magistrates in consequence of the CTG separation reforms actually led to a number of meritorious
recruits joining the judicial service, many of them from more modest backgrounds for whom joining the
judicial service had significant non-material incentives. However, due to the inadequate pay and facilities, as
many as 49 entry level judges have already quit the service out of 380 recruits, many preferring civil service
jobs (IGS 2009).
The Pay Commission, established in the wake of the judgment, submitted its
recommendations to the government for a pay increase for the judicial service. However, the
recommendations remain unimplemented. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Commission has the
requisite expertise to undertake systematic and comprehensive reviews of pay structures for instance,
looking at systemic changes consistent with fiscal goals and which in the medium term could bring about a
paradigm shift in compensation through attrition, early retirement, subdued pay increases at the bottom,
and large pay increases at the top paid for by reduction of lower level staff.
While a pay increase for the lower judiciary may result in it attracting and maintaining more able recruits
(since the principal alternative for many of these recruits, who are from more modest socio-economic
Masdar Hossain
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4.5.2 Remuneration and Privileges
“The salary is very low. When I decided to join the High Court Division as a judge, I had a good
practice, my own law firm and I was a principal of a renowned law college. I joined the High Court
Division for the prestige and honour. However, I must agree, my family backup regarding financial
matters was quite strong and to be honest, without that backup, it would not have been possible
for me to take the decision. A couple of months ago, I asked a very good lawyer whether he was
interested in joining the High Court Division as a judge. He is a very competent lawyer and he
would be a very good judge. He told me, “I earn 20 times more each month than you, why should I
join as a judge?” That's the real picture- low salary will only encourage those (to join), who now
make less than that and you can guess what his/her quality will be.”
65
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
backgrounds, is the civil service), it is unlikely to make a significant difference for Supreme Court judges.
Once the deterioration of quality has occurred and the non-material incentives further diminish because
good candidates are discouraged from joining a judiciary of very inconsistent and often poor quality,
increasing salaries at the margins is not going to make a difference to increasing quality. A massive increase
in salaries for superior court judges (several hundred percent, at the very least, to make the salaries
competitive with the private sector) is more likely make a difference, and many have recommended that
judicial salaries need to be delinked from government salaries and be established in line with market and
commercial considerations:
(WB 1996)
An increase in salary without adequate accountability measures and a restoration of non-material incentives
is unlikely to be an effective deterrent of corruption, especially for those who are already sitting in the
courts. If the informal incentives differ markedly from the formal incentives, and income from illegal rents
far exceeds the official salary, a salary increase is unlikely to change existing patterns of behaviour.
Potentially, there are two types of accountability pressures in relation to the performance of judges: internal
review by other judges (through judgments being appealed to the next tier of the courts or through
reviews of operational efficiency in the way of performance evaluation) and external scrutiny from the
media and civil society. External scrutiny of the Judiciary is severely curtailed, with not all decisions being
published, something one hopes will be overcome in coming years through the dual pressures of the
2009 and the digital agenda (see Y: appendix 1).
Under the existing system, the performance of sub-ordinate court judges is evaluated through the Annual
Confidential Report (ACR), a process that fails as an accountability mechanism but rather looms as a
potential instrument of political control. For the Assistant Judges up to Additional District Judges, the ACR is
written by the District Judge. The ACR of the District Judge and Additional District Judge is written by
Supreme Court Judges. The culture of (reflecting lobbying efforts and patronage without any
consideration of performance) prevails here, with judges being cautious in not alienating the senior judge
who reviews their performance. Political interference can also have an impact on the ACR (see Z: appendix
1). In 2000, a Code of Conduct for the Judges of the Supreme Court was prescribed by the Supreme Judicial
Council in the exercise of power under Article 96(4)(a) of the Constitution, but there is a dearth of
mechanisms to enforce such a code (see AA: appendix 1).
Participation in training and updating of skills has little impact on the ACR. Training received by the judges
in sub-ordinate courts consists of initial training at the Judicial Administration Training Institute and on-the
job orientation training. Once a judge is appointed to the Supreme Court, the only training s/he gets
receives is on the job.
There remain few meaningful accountability mechanisms for the Judiciary, which are able to protect itself
from criticism through contempt laws. Many have argued that the 1926 fails to strike
a balance between protection of the court and freedom of expression (see BB: appendix 1). The law of
contempt of court (see CC: appendix 1) that has developed in Bangladesh and other parts of the sub-
continent is far more draconian than that found in the United Kingdom and other parts of the common law
4.5.3 Accountability
Right
to Information Act
tadbir
Contempt of Court Act
"Transparent performance and qualification-based methods of enhancing compensation selectively
are widely practiced, would be politically justifiable and feasible, and would not lead to pressure for
system-wide wage increases."
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world today. It has been used on a number of occasions to protect judges from accountability and justified
criticism and to protect the Judiciary from public scrutiny. The Contempt of Court Ordinance 2008, which
effectively curtailed the courts' powers of contempt (see DD: appendix 1), was struck down by the High
Court in May 2008.
There are a number of examples where contempt laws have been used to protect judges against
accountability pressures from citizens, on the basis that they would interfere with the judges' ability to
function properly and would thereby have an impact on public confidence. An article published in late 2008
in the Bangla language daily, , chronicled significant judicial corruption and politicisation of the
Judiciary, has led to contempt of court charges against the journalist, rather than any move towards
extracting greater accountability of the Judiciary. Some years before, two national newspapers reported in
that an additional judge of the High Court, who was serving his probationary term, had doctored his law
degree. Instead of an inquiry being instituted to first determine the veracity of these claims, and then to
institute contempt of court proceedings if this was untrue and malicious, proceedings were instituted
immediately and the High Court convicted editors, publishers and three reporters for contempt of court in
2005.  Journalists were barred from contacting judges directly (see EE : appendix 1).
According to Article 88 of the Constitution, the salary of Supreme Court judges is charged on the
consolidated fund and not subject to a vote of Parliament. But as administrative expenses are not defined,
the Ministry of Finance can regulate such allocation in the name of financial discipline owing to its authority
to make financial rules and regulations and ensure financial discipline of the government. This practice has
the potential to seriously undermine the effective functioning of the judiciary (see FF: appendix 1). Many
interviewees suggest that the administration has a somewhat hostile attitude towards the judiciary, and fails
to respond promptly to requests for assistance in terms of staffing, manpower and basic resources (see GG:
appendix 1). If the is to be fully implemented, the budget management or the Judiciary
should be fully delegated to an independent secretariat in the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice's office.
The situation is more serious in the subordinate courts. When large numbers of new magistrates were
recruited last year, there were no new court rooms for them to work in (they needed to share courts and
could not sit in session regularly), they needed to share stenographers and were often not provided with the
most rudimentary of equipment (such as pens). In some cases, Deputy Commissioners permit judicial
magistrates or assistant judges to use their offices, but many do not (see HH: appendix 1). Recent newspaper
reports suggest that the Ministry of Law is creating obstacles in providing services such as housing and
vehicles for Assistant Judges, a contention that the research supports (see II: appendix 1) . Finally, executive
control over investigation officers can interfere with the autonomous functioning of the lower courts. Quite
often investigation officers are transferred from one police station to another and the judge fails to find the
officer as a witness when needed for a case (see JJ: appendix 1).
As there is no separate secretariat for the Judiciary, the Law Ministry can play a significant role in
determining the transfer, promotion and posting of the subordinate court judges. The recent changes to the
legal framework appear to have made little difference to end Executive dominance, because the whole
process of consultation with the Supreme Court can be undermined or manipulated by the Law Ministry.
Almost all the sub-ordinate court judges that were interviewed in the study are of opinion that no change
has occurred (see KK: appendix 1).
Prothom Alo
Masdar Hossain
4.5.4 Financial and Administrative Independence
4.5.5 Transfer, Promotion and Posting
67
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
4.5.6 Authority: Enforcement and Legitimacy
The Judiciary's authority is the extent to which it is seen by the society as a legitimate body for the
determination of legal issues and the extent to which parts of the state apparatus and powerful individuals
comply with, and enforce, its decisions. The ability of the Bangladesh judicial system to enforce its own
judgments is weak. Apart from systematic political interference in law enforcement at the lower levels
(Article2 2006), partisan interference at the highest levels (through, for instance, a pliant Attorney-General
who appeals cases or seeks stays on execution) has created a system where compliance is weak, where
powerful political and economic interests and actors are involved (Islam 2003).
The undermining of the authority of the courts as a legitimate arbiter of disputes over power has been a
longer term narrative. During the periods of martial law, constitutional rule was severely undermined and
the Constitution was subservient to the martial law proclamation ((DLR 1978 (SC) 207). The subordinate
courts were brought under executive control, which allowed the bureaucracy to take an upper hand over
the lower courts. The result was an effective partnership between the military government and the
bureaucracy, which preserved the interests of both the actors. An interesting thing to note here is that in
neither of the two martial law periods, was any attempt made to manipulate the appointment procedure of
Supreme Court judges. However, there was a gradual decline in the authority of the courts, which gathered
significant pace during the last BNP regime.
During 2006, the Supreme Court perhaps lost the 'moral authority' that it previously had and it is unclear
how this will be recovered. During that year, the Government and Election Commission were acting in open
defiance of laws, court rulings and the Constitution. Even where the courts made courageous decisions on
voter lists and asset disclosure for politicians, weak enforcement undermined accountability. High Court
rulings were typically appealed by the Attorney-General as a matter of course to stay execution of
judgments. Stays on Appellate Division hearings were sought. In the context of the voter list controversy, we
witnessed the spectacle of one of the Election Commissioners (a former judge) saying that he will only
implement those court judgments that he deems 'legal' and defy 'illegal judgments'. When the President
appointed himself as the head of the Caretaker Government in late 2006, the constitutional challenge was
subverted by the Chief Justice's actions. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court will fully recover from the
impact of events in 2006 and since, where it lost its legitimacy as the arbiter of significant disputes over
power.
Scholars have argued that judicial independence is, to a large extent, dependent on the 'authority' of the
institution gained through its political status, which eventually allows the institution to determine some of
the most sensitive political controversies of the day. The Indian Supreme Court has managed to maintain
this authority and political status, even to a point where it is now being criticised for it. It is this decline in
authority which makes it hardly surprising that the courts failed to challenge in a significant manner any
controversial policies (Barzilai and Sened 1997) during the CTG period.
When one examines the legal and constitutional framework over the past 35 years, there is an unmistakable
trend towards the undermining of the Judiciary, evident in the attempt to reduce judicial independence and
the authority of the institution for instance, through the 4 amendment to the Constitution, the curbing of
the authority of the Judiciary by the military governments through the 5 amendment, the deliberate
failure by successive elected governments to implement the Appellate Division judgment relating to the
separation of the Judiciary from the executive, and efforts to manipulate the appointments process to the
4.6 The Judiciary and the Stakes of Politics
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superior courts in recent years. The 'politicisation of the Judiciary' which this chapter describes, has occurred
during the last three decades, and refers to a multiplicity of mechanisms that emerged to subvert the
institutional autonomy of the Judiciary and the personal independence of judges, so that the extra-legal
actions of the executive or of individuals aligned with those influential in the ruling party remain beyond
challenge. The reason is simple: with the decline amongst political actors of any commitment to the idea of
a self-restraining state, came a desire to stifle the role of the Judiciary as an effective institution of
accountability which will provide some restraint on power and to use the law enforcement apparatus as an
instrument for party-political gain.
After the restoration of multi-party electoral politics in 1991, the ascendancy of the political class in
Bangladesh has seen the development of clientelistic relationships with the Judiciary. The rise of 'patriarchy'
gave birth to a 'winner-takes-all' syndrome, where an election assures the winner complete control of public
institutions and access to the economic benefits of the state (whether contracts from government tenders
or illegal rents). The courts became a useful mechanism for denying the opposition its own space in the
political realm (control over the lower courts and law enforcement agencies through criminal cases is the
key), a driver of control over the subordinate Judiciary. The impetus for control over the superior courts was
to undermine its operation as an accountability mechanism, through judicial review and the prerogative
writ jurisdiction. As the stakes of political power have increased over time with the quantum of resources
that are potentially the spoils of office, and the risk of access to rents being closed when losing office,
there were strong incentives for incumbent governments to hamper judicial independence and few
restraints preventing them from doing so. The drivers -- to control the distribution of public resources
keeping the ruling party and its allies above legal restraint whilst engaging in extra-legal and
unconstitutional practices are very powerful. It should be noted that the Judiciary was in a very vulnerable
position in any instance, due to a wholly inadequate (material and non-material) incentive structure that had
deteriorated steadily over the course of the independent Bangladesh.
The introduction of the Caretaker Government provides an illustration of a factor that has increased the
motivation for political actors to interfere in the judicial appointments process. Prior to 1996, the Chief
Justice played a number of roles of consequence to the ruling party: hearing cases on appeal from the High
Court, case allocation (especially of cases involving writ petitions to judges on the High Court Division), and
a role in appointments to the bench. However, the potential political cost of being caught in the act of
manipulating the appointment of the Chief Justice or the courts' decision-making was higher than the
benefits. After the inception of the CTG, the last retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is constitutionally
mandated to head a Caretaker Government which conducts an election upon which the ruling party's
political future rests. There emerged a strong new incentive to ensure that a loyalist is occupying the
position of Chief Justice, and thus to manipulate the entire system of appointments and promotions. The
parties started to manipulate the formal rules -- for the most part not breaching the letter of the existing law,
but acting in defiance of its spirit, discarding unwritten conventions (such as promotion and appointment to
the Appellate Division on the basis of seniority, or consultation with the Chief Justice in appointments to the
upper courts) and in some instances changing the formal rules (such as extending the retirement age to 67).
Eventually, a stronger nexus has formed between the Judiciary and the ruling party during the denouement
of the last BNP government, but continued to an extent during the CTG and the current government. The
control over the appointment procedure of Supreme Court judges eventually allowed the political parties
not only to choose the head of the CTG but also to use the institution in achieving its political objective of
suppressing the opposition and of avoiding any accountability for violations of the Constitution.
14
14 Refer to the discussion in Chapter 2.
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What ultimately protects the independence of Judiciary in developed countries and amongst more
politically mature countries in the developing world is a community consensus (amongst the general public,
politicians of all hues, the legal profession) that judicial independence is a quality worth protecting and that
there should be limits on the authority and power of political actors. Where the stakes of politics (the costs
of winning and losing elections) are low and especially where the stakes of being caught in the act of
interference are high, there is relatively little incentive for political actors to interfere with judicial
independence. In the Bangladesh context, we have witnessed an increase in the stakes of politics coupled
with few consequences for politicians being caught in manipulating the Judiciary. The latter is unlikely to
change very quickly in light of the small size of a vocal middle class voice that holds any real political
consequences for the ruling party. It will require either an enlightened political actor choosing to recommit
to the notion of constitutionalism, to the benefits of a self-restraining state, or strong public demand that is
likely to reverse this trend in the near future. The legal profession has a potentially large role in mobilizing
this demand, because of its proximity to, and familiarity with, the courts and its relative visibility and access
to media.
While there have been many changes to the formal institutional framework, judicial independence has
principally been undermined in recent years through the appointments process, with significant numbers of
partisan and less able appointees to the bench. This has had an obvious effect on the quality of justice, on
the fairness and impartiality of decisions; poor quality judges are often beholden to those who appoint
them, and are more open to improper influence and corruption. While corruption and external interference
in the lower courts have long been recognised as a serious problem, there has been growing recognition
that the superior courts have suffered a long term decline in both quality and integrity. In the past, the
relative homogeneity of social background of the upper judiciary (Griffith 1997), while making it quite
conservative, also imposed strong peer pressures for performance and acted as a deterrent against both
corruption and political influence. With the appointment of poor quality party loyalists to the bench from a
different social stratum, social and professional pressure from within the judiciary has not been a significant
deterrent to corruption and improper influence in verdicts. The legitimacy of the courts and citizens' trust in
its decisions have thus been undermined.
As indicated in the body of this Chapter, almost immediately after taking office, the CTG took concrete steps
to comply with the judgment, which ordered the separation of Judiciary from the executive
branch of government. Partisan political influences have also had far less influence over the courts' decisions
during the CTG period than in previous years. Nevertheless, the changes to the formal rules appear to have
had little impact to reverse the decline in judicial integrity. Judicial rulings through the CTG's tenure
consistently followed the political script of the period. Generally speaking, judges did not rule against the
vital interests of the CTG or military. In this light of these observations, the team has made an effort to
analyse the effects of the formal separation.
What we found is that the informal rules that have developed over time which have governed the Judiciary
appear to have such strong roots that substantial changes to the formal legal framework have had relatively
little impact. Thus, while the formal incentives within the Judiciary may not have changed substantially over
the last three decades, the informal incentives, as hypothesised, have changed or become accentuated in
recent years as patrimonialism has expanded. This in turn has distorted the application of formal processes
such as appointments and promotions, and led to the breakdown in routine monitoring and supervision.
4.7 Conclusion
15
Masdar Hossain
15 Corruption database of Transparency International in Bangladesh (2005) reports that 66% of the surveyed people, who went to
courts, had to pay bribes “to the lower judiciary at an average rate of Tk. 6,135.00”.
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While the appointment procedure of judges has been largely freed from executive control at the sub-
ordinate judiciary level (although we note the remaining administrative and financial reliance upon the
government), apart from the brief interlude of the Supreme Judicial Commission during the CTG, the
situation remains little changed for the upper courts. It is hoped that the government complies with the
recent Appellate Division judgment which requires consultation with the Chief Justice. Greater transparency
and credibility in appointments strengthens the confidence of the litigants and public in the Judiciary.
Apart from a transparent process for appointments with a greater role for the Judiciary, it will be necessary
to overhaul the compensation package for the judges by delinking it from the central government salary
system and restoring it to the levels prevailing in the 1950s (WB 1996).
5.1 Introduction
In a constitutional democracy like Bangladesh, Parliament and Judiciary are fundamental to rule-based
governance. In addition, there are four other key institutions which can potentially restrain and hold to
account the Executive as well as other politically and economically powerful actors. The institutions are the
Election Commission, the Public Service Commission, the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and
the Anti-Corruption Commission. Because of their key role in holding the government, bureaucracy and
politicians accountable, they are referred to as the 'Institutions of Accountability' (IoA). Schacter (2000)
defines IoA as independent public bodies empowered to oversee the state's actions, demand explanations,
and, when circumstances warrant, impose penalties on the government for improper or illegal activity. The
first three are constitutional bodies designed to strengthen governance by establishing rule of law, ensuring
equality, democracy, transparency and accountability within the statecraft. The Bangladesh Election
Commission is designed to ensure free and fair elections that reflect people's choice and also hold the
political parties accountable for their actions. The Public Service Commission is empowered to select the
best candidates in a competitive and impartial manner for the bureaucracy and ensure discipline within the
public administration. The Office of Comptroller and Auditor General is entrusted with the authority to audit
the public bodies in a timely and transparent manner. The Anti-Corruption Commission (established in 2004)
- not a constitutional body - is designed to address endemic corruption prevailing in Bangladesh.
These institutions are however yet to establish themselves with credibility and public trust. Massive
politicisation has hindered their optimal performance over the years. There has been an ever increasing
demand for reforming and strengthening these institutions from all quarters of our society. Against this
backdrop, this Chapter analyses these institutions under four key themes, namely, (how
independent the institutions are from any influence), (state of accountability mechanisms),
(organisational structure and capacity in discharging their mandate) and (how far
they are achieving their mandate). Independence, efficiency and effectiveness of these institutions are
inherently linked to the ultimate objective of ensuring accountability.
The Chapter draws extensively on the background papers on these institutions prepared through both
primary and secondary research by the Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) under its project on the
independence
accountability
efficiency effectiveness
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Institutions of Accountability
'Institutions of Accountability'. Section 5.2 describes how the concept of independence has been breached
in practice. Section 5.3 analyses the accountability structure. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 explore the issues of
efficiency and effectiveness of these institutions. Section 5.6 concludes by summing up the findings and
making specific recommendations for optimum functioning of these institutions. The objective of the
research is to understand the inherent deficiencies and challenges that these institutions face for further
research, debate and dialogue. The research outcome offers practical advice and guidance on a sequenced
set of feasible reforms that can raise the performance of the institutions of accountability to a more effective
and sustainable level.
Independence implies that these institutions should act without pressure- external or internal, and
should have the discretion to draw resources and spend them to fulfil their mandate. The Chapter argues
that leadership and fiscal autonomy of these institutions and their relationship with the executive organ are
key elements for upholding independence. The Chapter further argues that, the appointment process at the
leadership position is the main avenue for politicisation of these institutions by the executive organ.
The Constitution of Bangladesh bestows Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC), the Office of the
Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG) and the Public Service Commission (PSC) with independence. In
addition, the Constitution provides the BEC with authority to take legal actions against anyone obstructing
the Commission in its independent functioning. The PSC's independence and autonomy have been
guaranteed under provisions made in the Constitution and President's Orders, as per Schedule I of the Rules
of Business (issued in 1975) (Zafarullah and Khan 2005). The government cannot remove the leadership of
the above institutions at its will as the Constitution provides due protection. The Anti-Corruption
Commission (ACC) is not a constitutional body but the Anti-Corruption Commission Act (2004) ensures its
independence.
Although constitutional and statutory protection is the necessary precondition for upholding
independence, it is the institutional leaders' ability and willingness to act objectively in a non-partisan
manner which increases the institutions' independence and credibility.
The BEC scenario gives us a mixed picture interwoven with success as well as failure regarding leadership.
The 5 , 7 , 8 and 9 parliamentary elections were held under the non-party Caretaker Government
system. It may therefore be said that the BEC and the Caretaker Government share the success to a large
extent. The 4 and 6 parliamentary elections and a number of by-elections under the political regimes
have been criticised for not being free and fair. Some of these tainted elections created political crises in the
country. The by-elections of Magura (1994) and Dhaka (2001) are two such examples. During these elections
the BEC failed to compel the political parties to comply with the rules and regulations promulgated by them.
Similarly, the BEC has not been able to enforce the High Court decision on compulsory disclosure of nine
categories of information about the candidates except for the 9 parliamentary election.
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1 The Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) prepared four background papers on these institutions. In so doing, we reviewed
existing literature, analysed legal and statutory frameworks of these institutions and conducted in-depth interviews with relevant
experts and employees of these institutions
2 Article 118(4) and Article 128(3)
3 As per the Constitution the leadership are deemed equivalent to the Judge of Supreme Court
Although the current leadership has succeeded to register political parties with the Commission but there
are a number of crucial issues which are yet to be resolved. The local government election held under the
political regime in early 2009 has been criticised on the basis that it has not been as fair as the 2008
parliamentary election. The BEC has not been able to curb political influence during local government
election. However, the Commission has been vocal against such issues and has filed a case against a minister
for interference during the recent local government election. This indicates that if the leadership possesses
the willingness and ability, it can protect its independence and act with credibility to certain extents. But this
obviously cannot insulate the institution from the pressure exerted by the Executive. For leadership to work
truly independently, the Executive also needs to play a supportive role.
The PSC leadership portrays a similar picture. It is a common scenario in Bangladesh for the new
government to select a new PSC Chairman as a reward to the person who has proven his/her loyalty to the
party. However, there have been Chairs and Members whose strong leadership gave PSC credibility as they
upheld its independence. In contrast, some leadership turned the PSC into an institution crippled with
corruption and acquiescent to the political party in power (IGS 2007b).
The OCAG has the potential to hold the Executive accountable in their use of public resources. The
institution deals with sensitive financial issues directly related to political and administrative corruption
(when we define corruption as the use of public resources for private gain) and therefore the ruling party
would consider an effective OCAG a threat to its partisan interest. There is however not enough evidence
suggesting partisan behaviour by the OCAG in the public domain. At the same time, it can be argued that
the OCAG has not been able to generate public awareness on scrutinising the state's behaviour in using
public funds.
Unlike BEC, PSC and OCAG, the ACC is not a constitutional body but an independent, autonomous and non-
partisan organisation. Since its inception, weak and divided leadership has affected the ACC's
independence and its ability to function. Disagreements among the three Commissioners on different issues
further intensified the situation.
Fiscal autonomy is another important aspect of independence for the institutions. The roles of the Ministry
of Finance (MoF) and the Parliament are crucial in this respect. As per Article 88 of the Constitution, the
following expenditure shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund:
The remuneration payable to the Election Commissioners, Comptroller & Auditor-General, Chairman
and Members of the PSC;
The administrative expenses of, including remuneration payable to, officers and servants of the above
three Institutions.
The constitutional provisions for fiscal autonomy have a grey area, as the term 'administrative expenses' has
not been defined. This vagueness creates room for the Executive to curb fiscal autonomy of the
aforementioned bodies. The definition does not include capital expenditure, especially development
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4 The Daily Star, 'Minister Latif Sued for Poll Offence', 6 February 2009
5 The EC appointed Upazila Election Officers, who were selected through the PSC in 2003. This recruitment was criticised on the
grounds that the appointed people were ruling party men. Later on this recruitment created a controversy within the country;
New Age, “Corruption, nepotism dog civil service recruitment”, 27 November 2005
6 Section 3, ACC Act 2004
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programme. Thus, the BEC, PSC and OCAG are financially dependent on the MoF. BEC requires submitting a
bill of demand to the Parliament through the MoF. The institutions themselves usually prepare their
budgets, but it is in the submission and approval procedure where involvement of the Executive is practiced.
One BEC official asserted that MoF often fulfils their justified demands but a higher official from an election
observer group opined that the MoF can have a stronghold due to this dependency (IGS 2008). The PSC
budget in effect comes through the Ministry of Establishment (MoE). Whether or not the MoE plays a role in
preparing the PSC budget estimates remains unclear. There are two opposing views in this regard: some
opine that PSC prepares its own estimate and some suggested that the MoE plays a definite role (IGS 2007c).
A similar scenario is observed with the OCAG. Even though the OCAG prepares its own budget, the MoF
plays a definite role. The OCAG however, unlike BEC and PSC, can re-allocate funds across spending heads
(IGS 2009b). It is worth mentioning that BEC and PSC have their own source of income. However, they do not
have any control over these resources as they directly go into the government coffers.
As per Section 25 of the Anti-Corruption Act (2004), the government will allocate a certain sum in favour of
the ACC for its expenditure. Constitutional provisions do not apply since ACC is not a constitutional body.
However, there is no permanent source of funding for the ACC to take initiatives independently for the
various purposes essential for its anti-corruption drive. In order to make the ACC more independent in this
regard, a long-term block grant could be provided by the Parliament at the beginning of each new term (IGS
2007a).
This analysis shows that a lack of clarity in the definition of consolidated funds coupled with bureaucratic
control limits the fiscal autonomy of the four institutions under consideration.
All four institutions need support from various government agencies to fulfil their mandate. It has been
observed that the Executive often exploits opportunities to influence these institutions.
The BEC needs support from various ministries and agencies to conduct a free and fair election and
discharge its functions. Constitution has made it obligatory for all Executive authorities to assist the BEC in
discharging its functions. However, neither the Constitution nor the relevant statutes spell out the manner
of such assistance. There are instances where the BEC had to comply with government's directives (TIB
2006). According to one BEC official, Executive influences are prevalent while selecting personnel for
election management (IGS 2008). The Election Commission Secretariat is the operational hub for the
Commission, which was under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) until 2007. Hence, the Prime Minister was
able to exercise arm-length control over the BEC. However, the last interim government has separated the
BEC-Secretariat from the PMO.
The PSC has to depend on several offices of the government to perform its function, especially on the
Ministry of Establishment. One former PSC Member noted, “MoE many a times creates unnecessary delay in
providing the list of vacant posts to PSC” (IGS 2007b). Karim (2007) argues that the 'Warrant of Precedence'
creates opportunities for the bureaucracy to intervene PSC decisions. It is often the case that the
Establishment Secretary has a higher rank status than the PSC Members and thus the latter feel constrained
in seeking cooperation from the former.
5.2.3 Relationship with the Executive: Practical Requirement for Independence
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Doyal (2000) argues that OCAG is administratively subordinate to the government -particularly to the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Establishment. The MoF controls the budget and the Audit and
Accounts Cadre officers work in the OCAG: both parts of the Executive branch of government. One high
official of the OCAG said, “though the OCAG should have 4535 employees, currently it has only 2006 in its 10
Directorates. This is because the OCAG could not recruit in vacant positions, rather requires going through
the tardy channels of MoE and MoF” (IGS 2009b). The OCAG also lacks the freedom to professionalise its
office. This becomes acutely problematic in conducting technical audit, which needs multidisciplinary
expertise, as they cannot recruit the number and kinds of people required.
Since the inception of the ACC in 2004, Executive interference in the functions of ACC was notable,
especially on the two issues of appointment of the Secretary and absorbing the former Bureau of Anti-
Corruption (BAC) staff into the newly constituted ACC. The Commissioners blamed the Cabinet Division for
its interference in the function of ACC as the Cabinet Division sent a letter to the ACC stating that it (the
Cabinet Division) has the sole jurisdiction to transfer the staff of the defunct Bureau of Anti-Corruption. The
rift between the ACC and Cabinet Division on these issues escalated to such a level that the ACC sent a letter
to the Cabinet Division, asking it not to interfere with the Commission's activities and thus make it
inoperative. The ACC also needs to coordinate with a number of law enforcing and investigative agencies
such as the National Board of Revenue and Bangladesh Bank. Effective coordination with other law
enforcing, intelligence and investigation agencies is likely to increase the effectiveness of the ACC. However,
successful coordination has not been evident so far. Instead, attempts of control on behalf of the Executive
have been noted since the birth of the existing ACC.
The Constitution and the legal framework for each of these oversight institutions provide indications for
appointments to their leadership positions. The process lacks transparency, and at times it seems that the
process becomes an rather than a structured one. Lack of transparency and the nature of the
process creates room for politicisation. This section provides a brief account of the appointment process and
identifies the loopholes.
The Constitution furnishes directives about the number, nature of composition and tenure for the leadership
of the BEC, PSC and OCAG with articles specifying ineligibility as well as process for removal. The President
is the appointing authority and the leadership has to write directly to the President to resign from the post.
The Constitution provides for making of a law describing conditions and process for appointing the Election
Commissioners. But no such law has been formed to date. The Constitution also compels the President to
act as per the advice of the Prime Minister and hence the danger of partisan influence is high.
According to available information, five out of 10 Chief Election Commissioners (CEC) and 10 out of 19
Election Commissioners (EC) could not complete their full terms. Most of the CECs and ECs were forced to
retire prematurely for their allegedly partisan behaviour or lack of credibility. It is interesting to note that
they were however not tried before the Supreme Judicial Council for their alleged misconduct. Opposition
political parties agitated and campaigned against them demanding their resignation instead of the trial
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8 The New Age, 'ACC to ask Cabinet Division to stop interference', 24 March 2005
9 For example, in the early 2007, the then caretaker government created the National Coordination Council (NCC). This was done to
strengthen and speed up the anti-corruption drive. The later body in effect became the de facto arm of the government on the
Commission. The NCC appointed a number of special Task Forces, with representation from a number of agencies, to strengthen
the drive against corruption (IGS 2007a).
10 Article 118, 127,129, 130, 138 and 139
11 Article 48(3)
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under the said council as per the rule of law (IGS 2008). In April 1972, through 'Bangladesh Public service
Commission Order' (President's Order No. 34 of 1972), two separate PSCs were established, namely BPSC
(First) and BPSC (Second). The President had to appoint the Chair and Members as well as determine their
numbers. In 1977, the government through the promulgation of Bangladesh Public Service Commission
Order, 1977 decided to establish one PSC instead of two. The number of Members was also fixed by the
ordinance (IGS 2007b). The President more or less follows the seniority principle as a norm in appointing the
Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG). Since independence, the senior most officers of the Audit and
Accounts cadre usually received the appointment, except in two cases, in which the seniority principle was
violated, allegedly on political and nepotistic considerations. Another important trend found in the
appointment process is that officers who migrated permanently from the OCAG to the Secretariat were
appointed in most cases. The appointment of the 9 C&AG was the first deviation from this trend. He was
the first appointee from within the OCAG. The appointment of the 10 C&AG continued this deviation.
Considering the above dynamics in the appointment process, it can be argued that the seniority norm alone
cannot prevent the politicisation of the appointment process (IGS 2009b).
The Anti-Corruption Commission, established in 2004, is not a constitutional body but has an advantage
over the other three in terms of appointment process. The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004 and Anti-
Corruption Commission Rule, 2007 clearly define the process and criteria for selecting the Chairman and
Commissioners along with the non-eligibility criteria. The search committee makes the nominations and the
President appoints the Chairman as well as the Commissioners from the list of nominees suggested by the
search committee. Despite these advantages, the appointment of the first Chairman and Commissioners
created controversy due to politicisation (IGS 2007a). The process is well defined but lacks transparency.
The Constitution of Bangladesh along with the legal framework of the oversight institutions states that the
President is the appointing authority. But as mentioned before, Article 48(3) states that the President shall
act as per the advice from the Prime Minister - which opens up the avenue for politicisation. The
Constitution also mentions how and when a person can be removed from the leadership position s/he is
holding. However, neither the Constitution nor the statutes specify a well-defined and structured procedure
outlining the criteria (i.e. eligibility and non-eligibility criteria for these constitutional positions), rules and
process for their selection and appointment. The scope for civil society and media scrutiny does not exist
and there is no room for the opposition to play a role in the selection process either. The process appears
non-transparent and Executive dominated. Besides, the lack of transparency resulting from absence of
well-defined rules creates room for practicing discretion. This discretionary power is often exploited by the
political leadership from a narrow and selfish political/partisan point of view and hence, we have seen
crippled leadership in the oversight institutions.
Accountability is generally defined as "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's actions
and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct" (Schedler 1999).
This process starts with providing an incumbent with clearly stated responsibilities and ascertaining his/her
informed consent followed by periodic upward reporting by the incumbent regarding (his/her) performance
of responsibilities. Accountability is defined, in a strict sense, as the relationship between two parties - one
the 'holder of accountability' and the other the 'giver of accountability'. Therefore, whenever a relationship is
established in which the 'holder' has the right to seek information about, to investigate and to scrutinise the
actions of the 'giver', we can term that relationship as accountability (Mulgan 2002). In Bangladesh, the legal
framework of the oversight institutions spells out the accountability mechanism.
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This section analyses accountability as per the 'holder-giver' relationship elaborating the pertinent issues.
We analyse accountability from three aspects-
The relationship between the President as holder and the oversight institutions as giver
The relationship between the institution as holder and the institutions own administration as giver. This
is an analysis of the internal accountability mechanisms.
The relationship between the citizens as holder and the institution as giver
The Constitution states that the BEC shall be independent in the exercise of its functions and would be
subject only to the Constitution and any other law. The CEC and ECs can only be removed from their
positions by a Supreme Judicial Council. The Constitution empowers the President to form a Supreme
Judicial Council led by the Chief Justice to investigate misconducts of the CEC or ECs or their inability to
serve those constitutional positions. This is the only mechanism that the Constitution provides for the
accountability of the BEC to the President. However, political parties have many a time levelled the
allegation that the CEC and the other ECs were partisan, but the Council has never yet been formed. It
should be noted that the BEC has no accountability relationship with the Parliament. Unlike other
constitutional bodies, the PSC and the OCAG, the BEC does not prepare any annual report. However, in the
case of the BEC, independence and accountability should be complementary. The BEC should be
independent from undue influences and thus be given extensive authority. At the same time, the institution
should also be accountable to assure all concerned that it is not abusing its authority and is performing
without fear and favour. Accountability through Parliament may be advantageous for the BEC as it may be a
way to avoid Executive control under the thinly veiled guise of accountability. If the BEC annual report is
presented before the Parliament, the Parliament would be able to assess whether the BEC is performing as it
should and also be able to take necessary actions to strengthen it further. If any MP identifies any irregularity
in the performance of the BEC, s/he can move a petition following Section 100 of the Parliamentary Rules of
Procedure. This will establish a balanced relationship between the Parliament, the Executive branch and the
BEC (IGS 2008).
The PSC has the constitutional obligation to submit its annual report to the President by 1 March every
year. However, it is not mandatory for the Parliament to discuss the report. Research indicates that MPs are
often reluctant to discuss this report and at the same time the PSC is not adequately pro-active in ensuring
that its recommendations are implemented (IGS 2007b).
The OCAG, as per the Section 44 of the Rules of Business, has to submit its annual report to both the
President and Prime Minister through the Finance Ministry. As the report goes through the PMO, the risk
remains that the Executive might drive a hard bargain with the C&AG over politically inconvenient audit
objections. Of course, as the President is invariably an appointee of the ruling party, it makes not much
difference if the report is presented to him directly. All these suggest that the OCAG is currently working as a
part of the government. Under the prevailing circumstances, it is unlikely to play a bold and active auditing
role (IGS 2009).
In spite of not being a constitutional body, the accountability mechanisms of the Anti-Corruption
Commission are similar to that of PSC. According to Clause 29 of the ACC Act (2004), the Commission shall
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submit its annual report by 1 March every year to the President. The President has the onus to present the
report to the Parliament. Since its inception in 2004, under the previous leadership, the Commission
continuously failed to produce its annual report. At present, the annual report is being published and made
available online. Since there was no Parliament in 2007-2008 we will need to wait for the new Parliament's
evaluation of the report. However, it should be noted that the Parliament is not required to discuss the
report in its session.
Accountability of the oversight institutions (as giver) to the President (as holder) depicts a mixed scenario. As
observed earlier, BEC is not required to produce and submit annual report to the President but PSC, OCAG
and ACC are so required. The statutes do not specify any deadline for the President to present the annual
reports to the Parliament. The President can first of all play a pro-active role by placing the annual reports in
the Parliament within a specific timeframe. The research shows that Parliament may play a central role in
ensuring accountability of these oversight institutions. Parliamentary discussion on these reports is likely to
increase accountability and legitimacy of these institutions. The statutes however do not provide a clear
indication as to how the Parliament can play a role in this regard. The MPs, as per the Constitution, use the
committees and/or tools such as questions and answers, and various types of motions to exact
accountability. Since 1990s the Parliaments have been more or less active their predecessors. It
should be noted however that there is not much evidence available as to how the MPs have fared in
discussing issues related to the accountability of the oversight institutions, neither in the house nor in the
committees. It can be argued that the oversight institutions are not serious enough about producing a
credible annual report. The statutes also lack specific directions or guidelines regarding the preparation of
the annual report.
The internal accountability mechanisms within BEC were traditionally challenged mainly by two factors: the
control of the Prime Minister's Office over the BEC Secretariat and the staff on deputation. The Election
Commission Secretariat Act (2009) promulgated on 9 March 2008, placed the EC Secretariat under the
Commission. As per the Act, the Secretary is the head of the EC Secretariat and s/he will report to the Chief
Election Commissioner. The Secretariat is the executive agency for the Commission and it will control all field
offices, human resources, and budget, as well as address disciplinary matters. The Commission will formulate
its own rules and organogram. The Commission will appoint its own staff who will be subject to the Election
Commission (Officers and Staff ) Rules (1979). However, these rules do not apply to the officers on
deputation. A BEC official opined that the Commissioners have no scope for taking disciplinary actions
against deputed officials which creates complacency in the deputed officials (IGS 2008). It can be argued
that the hierarchical chain of accountability will be dominated by the Secretary against whom the
Commission cannot take any action. The Secretary, who is often a deputed bureaucrat, is virtually beyond
the CEC's control.
The Public Service Commission's accountability can be analysed from the hierarchical and the disciplinary
perspectives. The accountability structure between the Commission and the Secretariat follows a
hierarchical chain. The Secretary, who is deputed from other cadre services, heads the Secretariat. The
officers below him are accountable to him and the Secretary is accountable to the Chair of PSC. Within the
Commission, the Assistant Directors are accountable to the Directors and the Directors are accountable to
the Members. However in most cases there has been a complete absence of any control mechanism over
PSC staff who are very aware of this immunity. This negative attitude and the absence of clear rules
regarding disciplinary actions of the secretariat staff, in fact, hampers the internal accountability mechanism.
The situation becomes more complex when incompetent employees continue to go unpunished in spite of
vis-à-vis
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recurring proof of their inefficiency. Another basic problem with the internal accountability mechanism lies
in the accountability procedure followed for the officers on deputation. The Commission has no authority
over the officers on deputation in disciplinary matters (IGS 2007b).
The OCAG follows the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1979 and the Government Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules 1985 to retain internal discipline. As audit is an oversight function and very different from
the managerial functions that other government servants perform, the OCAG formulated a Code of Ethics,
which it tries to implant in its auditors through training. Despite such measures, many officials of audited
organisations revealed that auditors often made illegal demands and harassed them. Allegations include
intimidation, fictitious and inflated objections, negotiation on the number and types of para, etc. One senior
official of the OCAG admitted to the allegations but observed, “it is very difficult to prove corruption. Both
auditors and auditee are engaged in underhand dealings and therefore we get information from none. We
so far heard about few allegations and took departmental actions in proven cases” (IGS 2009). Although the
Conduct Rules 1979 require government officers to submit yearly asset statements, this is not followed in
the OCAG. After a thorough analysis of the situation, this Report recommends that the following measures
be considered for strict implementation of the Conduct Rules and Code of Ethics.
Mandatory submission of asset statements by the officers and their periodical verification
Introducing stricter punishment for violating the Code of Ethics
Conducting test audit of a certain percentage of the total yearly audits to identify cases of violation of
the Conduct Rules and the Code and make public the result of such test audits.
Developing a two-way communication mechanism between the OCAG and the audited organisation would
increase transparency with the former making the latter aware of the standard audit process and the latter
might appraise the former about the actual audit practice (IGS 2009b).
Clause 16 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act (2004) states that the ACC administration will be headed
by a Secretary who is directly recruited by the Commission. The Commission also has the authority to
employ its own staff. The Act further states that the personnel of the Commission shall be subject to the
rules laid down by the Commission. Under Clause 22 (Section 8) of the ACC Rules (2007), the Commission
can ask the government to send officers on deputation and at the same time ACC personnel can be sent to
other government offices. Section 7 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Rules (2007) states that the
Commission shall have the Internal Corruption Investigation Unit headed by the Chairman. If any person is
found guilty, the Commission has the authority to bring criminal charges. The ACC (Officials) Service Rules
(2008) defines the internal accountability mechanisms adopted by the Commission. The officers and staff
have to follow the rules while working at the Commission. Staff and Officers also have to submit their own as
well as their family members' wealth statement within seven days of joining the Commission and they have
to submit similar wealth statements by 31 December each year (ACC Annual Report 2007-2008). However,
there is no evidence or information on ACC taking disciplinary actions against any of its personnel.
The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and of speech. The citizens have the right to
know about the functions and activities of the state institutions to develop an informed opinion. Hence,
accountability to the citizens is another dimension of the oversight institution's accountability.
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The accountability of the BEC to citizens has not been very healthy, even though there is a provision in the
RPO 1972 entitling citizens to have access to the documents relating to an election. However, in case of any
real grievance, it is difficult for an ordinary citizen to access the Commission. Here, civic organisations may
play a vibrant role by creating a bridge between the BEC and citizens. At present, civic organisations are
mostly engaged in voter awareness and election observation functions. However, the BEC regularly arranges
briefings for the media, which is playing a critical role in ensuring accountability of the BEC to citizens. The
website of the BEC is updated regularly and contains pertinent information. Judiciary and the OCAG through
the Public Accounts Committee can hold the BEC accountable on behalf of the people.
The Constitution empowers a person to submit writ petitions to the High Court against the BEC, if s/he
thinks that the BEC has done something unlawful or violated her/his fundamental right which is guaranteed
by the Constitution. On 22 May 2006, the High Court (Appellate Division) gave a verdict rejecting the then
voter list in response to a writ petition of several Awami League (AL) leaders. The High Court (HC) also
passed a 'show cause' notice to the BEC about the appointment of the then CEC on 18 June 2005 following
another writ petition. Besides, the HC issued directives on independence of the BEC secretariat, decision
on consensus in the Commission, and some other issues of the past several years. According to Article 42 of
the RPO 1972, the BEC preserves all documents relating to an election for one year and provides copies of
such documents for examination necessary for an election petition as per the directives of the HC (Article
24). Therefore, it can be concluded that the HC at present is playing a vital role in ensuring accountability of
the BEC.
The Bangladesh Constitution empowers the OCAG to examine financial documents of the BEC and
prepare annual audit reports. Article 132 demands submission of such audit reports before the Parliament.
Although the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure (Article 233) enables the Public Accounts Committee to
examine audit report of the BEC, it has failed to do so in practice. Therefore, no such audit objections have
been resolved over the years. Thus, the BEC at present enjoys immunity in financial matters.
An issue regarding the accountability of PSC is the access of citizens to PSC related information. In most
cases, PSC is a 'restricted' place for citizens. Class III and IV employees of PSC have sometimes been known to
create problems for citizens intentionally. As one former Member explained, “Out of nothing, the PSC staff
portrayed me as someone who was quite a hard nut to crack, unresponsive and arrogant person to visitors.”
To solve this problem, another former Member proposed to set up an information desk in front of PSC (IGS
2007b).
The OCAG's accountability to citizens can be determined from the degree of its openness in conducting its
operations and making important documents (its own budget, its annual financial statement, audit reports,
decisions, follow-up, disciplinary actions, performance analysis, etc.) public. At present, the OCAG is not as
transparent as it ought to be. Audit reports, which are presented to the Parliament, are generally not
accessible by the public. It publishes only outdated audit reports on its website. OCAG is yet to take
institutional measures to establish citizens' right to information. However, the Office publishes an annual
report and quarterly newsletters on a regular basis. These reports mainly highlight its achievements and
rarely include critical analysis of its own performance, financial statements and challenges it faced. The
Office could arrange open dialogue with the civil society and media personnel periodically to make
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important documents public and get suggestions for further improving performance. The Office can
organise peer review sessions (peers might be private sector experts, representatives from auditees,
Members of Parliament, civil society members) on its reports and performance as means to identify its own
weaknesses and ways to improve its accountability for optimum performance (IGS 2009b).
The ACC has been under media scrutiny from its very inception. In recent times, the ACC has been pro-active
with the media in disseminating information related to its functions. Thus, media has become a conduit
between the citizens and the Commission. The Commission also acknowledges the role of media in fighting
corruption. It agrees that objective journalism could contribute to the fight against corruption along with
other social problems (ACC Annual Report 2007-08; 49). The ACC website is informative as it provides up-to-
date information along with the annual report. The report provides updates about its achievements and
challenges. The Commission has outreach programmes both at the district and the levels. The
Commission has also developed partnerships with civil society and NGOs to raise awareness against
corruption (ACC Annual Report 2007-08; 52-53). These activities have enhanced the credibility of ACC as an
institution.
It can be argued that accountability to the citizens is a high priority area that needs to be addressed. In the
absence of a formal mechanism for the citizens to know about the activities of these institutions, media
plays the crucial role of the conduit. Both electronic and print media update the people about these
organisations. Nowadays, updated websites have become an important tool in bridging the information
gap.
The classical definition of efficiency attempts to measure the relationship between committed resources and
the produced goods and services. As per the Weberian model, to be efficient, an organisation must have
four attributes: specialisations and/or division of labour, expertise (well-trained personnel with significant
job experience), rules which define structures, procedures, and individual responsibilities and hierarchy
(Gajduschek 2003). The New Public Management (NPM) concept demands that to be efficient,
administrators should have risk-taking attitude rather than being risk-averse and also should ensure the
optimal utilisation of resources rather than simply wasting it (Kernaghan 2000; Hughes 1994).
The following section analyses the issue of efficiency from two dimensions: organisational structures and
capacity in human resource management.
The organisational structures of all four institutions under consideration are hierarchical in nature and they
all suffer from the common ailment of lack of coordination and capacity amongst human resources.
The BEC has a three tier structure: (i) the Commission is the policy making body and initiates laws, rules and
takes policy decisions, (ii) the Secretariat implements the policy and decisions taken by the Commission and
manages supply and regulatory activities, and finally (iii) the field offices. Therefore, a clear subdivision of
work and coordination among the three levels is mandatory. In practice, this coordination is not properly
maintained. Although the CEC is supposed to have full control over the Secretariat regarding all sorts of
policy making, but the situation is different in reality. The Secretariat controls the budget disbursement
(except tender procurement) even though the CEC is the head of the Budget Committee. The Secretariat has
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full control over policy implementation and related progress information. On the other hand, the
relationship between Secretariat and the field offices is fraught with problems. The Secretariat hardly
recognises the significance of field offices and thus the deployment of officials in the and district
offices is insufficient in comparison to the volume of activities and responsibilities. Better efficiency could be
ensured by a proportionate deployment of officials based on area and population in each district (IGS 2008).
The BEC furthermore has neither a strategic plan nor an action plan with proper analysis of the risks and
challenges to achieve its mandate. At present, it works out annual plans solely based on elections, i.e. the
number of elections have to be held in that year, the process of preparing the electoral roll, the procurement
process and the modalities of the supply of election materials. Coordination among other relevant
government agencies is largely ignored and the BEC officials do not consider the strategic plan as a useful
option for their effective functioning. Election-related activities are very much considered as routine and the
outcome of the activity on the democratic process do not appear to be of major concern to the Commission
staff. The Commission also does not have the capacity to design a strategic plan and the presence of a
strong trade union poses a threat to any reform initiative (IGS 2007b). Due to the absence of such plans, it
sometimes fails to manage critical periods and thereby earns public distrust (IGS 2008).
At present, there are two management lines in the PSC: the Commission and the Secretariat. While the
Commission consists of the Chairman and Members, the Secretariat - headed by the Secretary who comes
from the bureaucracy on deputation - consists of 12 functional units to assist the Commission in discharging
their constitutional responsibilities. The Secretariat is the implementing agency and also maintains the day-
to-day functioning of the Commission. Lack of capacity of the personnel is a major challenge, which
becomes a threat due to the existing rivalry between officers on deputation and PSC's own staff.
Unlike BEC and PSC, the structure of the OCAG is slightly different. The OCAG plays the role of the Secretariat
by helping the C&AG in policy making and monitoring implementation of those decisions. Ten Audit
Directorates under 10 Director Generals run the office and they meet with the C&AG monthly to coordinate
their respective activities. However, the official structure of the OCAG is not above question. Although as a
part of the separation of audit activities from accounts, the Comptroller General of Accounts (CGA) has been
placed under the Ministry of Finance, but the OCAG still carries out the accounts of the railway and defence
service. Placing Divisional Accountants by the OCAG in different government works departments might
prove to be a hindrance towards the efficiency of the OCAG auditor due to the possibility of collusion
amongst them. Moreover, the departmentalisation of audit into 10 directorates often creates confusion due
to allegations from audited organisations on overlapping of jurisdiction and duplication of audit works by
the OCAG (IGS 2009b). The OCAG formulated its first ever strategic plan for the period 2003-2006, which
included a four-phased work plan for enhancing capacity. The phases focused on reorganising the internal
work plan, introducing supervision, improving methodology and information, and greater coordination
between OCAG activities using IT etc. There have been significant improvements in terms of timeliness in
reporting, audit and reporting process, settlement of audit observations, and quality (IGS 2009; OCAG
Annual Report 2007). The second strategic plan for 2007-2012 has been formulated but it did not take
account of the external environment and the activities are thus not linked with budget. It also appears that
the mid-level officers of various directorates under the OCAG are unaware of the new strategic plan due to
lack of adequate dissemination (IGS 2009b).
The ACC in Bangladesh has an organogram with six separate wings - each headed by a Director General
(DG). The DGs are under the Secretary, who reports to the Commission. The Commission has a separate
monitoring and evaluation unit, which operates under the Chairman of the ACC. It has a total of 1,264 staff
besides the Chairman and the two Commissioners. The Commission has formulated its strategic plan and
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also has its own operational framework. Currently there are two types of staff in the Commission: staff of the
now defunct Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC) and the officials directly recruited by ACC. Since a significant
proportion of ACC personnel are former BAC officers, who have long been criticised for being corrupt, this
might pose a threat to the efficient functioning of the ACC. To date, there has been no analytical review on
the organisational structure of the ACC to identify its challenges and shortcomings.
Human resource management is one of the major challenges in the institutions of accountability.
Inadequacy in expertise and inadequate distribution of staff and resources are prevalent with an excessive
number of clerical staff. The promotion policy is not performance and merit based rather in nature,
and capacity building is often overlooked. Deputation of personnel from the bureaucracy often creates
conflict within the organisations.
The proper management of human resource is also crucial for ensuring efficiency in the BEC. In case of
human resource management, there exist two types of inconsistencies: deputation and unbalanced
distribution of expertise. Officers on deputation fill in all technical and policy level posts like Secretary,
Additional Secretary and Joint Secretary. As a result, BEC fails to build the capacity of its own officials and
thus creates uncertainty in their career prospects. Besides, improper distribution of expertise, with excessive
support staff and inadequate managerial staff is another threat for the efficient running of the BEC. Hence it
can be argued that the human resource management is suffering both from excess capacity as well as
under-utilisation. The promotion policy of the BEC is also not beyond criticism. According to Election
Commission (Officers and Staff ) Rules 1979, there are quota restrictions in promotion policy for its own staff.
Moreover, class III and IV staff are not required to sit for a promotion examination, which is also likely to
reduce human resource quality within the BEC. The capacity of such an important organisation also depends
on proper financial management. But getting less priority on capital expenditure under consolidated fund
and development expenditure under demand for grant in the budget planning of the BEC proves their
weakness in financial management (IGS 2008; TIB 2006).
There are a multitude of problems regarding human resource management of the PSC. Conflicting
deputation system, unclear promotion policy and non-transferability of staffs hamper the efficiency of the
PSC. Research indicates that there is rivalry amongst the deputed officers and PSC's own staff. On the basis
of the present promotion policy, a clerk may move to a position of strategic decision making and
implementation that is equivalent to the position of a Deputy Secretary of the administration cadre with
insufficient academic background as well as no in-service training. This is likely to compromise the standard
of the PSC staff and overall efficiency of the organisation. Also, the non-transferability of the PSC staff might
allow them to be involved with corruption and make them resistant to change (IGS 2007b).
There are mainly two types of problems that plague human resource management of the OCAG. They are:
lack of specialised auditors in different areas and unnecessary emphasis on the recruitment of class III
officials rather than recruitment in the class II or non-cadre class I officials. As well qualified candidates
would not be interested to join as class III officials, OCAG consequently is saddled with a large number of
officials who are possibly less qualified than the desired level. It is worth mentioning that 71 percent of the
OCAG staffs are Class III officials. A senior official observed, “Class III officials are poorly paid and treated as
clerks. So they develop a mindset inappropriate for auditors” (IGS 2009b).
Last but not least, the ACC is suffering from a lack of expert officials for certain sections. Despite a research
wing in the ACC, it is completely inactive due to the absence of qualified researchers. One high official
5.4.2 Capacity in Human Resource Management
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claimed that, no qualified researcher would like to join at the section due to the low salary scale. ACC also
needs good lawyers for trying corruption cases. However, ACC budget poses a constraint in this regard.
Effectiveness is defined as the measure of the relationship between the results obtained and the objective
laid down from the beginning. The objectives for the oversight institutions are defined in the Constitution
and in the corresponding statues. The results obtained are subject to the activities. Convergence between
the two indicates effectiveness and divergence indicates ineffectiveness. It should be noted that the issues
related to independence and accountability has an impact on the results obtained - independent and
accountable functioning is likely to ensure better results.
Holding free and fair elections, both at national and local levels, is the main responsibility of the BEC. For
effective realisation of its constitutionally assigned mandate, the BEC needs continuous legal, administrative,
and resource support from the ruling regime. However, as history has shown, successive regimes either
could not rely on the BEC or perceived it as threatening to their interest. Other actors such as citizens and
civil society organisations have failed to support the BEC to act as an effective countervailing democratic
institution. As argued earlier, the BEC shares its success in arranging free and fair parliamentary elections
with the Caretaker Government and it has not been pro-active enough in realising the authority bestowed
upon it by the statute and Constitution. As a result, it has become an institution in which the power
bestowed upon by the Constitution and laws are seldom realised. The BEC personnel are often fearful of
repercussion from politicians, which deters them from acting objectively and with integrity. Thus, the
organisational culture of the BEC mirrors the culture of our society, i.e. subservience to power. Consequently,
the BEC failed to hold free and fair parliamentary elections except those held under Caretaker Governments.
If political parties and citizens genuinely want the BEC to pursue its constitutionally assigned objectives,
they must create an enabling environment for the BEC in the forms of compliant and responsible
stakeholders (IGS 2008).
BEC also is responsible for the preparation of the electoral roll. Political parties, donors, media, and civil
society alike criticised a faulty electoral roll prepared under CEC Justice MA Aziz. The Commission has also
been criticised for employing party men in the roll preparation process. The current roll with photo ID was
prepared by the Bangladesh Army, which has been appreciated for accuracy and authenticity. However,
two caveats must be remembered in this regard. First, although the army prepared the current roll it will be
the responsibility of the BEC to update the roll. It is a major concern whether the BEC has the capacity to
handle this technology-intensive task along with maintaining the authenticity of the data. Second, the
update mechanism has to be worked out. This commendable programme could fail if a proper update
mechanism is not devised. It should be noted that the BEC has not taken any capacity building programme
in this regard (IGS 2008).
Delimitation of constituency is another responsibility of the BEC. The Commission follows specific
delimitation rules and so far six delimitations have taken place. However, these delimitations have not been
studied extensively for the impact of delimitation, and thus it is very difficult to measure the effectiveness of
the BEC in this respect.
5.5 Effectiveness
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Effective disposal of election petitions are imperative for ensuring justice, removing electoral irregularities,
and, strengthening the electoral management process. The BEC has to depend on the judiciary for
settlement of these types of dispute, and evidence paints a dismal picture. To speed up the process, the
cases are now referred to the Supreme Court although no notable improvement is seen. The challenges for
such poor status include absence of a time-limit for disposal of petitions, and the state of the judiciary and
the law which exempts MPs from physical presence at the hearings. Besides, the Commission itself is not
pro-active but rather reluctant to conduct these tribunals with a degree of objectivity. Evidence of
malpractice is essential for an effective verdict, but the Commission's role in collecting and presenting this
evidence can often be questioned (Ahmed 2001; FEMA 2000; IGS 2008). In recent times, the Commission has
proposed to put a time limit of 1 year for these tribunals (IGS 2008).
Legislative support by enacting and/or amending the laws for effective functioning of the BEC is also likely
to have a positive impact. But the Commission has no access to the parliamentarians for such support
although the Constitution entrusts the Parliament for such laws. In practice, politicians have been less
supportive to strengthen the Commission (Azizul Islam Committee Report 1994). Reforms conducted thus
far have been crisis driven and are criticised for being unsustainable (IGS 2008). The BEC, under the current
leadership, introduced some key reforms which include:
Mandatory registration of political parties
Submission of audit and financial reports by registered parties
Mandatory disclosure of candidate's information about their education, profession and past career etc.
Election expenditures rationalized and rules made stringent about submission of election expenditures
returns
All these changes are fundamental in nature and will help the BEC establish a degree of systemic control
over political parties and candidates upon their appropriate implementation. And proper implementation of
those far-reaching reforms depends upon bold leadership of the Commission and planned capacity
building, especially targeting political resistance and in-house performance management. For effective
demonstrative capacity, the BEC needs to build supportive relationships with political parties and citizens at
large.
The objectives of the Public Service Commission are as follows: recruiting personnel for the civil service (for
class I gazetted posts), recommending personnel for promotion after examining their Annual Confidential
Report (ACR) and considering their seniority, and taking decisions regarding disciplinary matters. It plays a
central role in the civil service administration and therefore, in order to be effective, must ensure that:
Only the best among the candidates are selected for recruitment to the civil service
Only qualified persons are recommended for promotion
Disciplinary matters are dealt with objectively as per the rules.
The effectiveness of the PSC should be measured from two perspectives: structural dimension and
managerial competence. Discussion regarding structural dimension revolves around the examination
procedure, the question pattern, the quota system, the length of the examination, and other examination
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related issues. Managerial competence concentrates on the role of the Chair and Members of the
Commission.
The Bangladesh Civil Service Examination is conducted by the PSC. The Commission plays the key role in
holding these examinations whereas the PSC Secretariat is responsible for providing logistic support. The
examination involves the following phases: application followed by screening, preliminary examination,
written examination and finally . There is no minimum pass mark for the preliminary examination.
The 1000 marks written examination follows a generalist approach for all cadres except for 200 marks ear-
marked for Professional and Technical Cadres. After the viva, the PSC makes the final recommendations to
the Ministry of Establishment and the Ministry, after the required medical check up and police verification of
each candidate, makes the final appointment. The basic eligibility criteria for appearing in the exam have
been criticised for being very lenient. The quality of the questions in the BCS examinations has also faced
severe criticism as inadequate for screening the most meritorious and able participants (Zafarullah
2005; Jahan 2006). In recent times, the PSC introduced two new changes in the examination process: (i)
negative marking for every wrong answer during the preliminary selection examination and (ii) raising the
passing mark to 50 percent during the written examination. This is likely to bring about some positive
changes in the quality of candidates. This also means fewer candidates will be eligible for the thus
reducing the length of the selection process (which is 22 months on average at present).
A major problem within the selection process is the existence of quota reservation. There are district quota,
female quota, tribal quota and the freedom fighters' quota. Ultimately, only 45 percent of the selected
candidates are screened on the basis of merit. The remaining 55 percent are selected on the basis of quota
reservations. This clearly denoted that more than half of the civil servants are in fact selected on the basis of
some pre-defined quota policy and not on the basis of merit. The existence of quota for freedom fighters'
children is a major source of controversy. For instance, in the last BCS examination, a candidate who stood
7000 in the merit list was selected, as s/he is a child of a freedom fighter.
Managerial negligence, incompetence and corruption on the part of the Commission have been burning
issues, the repercussion of which on the civil service may be disastrous. In this area, the role of PSC has raised
many questions at recent times. The BCS examination system has proved to be a fertile ground of corruption
and “a gateway of ruling party activists to enter into the civil service” (TIB 2007b). Political pressure during
the selection process is a major problem for the PSC leadership. It is argued that the extent of politicisation
has increased under successive political regimes since 1991. The PSC Secretariat's efficiency and integrity of
its staff has proven to be yet another major concern. Research indicates that the staffs, especially the class III
and IV employees, have been involved in corrupt practices due to their access to certain strategically useful
information. is an integral part of the examination process and the Commission is responsible for
convening these boards. There has been widespread allegation of corruption and malpractices against
various board members (IGS 2007b; TIB 2007b). However, there has not been a single incident where the
Commission has taken any steps to investigate these allegations.
Question paper leakage is another area of serious concern. In face of concrete evidence of question paper
leakage, the PSC cancelled 24 BCS preliminary examination. The Commission, however, has been neither
prudent nor pro-active in taking any legal or disciplinary actions against any body for such negligence (IGS
Structural dimension: the loop holes within
Managerial competence: crippled by corruption
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27 For a detailed account of the examination process please refer to the IGS Background paper on PSC available at IGS website.
28 New Nation, “Manipulation of BCS results not possible: Chairman”, 11 March 2007
29    New Age, “How Greed Destroyed the Public Service Commission”, February 16-22, 2007
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2007b; TIB 2007). It is not only the recruitment process, but matters relating to promotion and disciplinary
actions also are not immune to corruption. “Promotions were sold at Tk. 5-10 lakhs, while corruption cases
against government officials - which must be first vetted by PSC - were dropped for sums as high as Tk 2
crore in the past five years”.
The mandate of the OCAG is to conduct objective and timely audit of the accounts of the Republic and of all
courts of law and all authorities and offices of the Government. The Office's mission is to ensure honest,
efficient and cost-effective governance through conducting effective audit and evaluating public sector
operations (OCAG Annual Report 2007). The OCAG however has to depend significantly on external actors
such as the Parliament and auditable bodies for realising its mission. This research identifies the following
factors as challenges to effective functioning of the OCAG.
First, quality audit reports are a pre-requisite to effective functioning of the OCAG. Such reports need to be
objective, reader friendly and evidence based. The OCAG audit reports are considered non-reader friendly
and non-comprehensive. They are too lengthy in volume and technical in nature. They often contain
detailed analysis of trivial issues, and also found lacking in evidence. The reports do not look at outcomes
nor do they identify high-risk issues and areas of concern. They seldom address the challenges and
constraints faced by the audited organisation. The capacity of the people preparing these reports is a key
area of concern. OCAG officers opined that poor quality reports not only put an extra burden on them but
also cause inefficiency. Doyal (2000) argues that OCAG reports do not emphasise on the performance
aspects of audited entities. These days emphasis is put on performance audit and the OCAG has designed a
structure for their reports in this light. Internally there is a two-phased monitoring system to ensure quality
reports. The first quality check is undertaken at the Directorate level and then a central committee is there to
address quality. However, there is not enough evidence suggesting OCAG is taking measures to improve the
report writing capacity of their staff (IGS 2009).
Second, the Internal Control System (ICS) followed by the audited bodies is a practical challenge for the
auditors. Public organisations in Bangladesh do not have well defined ICS consisting of proper job
descriptions for their staff, proper inventory and cash management system, internal audit, accounting
system etc. There are different systems of drawing money from the government exchequer. Common
problems faced by the auditors include poor record of book keeping, delays in producing records, lack of
understanding of financial and procurement rules, and political influence. Public organisations follow the
General Financial Rules and Treasury Rules issued by the Finance Division. At the same time, departments
and ministries have the authority to issue Office Orders that supplement these rules. The financial rules are
also not well equipped to take account of the contingencies. Some of the rules are perceived as outdated as
well as complicated and which provide opportunities for impropriety and irregularities thus complicating
the audit process. Office Orders often lack clarity and contradict financial rules. These rules and orders make
the audit process complicated and cumbersome. There are concerns regarding the level of understanding of
the financial rules by the audit officials. The government bodies, at the same time, have to follow the rules
despite lack of expertise. The OCAG established a Rules and Regulations Unit in 1997 to compile all financial
rules and update their changes immediately and disseminate them amongst the relevant authorities.
However, the unit is yet to show any progress (IGS 2009; Uddin 2006; Khan 2001). Thus, lack of a proper ICS
coupled with lack of clarity of financial rules make it difficult for the auditors to produce quality reports.
29
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Third, the issue of settlement is an important aspect of effective functioning by the OCAG. The settlement
process involves a number of stakeholders in a wide range of meetings, clarifications, and exchange of
documents amongst agencies and goes through a slow-moving official channel. This not only causes delay
but also increases the transaction cost. It is often the case that new people get involved in the process and
the audit observations lose their utility due to promotion, transfer, retirement or even death of the person
responsible. The OCAG has introduced bilateral and tripartite meetings to speed up the process, but the
success of this process is contingent upon availability of reports, speedy and quick action by the
participants, and most importantly, whether or not the participants have the authority to take and enforce
decisions (IGS 2009b). Ali (2005) argues that delayed non-response from the audited institution in respect of
audit queries is a common occurrence in Bangladesh which results in large number of unsettled
observations.
Fourth, the Parliament through the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and Committee on Public
Undertakings (CPU) play a crucial role in ensuring accountability of the audited bodies. However, it should
be noted that although PAC can make recommendations, but these recommendations are not binding on
the Executive. PAC reports are furthermore not discussed in the Parliament. Although the PAC is supposed to
sit once every month, practice indicates otherwise. The Committee does not receive proper secretarial,
budgetary and research support from the Parliament Secretariat, which are hindering its functioning.
However, since the Seventh Parliament the OCAG has been providing necessary support to the PAC (IGS
2009b).
According to Section 15(vi) of the Audit Code, the auditors need to ensure that appropriate action is taken
against irregularities and improprieties. Section 17(x) also requires existence of a follow-up mechanism. But
the existing legal framework neither empowers auditors to enforce their observations, nor obliges to have a
mandatory follow-up mechanism in the audited. However, as per the current rules, if an officer has audit
objection against him, his pension is freezed. Notwithstanding this, the level of awareness about the audit is
not satisfactory among the government officers, which makes follow-up of observations tardy. The OCAG
never publishes follow-up reports. During the study, it has been found that departments having a separate
audit cell are considerably faster in taking actions in accordance with audit observations and the audit
directorate can easily follow-up such actions.
The Anti-Corruption Commission since its inception in 2004 was more or less dysfunctional until 2007. The
Commission could not finalise its organogram and there was a dispute between the Commission and the
government regarding the appointment of personnel. The Commission itself was split due to disagreement
amongst the Commissioners. In addition, a number of petitions in the High Court further complicated the
matters slowing the Commission's progress. The Commission could not even coordinate with other law
enforcing agencies for matters related to investigation. The Commission did not have formal rules, an
organogram, efficient personnel and not even good leadership. This dysfunctional state in the early years,
since its inception, destroyed its credibility and it failed to achieve anything at all in terms of its mandate (IGS
2007a).
The Fakhruddin-led Caretaker Government took quick and effective steps to strengthen the Commission
and reconstituted it. The leadership took multi-pronged actions and received support from the interim
government. The Commission's organogram was finalised along with the ACC Rules, and human resources
were increased. Ordinances and the Emergency Power Rules further assisted the Commission's activities. The
30
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30     In the 8 Parliament the PAC was formed almost after one and half year of the first sitting.th
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Commission demonstrated considerable success in its attempt to fight corruption through a top-down
approach. It published three lists of corruption suspects and many of those were taken into custody and
eventually sentenced with corruption charges (IGS 2007a).
But this success needs to be analysed with a sense of caution. The ACC operated with support of special
powers due to the unique situation of the state of emergency the country was in at the time. As
fundamental civil rights had been suspended, citizens did not have much recourse if there were excessive
and arbitrary behaviour of the joint forces involved in arrest and interrogation. Furthermore, all offences
tried under the ACC Act are non bail-able, meaning that any person under investigation can be detained for
a maximum of five years, fined, or both as a preventive measure if s/he is perceived as a threat to the state.
The ACC has also been empowered to arrest accused suspects without first obtaining a warrant from the
courts. When the ACC makes arrests without judicial oversight, it opens the door to speculation as to
whether or not there are legal grounds to make the arrests in the first place. While the measures taken to
address corruption during the tenure of the Caretaker Government were perceived as temporary, they may
have had a negative impact on the long-term operations and sustainability of the institution, as is evinced
by the recent turn of events. If allowed to persist without restoring due process, the legitimacy of the ACC
will be compromised and the public's confidence in the organisation, created to enhance transparency and
accountability, will diminish. Finally, there is a question of capacity to deliver results. Corruption cases are
tried in special courts. This raises an important question regarding the sustainability of the prosecution
activities of the Commission. It also raises a question regarding the actual intention of the interim
government (IGS 2007a).
Thus, it can be argued that the Commission operated in a unique situation, gaining public trust in the
process, but there is a sense of concern about its sustainability under a political regime. In its first two-years
under a political regime, the Commission was neither functional nor effective. But a non-political regime
made it functional and it seemed that it was striving to fulfil its mandate. However, it is too early to discuss
the effectiveness of the ACC at this point of time.
Oversight institutions in Bangladesh enjoy the necessary Constitutional and statutory protection but their
leadership has unfortunately not been pro-active enough to exercise this in their favour. Rather, in many
cases they are perceived to be partisan and compliant to external pressure. There is extensive evidence of
Executive influence through avenues of human resources and budget. Appoint of the leadership is the main
channel of politicisation, which also needs to be looked at immediately.
Accountability mechanisms need to be rationalized, especially to the citizens. Institutionalisation of the
accountability mechanisms, both internal and external, is likely to reinforce efficiency and effectiveness.
Structural and systematic loopholes often become constraints to effective functioning. The successes are
overlooked mainly due to corruption and partisan behaviour. The human resources for the most part lack
capacity and motivation and the issue of deputation makes the scenario worse. Dependence on the
Executive, for both fiscal and human resources, curb independent functioning to certain extents and also
prevent long-term capacity building.
Finally, political will is the main catalyst that can bring about real change to make the institutions of
accountability effective in a democratic framework. This, in turn, is likely to ensure good governance for the
society as a whole.
5.6 Conclusion
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6.1 Introduction
6.2 Objectives of the Survey
This year's State of Governance in Bangladesh report has focused on the evolution of a zero-sum game in
Bangladesh politics, which has allowed the winning party absolute power over the state apparatus. The
winning party exerts complete control over all state resources and we see capture of all independent and
effective institutions capable of exerting checks and balances. As part of the Report, a nationally
representative survey was conducted to gauge public perception about the overall state of governance and
political system in Bangladesh.
After the abrupt political transition of 11 January 2007, the political environment of the country has gone
through a series of changes over two years, and this year's survey has attempted to gauge people's
perceptions and opinions about these changes. The survey was conducted immediately after the Ninth
Parliamentary election and therefore also tried to determine public perception about the election process.
The survey also attempted to assess people's perception about their present living standard, service
delivery, political parties, Parliament, the Judiciary, and the law and order situation of the country. A similar
survey was conducted for the Report, and this survey draws parallels
where possible and compares and contrasts results.
After the intense political turmoil that emerged with the formation of a controversial Caretaker Government
in October 2006, a second Caretaker Government (CTG) came to power in January 2007 with the backing of
the military and held office until it transferred power to the new Awami League led Government in January
2009. The CTG began its two-year tenure with an ambitious reform programme, parts of which were
tempered as the imperative to hold a credible election with the participation of the political parties became
apparent. The CTG also initiated a robust anti-corruption and law and order drive, reforms of the institutions
of accountability, and made an effort to re-configure the political landscape of the country. It was
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Public Perceptions of
Governance
undoubtedly successful in preparing a credible voter list and in delivering a well-executed and fair election.
In this context, the objectives of the people's perception survey are as follows:
a) To gauge public perceptions about the state of the governance, the political system and political
culture in Bangladesh;
b) To ascertain citizens' perceptions and opinions about the institutional reform initiatives of the CTG,
especially their effectiveness, sustainability and impacts on the political system in Bangladesh;
c) To evaluate people's views about the performance of CTG in holding fair and credible election and
initiatives against corruption; and
d) To determine public opinion about service delivery in education, health, water, and electricity sectors,
their living standard and price hike situation compared to the previous year.
This survey is nationally representative and was carefully designed to maximise geographical coverage. It
includes both the ordinary citizen as well as respondents belonging to selective occupational groups. The
sample size was 4,000 respondents, 3,500 of whom were chosen randomly as 'General Citizens' and the
remaining 500 were selected from different professional groups. The latter are referred to as 'Professionals'.
The survey used a structured questionnaire with a five point scale: e.g. Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Somewhat
satisfied, Dissatisfied and Very dissatisfied about various service delivery institutions in Bangladesh. This
method is generally used in perception barometer surveys to incorporate public's opinion (ranging from
highest affirmative to negative) regarding any issue. The survey questionnaire is at Appendix 2.
An extensive secondary literature review was done for the development of the questionnaire for the survey
in late 2008. A pre-testing of the questionnaire was performed in the field during the last week of December,
2008 to test its aptness. The feedback of the field-level pre-testing was incorporated into the questionnaire
to refine it further.
The survey was conducted between 15 January 2009 and 6 March 2009. SIRIUS Marketing and Social
Research Ltd. conducted the field work. The IGS survey monitoring team travelled to the six divisional survey
areas. They monitored and accompanied all the survey teams of SIRIUS at field level to ensure data quality.
A multistage cluster sampling method was used for the study. Fifty-one urban primary sampling units (PSU)
and 124 rural PSUs were selected using 'probability proportional to size' (PPS) method. A two-step PPS
procedure was followed for selecting the rural centres i.e. 124 unions were selected in the first stage, and
then one village in each of the selected unions in the second stage.
In each starting address, ten consecutive households were contacted by using the 'Right Hand Rule' for male
respondent interviews and 10 consecutive households by 'Left Hand Rule' for female respondent interviews.
One respondent was selected randomly from each household through KISH Grid. If the selected respondent
was not available after two attempts, the survey team selected a substitute respondent from that starting
point (from 11 household onward) by matching age group i.e. (18-25 yrs, 26-35 yrs, 36-45 yrs, 45 yrs +) and
gender.
6.3 Methodology
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'Professional' respondents were chosen using purposive sampling technique throughout the country.
Professionals were selected from amongst political parties, government service, NGOs, school, college/
university and teachers, lawyers, medical doctors, middle/senior-level executive of private
organisations, local government representatives and media personnel.
The survey sought responses only from adult household members. Fifty-three percent respondents were
male and 47 percent female. The average male female ratio is 1.12 whereas it is 1.05 as reported in the
national survey. The average age of the respondents was 35 years, which differs by 13 years from the
national average of 22.
Table 6.1 compares the education profile of respondents participating in the IGS perception survey with the
education profile attained in the latest BBS Poverty Assessment survey (2004). The variation between the
education profile of the survey respondents and the national profile can be explained thus: rather than
incorporating the information of all household members, the survey purposively concentrated only on the
education status of the adult respondent. That is why it includes less primary enrolment with a higher
percentage of secondary and tertiary level. The average age of respondents is also significantly higher than
national profile because of the same reason. Nevertheless, accepting these small and explainable deviation,
the overall sample was nationally representative as it matches the national features in most aspects.
madrassah
6.4 Social and Demographic Characteristics
Gender and age
Education status of the respondents
1
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Table 6.1 Education profile
Never attended school
Primary
Class VI-IX
SSC+
35.3
36.3
18.1
10.3
28
23
24
25
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Poverty Monitoring Survey 20042 and IGS Survey 2008
Level of Education National Survey (Percent) SoG Perception Survey (Percent)
1 Statistical Pocket Book of Bangladesh, 2007
2 http://www.bbs.gov.bd/
3 Nationally, the bottom five percent households earn less than 1605 taka per month, where the earning of the top five percent is
33,471 taka per month, which corresponds to the findings
Poverty level
Among the households, more than 55 percent earn an income of less than 8,000 taka per month whereas 25
percent amongst this group earn less than 4,000 taka a month (falling below than the dollar-a-day poverty
line).  Only five percent of the surveyed households earn more than 25,000 taka (USD 365) per month.3
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Table 6.2 Poverty distribution of surveyed households
Extreme Poor
Very Poor
Moderate Poor
Middle Class
Rich
1-19
20- 35
36-54
55-80
81+
2.5
10.8
30.7
50.7
5.4
Group Score Percent
The poverty score-card was also used to determine the poverty level of the households as per the poverty
distribution used by the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2005. From the scores obtained
from the survey data, five cut-offs have been decided to determine poverty level of the sample households.
Among the households, 56 percent belong to non-poor group and 44 percent belong to poor group. It
largely matches the national 60/40 proportion of non-poor and poor found by the 2005 HIES Survey
conducted by BBS.
The price of essential goods, especially food grains, has gone spiralling up significantly since mid-2008
which has adversely affected the lives of citizens in general and the poor in particular. Considering the fact
that roughly half of the population lives below the poverty line in Bangladesh, this has serious implications,
especially in the context of the current global economic crisis. Respondents were also asked for their opinion
about their standard of living. The survey result depicts that citizens have been concerned about the price of
essentials and lack of employment opportunities in 2008. The major findings are as follows:
4
6.5 Living Standards and Optimism about the Future
Citizens opinion regarding their living standard
4 According to the Cost of Basic Need (CBN) approach, lower and upper poverty lines are set calculating the cost of food basket
required to fulfill the basic nutritional requirements and the cost of basic non food expenditure. Using CBN approach, BBS defined
five groups under two poverty lines which are-
Per capita total expenditure is on or above the upper poverty line.
Per capita total expenditure is on or above the upper poverty line but within 10% of the line.
Per capita total expenditure is below the upper poverty line but above the lower poverty line.
Per capita total expenditure is below the lower poverty line.
Per capita total expenditure is below the food poverty line.
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Figure 6.1 Living standards in 2008 and 2007
Very bad bad Average good Very good
Living standard in 2008 Living standard in 2007
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According to Figure 6.1, only three percent of the respondents were highly satisfied about their current
living standard. Half of survey respondents marked their standard of living in 2008 as neither good nor bad'
Twenty-eight percent (with opinions of 'very bad' and 'bad' in Figure 6.1) of the respondents expressed their
dissatisfaction about their present standard of living.
The sharp increase in the prices of essential commodities throughout 2008 seriously affected the livelihoods
of citizens. Seventy-nine percent of surveyed households expressed their dissatisfaction with the inflation
level (Figure 6.2). This overwhelming dissatisfaction suggests, quite unsurprisingly, that the high price of
essential goods has been the main challenge for most citizens in 2008.
' .
Concerns about the price hike of essentials
Figure 6.2  Respondents dissatisfied with price of essentials
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Optimism expressed about the future
Despite the fact that most people described their current living standard as 'neither good nor bad', they
were found optimistic about a better state of living in the coming year, regardless of their socio-economic
backgrounds. About 57 percent of the general respondents and 75 percent of the professionals expressed
optimism about the future whereas only eight percent of the general respondents and five percent of the
professionals were pessimistic about the prospects for better living standards in 2009. This positive attitude
for future living standard may imply that citizens have great expectations from the newly elected
government. This optimism also relates to broader literature on human agency and wellbeing as well as
other research done in Bangladesh. Sen (1998) defines wellbeing as the achievement of a person in the
context of his personal advantage. Accordingly, there are two aspects of human beings: 'agency' and its
wellbeing. He argues that the wellbeing of an 'agency' depends on capabilities set. Capabilities denote
rights and opportunities which one is allowed to have. In this light, Rahman and Uddin (PPRC 2007) argue
that optimism is an important indicator of agency potential because citizens can read what possibilities they
might be able to extract from a given political, social and economical environmental setup. The year 2007
began with political uncertainty followed by extended emergency rule. In 2008, the political situation
improved and an elected government came into power. The new political regime may have created a sense
of optimism among the people for 2009.
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6.6 Service Delivery
The functioning of government service delivery mechanisms is linked to citizens' standard of living. The
survey inquired about the respondents' level of satisfaction about different aspects of service delivery in
various sectors. The majority of citizens still live outside of the coverage area of most utility services and thus
their responses concerned only the supply of electricity. On the other hand, almost 80 percent of the
respondents expressed satisfaction with government's education services. The important findings are
highlighted below.
Highest dissatisfaction with electricity supply
Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of four basic service sectors: health, water supply,
electricity, and education. Fifty-five percent of survey households expressed their dissatisfaction regarding
the supply of electricity; another 22 percent were somewhat satisfied whereas only 16 percent of
households were satisfied with the existing electricity supply (Figure 6.3).
According to the survey findings, widespread corruption has hampered the service delivery for citizens in
the power sector. Citizens have identified the power sector as one of the most corrupt service delivery
sectors in Bangladesh. Almost 75 percent of the people in 2007 identified power sector as one of the most
corrupt sectors, with 63 percent in 2008. This seems to signify that corruption in this sector was brought
under control to a limited extent during the tenure of the CTG.
On the other hand, citizens' perceptions of the education sector indicated high levels of satisfaction with
service delivery. More than 80 percent of respondents expressed satisfaction ('highly satisfied' and 'satisfied'
in Figure 6.3). Citizens were also more or less satisfied regarding health and water supply. However, it is
important to mention that most respondents lived outside public utility services (providing water) coverage
area.
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Figure 6.3 Level of satisfication with service delivery
Electricity Health services Water supply Education
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Government failure in employment generation
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Figure 6.4 Level of satisfication with service delivery
Employment Local government Law and order
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Respondents were asked about other areas of public service including the law and order situation, the
performance of local government and employment generation. Forty-seven percent of citizens expressed
their dissatisfaction with the Government's performance in employment generation (Figure 6.4). This finding
also correlates with the view expressed by a large percentage of respondents who identified that closing
down a number of jute mills has been a negative activity of the CTG regime that exacerbated the
unemployment problem in Bangladesh (see Figures 6.32 and 6.33 for detail).
A significant percentage of respondents perceived that the law and order situation had improved in 2008.
Forty-five percent of respondents were satisfied whereas another 35 percent were somewhat satisfied about
the law and order situation. This is not a surprising result during a period in which the country was governed
by a military-backed interim Government, and the military was largely responsible for maintaining law and
order. It is interesting to see that despite the promulgation of the Local Government Commission Ordinance,
2008, it is one area where the CTG did not score well. The performance of local government was a source of
dissatisfaction amongst our respondents. Forty percent of those interviewed were only somewhat satisfied
about the performance of local government whereas 33 percent of the respondents expressed
dissatisfaction.
The CTG passed the Right to Information (RTI) Ordinance in 2008, granting every citizen the right to
information from the authority, and the placing the onus on the authority to provide information upon
demand. While the passage of the law itself was viewed as a major step to ensure transparency, the survey
attempted to evaluate people's awareness about their right to receive information from the Government
and the potential utility of this right.
6.7 Access to Information
5
5 The current Parliament passed the Right to Information Act on March 29, 2009 with minor modifications to the ordinance.
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Citizen awareness about right to information
Figure 6.5 Public's legal right to receive information on government activities
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When people were asked to respond if they have the right to receive information about government's
activities, it was found that majority of them was vocal about their right to know. Eighty-six percent of
general respondents and 91 percent of professional respondents agreed that they legally have a right to
know information held by public authorities.
Public denied information about government activities
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Figure 6.6 Public's ignorance about obtaining information on government activities
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However, even though the RTI ordinance was promulgated by the CTG, it did not affect the practices of the
government. When asked about access to information in general, respondents expressed that they generally
were not been properly informed about the sources of information during this regime. When asked about the
present sources of information, 71 percent (total of those who responded with 'strongly agree' and 'agree' in
Figure 6.6) opined that they usually do not know where to go to obtain information about government's
activities. Respondents were divided in their opinion about the fact that one has to pay bribe to access
information from a government office: 45 percent (combining 'strongly agree' and 'agree' in the Figure 6.7)
agreed and 27 (combining 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree' in the same figure) percent opposed it.
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Figure 6.7  Obtaining information through bribery
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Media (electronic & print) most authentic source of information
Respondents were asked to express their opinion about the authenticity of particular sources of information.
TV channels and Radio stations, both private (82 percent) and government owned (78 percent) were
considered to be authentic. It is interesting to note that a significantly smaller percentage of urban people
(68 percent) considered government owned TV/Radio authentic and a greater number of urban people (87
percent) considered privately owned TV/Radio as authentic sources of information compared to their rural
counterparts. Government owned TV/Radio are trusted as sources of information by significantly higher
number of rural people (82 percent). However, this may be due to the fact that private TV channels are not
available in most rural areas, and citizens only have access to the Government-owned channel.
Table 6.3 Source of information
Private TV channels and radio stations
Government owned TV, Radio
Newspaper, magazines, posters
Friends/relatives who are working in government offices
Local Upazila Chairs /UP Chairs/Ward Commissioner and local
counsellors/UP members
Government Officials such as UNOs and DCs
82
78
70
67
63
59
Percentage of respondents
who perceive the source as authenticSource of authentic information
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A significant percentage of respondents also considered newspapers as authentic sources of information.
Citizens were also found to rely on informal sources of information such as friends and neighbours who
work in government offices. It has also been perceived by respondents that their own elected local
government representatives are more authentic sources of information than local government officials.
Fifty-six percent are of the opinion that Ministries and secretariat officials also provide authentic information
to general people.
In light of the team's understanding of the impediments to an independent judiciary, including partisan
political influences, bribes, nepotism and corruption, respondents were asked to express their opinion about
the existing judicial system in Bangladesh.
Courts are responsible for adjudicating legal disputes in accordance with the law. Respondents held the
view that public access to judicial system in Bangladesh has been restricted by different factors. Citizens
have been more willing to go for negotiation than to take the matter to court. It seems a widely held belief
that poor, minority and aboriginal people usually do not get justice from the court and their access to court
is also restricted. An important revelation was the widespread perception that those with political and
economic influence are prepared to interfere with the independence of the courts in Bangladesh.
6.8 Judicial Independence and Law and Order
Courts unable to work independently
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Figure 6.8 Independence of judges and courts
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Forty-nine percent of professional respondents disagree with the statement '
whereas 46 percent of the general respondents did not agree with the statement.
Moreover, 25 and 19 percent of professional and general respondents respectively strongly disagreed with
the statement.
judges and courts in Bangladesh
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Several entities influence court activities
Figure 6.9  Influencing court proceedings
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According to the citizens surveyed, different actors can influence court activities, and do. At least 30 percent
of general respondents agreed (combining 'strongly agree' and 'agree' in Figure 6.9) that ministers, Members
of the Parliament (MP), law enforcers (e.g police, RAB), influential businessmen and local politicians influence
courts and can manipulate court's activities. Twenty-four percent of the general respondents strongly
agreed that ministers are the most influential actors who undermine the independence of the courts. Thirty-
one percent of the general sample agreed that MPs can influence the court and 26 percent of people
somewhat agreed that local politicians can do so. Twenty-four percent of professional respondents strongly
agreed that ministers can influence the court while 33 percent of them agreed that MPs can manipulate
court activities.
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Figure 6.10  General people's perception as victim of crime/resolving dispute
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Figure 6.11 Professional people's perception as victim of crime/resolving dispute
Citizens' preference for elected representatives with social arbitration
Preference for negotiation over the judicial system for dispute resolution
Respondents were asked to whom or which institutions they would prefer to go first if they became victims
of crimes. They were asked to rank their top three preferences out of the nine options about what they
would do if such a situation occurs in their life. The issues/factors were weighted according to their rank of
preference by multiplying the first ranked attributes by 3, the second ranked by 2, the third ranked by 1 and
the 'no rank' by 0. The summed up scores of each attribute was indexed to 100 to arrive at results.
This survey found that the majority of the general and professional respondents prefer to seek help from
their elected representatives at national and local level (60 percent from general people and 46 percent from
the professionals) as reflected in Figures 6.10 and 6.11. The second preferred option to general people is to
consult a local respected person (51 percent). But professionals appear to prefer to take their own initiatives
rather than consult a local respected person. Thus, a significant response was also received for the option
'undertake own initiative', reflecting the lack of trust in the formal institutions.
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Figure 6.12 Dispute resolution: social arbitration vs court
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Almost 56 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that it is more convenient for them to go for
negotiation to resolve disputes than to go before a court (Figure 6.12), quite possibly because of the delays,
bribery and harassment, and potentially unfair outcomes. Most general respondents prefer to resolve
disputes by their own initiative rather than by taking the matter to the court.
General public unfamiliar with court proceedings
The jargon of the court and complexity of its procedures are in all likelihood the reasons why more than 80
percent of respondents, irrespective of their experience of courts, opined that it is hard to understand court
proceedings. The difficulty in understanding was found to be more or less the same for both illiterate as well
as literate respondents, with 48 percent of the respondents having primary education strongly agreeing that
they could not understand court procedures (figure 6.13). Forty-eight percent of illiterate respondents
agreed with the statement. Forty-one percent respondents with HSC and 31 percent of respondents with
post graduate as well as PhD degrees agreed that it is difficult for them to understand the language
employed in courts. Also, 95 percent of both general and professional respondents agreed that common
people have less access to court as they cannot afford to bear the cost of drawn-out court proceedings.
Justice denied to poor, minority and aboriginal people
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Figure 6.13  Complexity of court proceedings
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Figure 6.14  Reduced access to justice for poor, minority and aboriginal people
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008
104
The general consensus among respondents was that the overall justice system in Bangladesh has not been
accessible for the indigenous, minority and poor. The social and institutional arrangements of the legal
system have especially marginalised the rights of the indigenous people. Almost 83 percent of general
respondents agreed that the existing justice system failed to provide justice for all strata of the society
(Figure 6.15), and that access to justice for the poor, minority groups and indigenous people is more elusive
than for the population at large. This reflects a good awareness among the common people of the
discrimination suffered by these groups.
Lack of enforcement makes laws largely ineffective
Almost 93 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that poor law enforcement renders laws
ineffective (Figure 6.16), while amongst this group, 52 percent strongly agreed with the idea. Citizens also
perceived that there is a greater tendency to violate laws and rules due to the lack of any proper
enforcement mechanism. There is a strong correlation with respondents' responses to questions relating to
the police sector, with almost 67 percent of the general sample and 80 percent of professional respondents
agreeing that police is one of the most corrupt sectors in Bangladesh.
Improvement of Law & Order during CTG tenure
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Figure 6.15 Good laws with poor enforcement
Figure 6.16 Justice during CTG regime
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Figure: 6.17  Increase in crime during CTG regime
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Despite the lack of trust in law enforcement agencies, the CTG regime was perceived to perform better than
previous political regimes in bringing down crimes. Figure 6.16 shows that 80 percent of both general and
professional respondents disagreed with the statement that crime has increased during CTG regime, hardly
a surprising result during a period when the military was responsible for maintaining law and order in the
country. Ninety percent of the respondents agreed that the possibility of getting justice during the CTG
regime was much higher than that of during political regimes (Figure 6.17). Only six percent of respondents
disagreed with the statement. According to the survey findings, almost 34 percent of the respondents
agreed that the police in 2008 (under the CTG regime) was more active in their locality in curbing criminal
and political violence and terrorist acts. This overwhelming positive perception regarding CTG's
performance in law and order appears to imply that in the absence of political pressure and influence, law
enforcement and judicial systems can work better so that people get justice.
In light of the history in Bangladesh of election results being repudiated by the loser, and the credibility of
the election process itself, respondents were asked for their opinions about the parliamentary election in
2008.
The survey suggests that the general election was free and fair. The electronic media was active in
disseminating election-related information. Citizens chose their candidates mostly on the basis of their
qualifications and their political party identity, although at the same time the huge amount of money being
distributed by the candidates may have also been a deciding factor.
6.9 Parliamentary Election 2008
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Most of the respondent views that the election 2008 was free and fair
Figure 6.18 2008  parliamentary election
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Eighty-two percent of those who were surveyed responded that election of 2008 was completely free and
fair (Figure 6.18), although the perception of the professional group differs slightly. Among the professional
groups, 61 percent perceived the election as completely free and fair whereas 31 percent of the professional
respondents stated that the election was free and fair although there were some minor problems. The
International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted an exit poll during parliamentary election 2008, where
the opinion on different issues of election was collected from 150 polling centres. The result showed that 93
percent of the respondents stated the election environment to be very good. This perception survey reflects
a similar finding. The survey results also revealed that there is a slight variation of opinion between urban
and rural respondents; 87 percent of the rural and 71 percent of urban respondents believe that the election
was completely free and fair. The response did not vary across gender, though it is interesting to note that
the percentage decreases with an increase in educational qualifications among general respondents. While
89 percent of respondent having no formal education responded that the election was completely free and
fair, only 63 percent of the respondents with graduate level education (or higher) responded with the same
answer.
6
6 http://www.iri.org/pdfs/2009%20January%206%20Exit%20Poll%20Bangladesh%20Parliamentary%20Elections, %20December
%2029,%202008.pdf
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Table 6.4 Variation in public perception at different levels of education
Percentage of response
Opinion on Election Illiterate Up to Primary Secondary to HSC + Vocational Tertiary
Completely free and fair
Free and fair with some minor problem
Free and fair with several major problem
Not free or fair
Don't know
89
9
1
1
0
85
11
1
2
0
79
17
2
2
0
63
30
4
3
1
Respondents also perceived that the CTG was able to restrain the participation of corrupt politicians in the
election. A large number of politicians were charged with corruption-related offences during 2007.
According to the Cabinet committee on Law and Order, starting from January 11, 2007 until January 2008, a
total of 4,40,684 people were arrested among which 200 politicians were included under corruption
charges.7
Half of the respondents agreed that the CTG's efforts to reform the legal electoral framework could restrain
the participation of corrupt politicians in the election, while 28 percent somewhat agreed with the
statement. This was a common trend found among professionals and general respondents, as 14 percent of
them strongly agreed and 26 percent of them somewhat agreed with the statement (Figure 6.19).
Nevertheless, 18 percent of general respondents and 32 percent of professionals perceived that the reforms
initiated by the CTG could not stop the corrupt politicians contesting the election.
An effective, independent and non-partisan Election Commission is a for holding a free and fair
election. Historically in Bangladesh, debate centred on the performance and integrity of the Bangladesh
Election Commission (BEC). The CTG, being a non-partisan government which had the delivery of a credible
election as the fundamental aim of its tenure, initiated some reform initiatives to enable the BEC to perform
independently and more efficiently. As a result, the role of the BEC was greatly appreciated in the last
election by the general public.
Bangladesh Election Commission: Highly trusted
sine qua non
7 http://www.achrweb.org/reports/SAARC-2008.pdf
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Figure 6.19 CTG reforms prevented corrupt politicians' participation in election
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Table 6.5 People's trust in the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC)
Percentage of response
Groups of Respondents
General
Professional
Trust completely Can trust Trust more or less Cannot trust Cannot trust at all
19
18
43
42
27
30
6
8
2
3
The Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) was mandated to conduct a credible and fair election by the end
of 2008. Its programmes relating to the preparation of the voter list and the digital voter ID card brought the
institution to all strata of Bangladeshi society. The survey found that 89 percent of general respondents
answered positively when asked about their trust in the BEC with 19 percent claiming complete trust in the
BEC. Only eight percent of general respondents and 11 percent of professional respondents claimed not to
have any faith in the BEC. The general trust in the BEC is also reflected when respondents were asked about
the 2008 Election. Around 82 percent of general people opined that the general election in 2008 was
completely free and fair. Moreover, 61 percent of professional respondents agreed that the 2008 general
election was free and fair. Thus, the CTG's various compromises during 2008 to ensure the participation of
the major political parties in the December election did not affect people's trust in BEC.
The survey revealed that a significant percentage (88 percent) of the respondents trust the Bangladesh
Election Commission as a reliable source of information.
BEC and Media: Most reliable source for election information
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Figure 6.20 Most reliable source of election information
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The survey also found that people rely on media as the authentic source of information. More than 75
percent of respondents described television as always reliable, whereas 20 percent said it is sometimes
reliable (Figure 6.20). Less than five percent of respondents think television cannot be relied upon as a
source of election information. Further, 59 percent and 58 percent of general respondents respectively
consider newspaper and radio as always reliable, where almost 30 percent of respondents consider them as
sometimes reliable. Citizens have relatively lower trust in word of mouth, posters or pamphlets as sources of
election information.
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Factors influencing voting behaviour
Qualification of candidate tops list
The survey attempted to explore factors influencing the voting behaviour of respondents. The findings are
as follows.
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Figure 6.21 Factors influencing voting decision
General Professional
Respondents were asked to rank several issues according to importance that influenced their vote in the
2008 national election. Most of the respondents (75 percent) ranked the option 'qualification of a candidate'
as the most important factor that they considered (Figure 6.21). This factor was also recognised by 74
percent of professional respondents as the biggest influence on voting decisions. Party affiliation is
considered as the most important factor by 11 percent of general and 12 percent of professional
respondents, whereas the party manifesto is ranked as the priority factor by eight percent of general and 13
percent of professional respondents. Though there has always been a complaint of during
election in the past, only one percent of general respondents admitted they were offered money to
influence their votes. These results may be compared with IRI's exit poll 2009 where 93 percent of the
respondent participated in the poll stated that they were not offered any gift, favour, food or money by any
candidates, their surrogates or the party.
vote buying
Party alliances restrained voters from voting for their preferred candidate
Figure 6.22 Election alliances restrained voters to vote for their preferred candidate
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Election alliance has been a widely discussed issue in 2008 parliamentary election, which has been
embraced by major parties as an effective 'winning' formula. Due to election alliances, two or more parties
may agree to field only one candidate in a constituency. One downside of the alliance formula is that it
might hold the voters back from voting because their preferred party/candidate might not have contested
from their constituencies because of negotiation among parties. When the respondents were asked if they
faced any problem in voting because of election alliances, 37 percent of general and 51 percent of
professional respondents agreed with the statement that they could not vote for their preferred candidate
because of the alliance. However, 27 percent of the general respondents and 22 percent of professional
respondents did not face any such problem due to alliances (Figure 6.22).
Public attitudes about political legitimacy and current political practices identify the trajectory of political
culture in any country. During the survey, respondents were asked to express their perceptions about
different aspects of political governance in Bangladesh. This section analyses their knowledge about the
state of political parties, political culture, stakeholder management in Bangladesh and their views about the
legitimacy of political parties and the political discourse.
The survey findings revealed that public perception about the political culture of Bangladesh is not very
positive. Citizens perceived that like other parliaments in the past, absenteeism, walk-out without proper
reasons, unnecessary demands by the opposition parties and the dominance of the government parties will
remain the same in the Ninth Parliament. In fact, citizens have demonstrated a high level of awareness about
the existing state of play. Respondents opined that political nepotism in Bangladesh is pervasive in the
political, economic and social lives of the citizens. Citizens also perceived that only people having political
affiliation can grant the major share of the government provided safety net facilities for the poor. More
importantly, political party influence over the legal system guarantees impunity from prosecution for those
with the relevant connections. The important findings are discussed below.
6.10 Political Governance
Political Nepotism Bypasses Rule of Law
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Figure 6.23 Political nepotism
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According to the respondents, the prevailing political culture in Bangladesh results in a very high degree of
political nepotism. Such nepotism encompasses the rise of relatives and associates of political actors to
positions of power which enable them to capture major shares of economic and political benefits.
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Almost 38 percent of general respondents agreed that affiliation with the political parties helps businesses
to have leverage in Bangladesh (Figure 6.23). Of the general respondents, 37 percent strongly agreed that
the Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) and Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) benefit distribution system
in Bangladesh is largely manipulated by the political parties (Figure 6.24). This signifies that party
membership or affiliation to a large extent is seen as a primary eligibility criterion to access those social
services, ignoring the real poor who are in need of a social safety net. During 2008, respondents felt that
they had better and more neutral access to the social service distribution system. The survey findings
demonstrated that almost 57 percent of general respondents and 66 percent of professional respondents
were satisfied with the Government-led social safety net programmes during the period.
A most striking finding is that almost 37 percent (Figure 6.25) of general respondents thought that party
favouritism could save its members from the legal processes of the state after committing crimes. Twenty-
one percent of general respondents more or less agreed that political nepotism in Bangladesh favoured its
members and thus overlooked the law of the country. There is consistency between both professionals' and
the general sample's responses as to how political nepotism benefits party members and followers in
Bangladesh.
Unconstructive roles of ruling and opposition parties in Parliament
Figure 6.25 Political nepotism protects criminals
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Figure 6.26  Opposition's voices ignored (by ruling party) in Parliament
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The bulk of respondents indicated that Parliament was far from being a forum for constructive debate,
ensuring executive accountability, or sharing opinion on relevant national issues among the ruling and
opposition parties. More than 65 percent of the general respondents agreed that the ruling party always
ignores the opposition party's opinion while 41 percent of the professional respondents strongly agreed
with the statement (Figure 6.26).
Parliament boycott tendency of opposition
Figure 6.27 Opposition tendency to boycott the Parliament
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The opposition's absenteeism in the Parliament and boycott of the sessions have become a regular
phenomenon since multi-party electoral politics re-emerged in 1991. Both professional and general
respondents agreed that opposition parties are keen to boycott the Parliament regardless of the merits of a
particular issue and that they deliberately disrupt the functioning of the parliament. The respondents also
agreed that whenever there is a disagreement, opposition calls for a strike (UNDP 2005). However, the
respondents also felt that the ruling party is expected to play a more constructive role in the Parliament by
providing adequate space and ensuring voice of the MPs but most of the time they dominate the
proceedings and engage in debates on issues seemingly irrelevant in terms of the national interest. Both
general and professional groups agreed with the statement and almost 41 percent of professional
respondents strongly agreed that ruling and opposition parties usually do not agree upon the important
national issues.
8
8 The result of the opinion survey conducted by UNDP (2005) revealed that 95 percent of their respondents views that has a
very negative or somewhat negative impact on the country. Lack of political unity has been stated as the major reason behind
this, where illiteracy also has been stated as another cause. Seventy percent of the respondents view that there are other
alternatives to .
hartal
hartal
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Party affiliation irrelevant for MPs to work for their constituencies
Figure 6.28 Little scope for opposition MPs to work in locality
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More than 32 percent of general respondents and 26 percent of professional respondents thought that
Members of Parliament, regardless of their party affiliation, can make a positive contribution to their
constituency (Figure 6.28). In this regard, almost 32 percent respondents strongly agreed that government
could not influence or bypass opposition MP's efforts/activities at the local levels.
Citizens' anxiety about the power and role of ChairsUpazila
Upazila elections and the respective roles of UZP Chair and MP have been a much debated issue over the
year. While the Upazila Parishad (UZP) is a tier of Government established by the Constitution (in Articles 9,
59 and 60 depict the powers and functions of the local government). This tier of government was only
established in 2009 through elections that were originally planned to be held during the CTG tenure. A
major concern is whether there will be effective power-sharing between MPs and the UZP chairs in the
future, where the two are from different parties. On that issue, more than half of the respondents from both
the general (49 percent) and professional (51 percent) groups anticipated that the local MP and UZP
chairman from two different parties will not work together and this will slow down the development work in
the locality (Figure 6.29).
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Figure 6.29 Local MP and UZP Chairman will not work together
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Consequences of CTG-proposed reforms on Bangladeshi Politics
Respondents showed a high awareness of the compromises that the CTG made to secure the participation
of the parties in the 2008 general election. Conducting a free and fair election with the new voter ID card
was amongst the most lauded achievements of the CTG, although there was disappointment that accused
politicians were allowed to participate in the general election. The drive against corruption was next in
popularity. On the other hand, closing down jute mills and eviction of slums were identified as two most
negative steps undertaken by the CTG.
Figure 6.30 CTG had to compromise with the politicians
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The CTG came to power with pledges to initiate effective political reform initiatives in Bangladesh. It
attempted several activities throughout its two year tenure. During the survey, questions were asked to
elicit public opinion about the CTG reform agenda.
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Figure 6.31 Honest and qualified candidates participated in 2008 general election
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Both general and professional respondents (37 and 30 percent respectively) agreed that the CTG had to
compromise with the politicians to ensure their participation in the 2008 election while 34 percent of the
professional respondents strongly agreed with the statement (Figure 6.32). However, at the same time, it was
felt by respondents that the CTG's political reform agenda ensured more honest and qualified candidates in
the 2008 general election. Almost 33 percent of both general and professional respondents strongly agreed
that a comparatively greater number of honest and qualified candidates participated in the 2008 election.
Positive versus negative initiatives of CTG
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Figure 6.32 Positive steps by CTG
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Figure 6.33 Less popular activities of CTG
A 'performance evaluation' of the last CTG had been a focal point of the perception survey. People were
given some information about the best known initiatives of the government. Around 90 percent of the
respondents remarked that the best initiative of the CTG was to conduct the general election with new voter
lists and ID cards (Figure 6.33). This move to prevent fake voters from being registered was seen as the most
important step in ensuring that the election was free and fair. Furthermore, in the case of people's
perceptions about the 2008 general election, it was found that 81 percent of them opined that it was held
completely free and fair. In that case there is convergence of opinion among the respondents about the
performance of the CTG.
An overwhelming majority of general respondents - 86 percent - identified the anti-corruption drive as a
good initiative of the CTG. In addition, promulgation of 'Right to Information Act' and 'Citizen's Charters'
were identified by the public as two more excellent steps by the CTG.
People were also asked about the policies of the CTG which adversely affected citizens. Almost 88 percent of
the respondents identified that closing the jute mills in different parts of the country was the worst step
taken by CTG (Figure 6.33). People had identified slum eviction as the second most negative step. Moreover,
decisions undertaken by the CTG to close shops after 8 pm was ranked as the third negative step.
The report provides an account of how the winning party has
customarily captured the state apparatus (i.e. the Parliament, the Judiciary and the bureaucracy) to control
resources. Partisan influence renders the accountability mechanisms largely futile. This is the context in
which the survey findings are situated, which have shown mixed results. On the one hand, citizens
6.11 Conclusion
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expressed their satisfaction with the CTG reform efforts and free and fair parliamentary election. They have
high hopes that the MPs and local government representatives will be able to work constructively for
citizens and their locality. In fact, contrary to general belief, the survey revealed that citizens seek help from
their elected representatives when faced with disputes/crimes. On the other hand, citizens perceive that
political influence will continue to cripple the institutions of accountability (e.g. judiciary) and hamper the
service delivery (e.g. law and order and social safety nets). Respondents also expressed their strong opinion
that the opposition parties will exercise the negative political norm of boycotting Parliament and there will
be lack of political consensus among the ruling and opposition political parties on important national issues.
In terms of the performance of the CTG, although respondents largely supported the reform activities of the
CTG, they remained dissatisfied with the performance of the power sector, price hike of essential and
existing state of unemployment. Respondents also opined that CTG initiated anti-poor initiatives like closing
down jute mills and evicting slums. Finally, citizens are found optimistic about the state of governance in the
years to come. The majority of the respondents hoped that this fairly elected political government will bring
some much awaited positive outcomes for better functioning of democracy in Bangladesh.
Over almost two decades, Bangladesh moved from what may be considered a 'minimalist democracy' -
regular free and contested elections, peaceful transfer of power, fundamental freedoms, civilian control over
policy and institutions - to what has been called illiberal democracy - misuse of state power for partisan and
personal gain; and institutions brought under partisan political pressure. The practice of partisan politics has
severely undermined the accountability mechanisms of the political system and rendered it largely
dysfunctional. The institutions of the democratic multi-party state have been dominated and undermined
by partisan politics and party patronage networks run by the major parties. Bangladesh is further
characterised by high levels of competition between major parties, absence of intra-party democracy, highly
centralised decision-making and personalisation of internal party structures. These have had a negative
impact on the overall governance of the country.
The report has focused on the functioning of formal accountability
mechanisms particularly prior to 1/11 and has attempted to identify how comprehensive accountability
mechanisms can help ensure functional democracy in Bangladesh in the years to come. The Report has
attempted to demonstrate how institutions meant to instil accountability in and of government have been
systematically and increasingly impaired. Throughout the Report, the research has repeatedly demonstrated
the diminution amongst the political class of a commitment to the idea of a self-restraining state.
Specifically, it has outlined the main gaps and weaknesses that have impaired the effectiveness of these
accountability mechanisms, assessed the extent to which the Caretaker Government-proposed reforms have
addressed those deficiencies, and discussed the importance and challenges of deepening these reforms
under a political government. It needs to be stressed that the Report, and the nationwide survey conducted
to support the analyses, is a portrayal of the situation in Bangladesh in 2008 and does not necessarily reflect
the conditions as they are in 2009.
The target audience is academics, researchers and expert practitioners in the field of governance and
development, among whom it is hoped it will provide a basis for discussion and debate. It is also expected
to provide information for students on the increasing number of courses devoted to the study of
governance and development in Bangladesh. Criticisms and comments are actively welcomed, as the State
of Governance in Bangladesh research project continues beyond the publication of this Report.
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Conclusions
7.1 Findings
The Report contends that core prerequisites for a functional
democracy are manifest in - effective checks and balances that strengthen accountability. A functional
democracy has been defined as a system which is representative, responsive, transparent and accountable.
Formal and properly functioning accountability mechanisms are deemed essential to establish and sustain
stability, and are designed to inhibit the incumbent government from manipulating the state apparatus
with possibly disastrous consequences for the public interest. Against this backdrop, this Report has
attempted to analyse the informal norms that affect the political game in Bangladesh through review of
political parties, the bureaucracy, institutions of accountability (e.g. the Bangladesh Election Commission,
the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Public Service Commission, and the Office of the Comptroller and
Auditor General), the Parliament and the Judiciary - through both primary and secondary research, and
solicited public opinion on governance issues through a nationwide survey.
There is no doubt that an important goal of all modern political parties is to acquire and exercise power. In
fact, power is an important resource that parties often use to reach other goals, which may range from
implementing commitments they make to the people and popularising party ideology, to expanding the
party base and rewarding the patrons providing the support base of the party. In other words, power is a
means to an end, and not an end in itself. The concentration of power within the political parties in
Bangladesh has constricted the space to develop an effective, intra-party, accountability framework. This has
translated into a degradation of the organisational constitution, failure in management of party resources
and capacity, and purposeful neglect of building a new generation of leaders. In a resource scarce polity
(and society) along with an underdeveloped network with non-state actors, political parties have turned to
the organs of the State to support its sustainability. The Parliament, Judiciary and other oversight institutions
have all become instruments in the hands of the ruling party to be used in the 'winner takes all' system that
has evolved in Bangladesh.
The Executive has come to acquire the culture of the 'politburo', monopolising the organs of the State and
using them as instruments of control. Political parties continue to undertake practices which perpetuate the
existing norms and show little sign of undertaking reform measures. This Report has extensively analysed
the motivating factors of political parties in supporting the current norms. Internal, operational and
decision-making mechanisms of political parties have been examined at length, as have intra-party
coordination and mobilisation of resources (focusing on the mechanism of the patron-client relationship).
The political party-bureaucracy nexus has also been closely examined, as bureaucracy, being the
implementing apparatus, has to work closely with the ruling party. We have seen that unbridled
politicisation of the bureaucracy has become a natural corollary where the incumbent tends to uphold
partisan interest in recruiting, promoting or transferring civil servants. The Report has attempted to identify
the loopholes that allow the incumbent to manipulate the bureaucracy and analysed the (in)effectiveness of
their internal accountability mechanisms.
In its analysis of the institutions of accountability in Bangladesh, the Report concludes that even though
these institutions enjoy the necessary Constitutional and statutory protection, their leadership has
unfortunately not been pro-active enough to exercise this in their favour. Rather, in many cases they are
perceived to be partisan and compliant to external pressure. There is extensive evidence of Executive
influence through avenues of human resources and budget. Appointment of the leadership appears to be
the main channel of politicisation. Structural and systematic loopholes often become constraints to effective
functioning. The successes are overlooked mainly due to corruption and partisan behaviour. The human
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resources for the most part lack capacity and motivation, and the issue of deputation makes the scenario
worse. Dependence on the Executive, for both fiscal and human resources, curbs independent functioning
to certain extents and also prevents long-term capacity building.
Bangladesh embarked on its second phase of parliamentary democracy in 1991, and with renewed vigour
attempted to create a balance between the two distinctive roles of the Parliament: consensus-building and
policy-making. The initial attempt of the framers of the 1972 Constitution to provide adequate checks on the
Executive through the legislative institution was marred due to the political turmoil, amendments to the
Constitution, and changes in political dimension and actors. Consequently, the Parliament has turned into
an institution which has failed to hold the Executive accountable and play the 'consensus-building' role.
Since early 1991, certain reforms have been made in the formal arrangements of the Parliament in general,
and into the committee system in particular. These include broadening the jurisdictions of standing
committees to deal with legislation and oversight simultaneously, replacing ministers by backbenchers as
committee chairs, establishing an independent parliamentary secretariat and an Institute of Parliamentary
Studies (IPS) for research support, introducing the Prime Minster's Question Time (PMQT), and broadcasting
the proceedings of the Parliament on the national radio. However, despite these efforts to make the
Parliament an effective institution of accountability, due to long boycotts of the Parliament by the
opposition, the refusal of the ruling party to give enough opportunity to the opposition to criticise the
government and the inadequacies of the parliamentary committees transformed the Parliament into a
rubber stamp institution. The Report provides a critical review of the performance of contemporary
Parliaments in Bangladesh in performing their key functions in general and the role of parliamentary
sessions and committees in holding the government accountable in particular. Through an analysis of the
formal rules and identification of the informal rules, the Report has explored how the combination of these
two has generated an entirely new rule of the game which governs the activities of the MPs both in the
plenary session and standing committees of the Parliament. It is this new informal rule of the game that
determines the effectiveness of the institution in holding the Executive accountable. However, recent
changes in the electoral laws - initiated by the CTG - had a positive impact on the Ninth Parliamentary
election as candidates with comparatively cleaner images were selected by the political parties. This positive
momentum has led to the formation of all standing committees in the first session of the Parliament and
with two chairman positions (of standing committees on ministries) being held by opposition party
members. This 'empowerment' of the opposition in the parliamentary procedure is a very welcome change
and hopefully marks the change in the hitherto displayed authoritarian attitude of the ruling party. This may
in the long run pave the way for positive change in the existing culture of confrontational politics.
The Report also analyses impediments to an independent Judiciary, including partisan political influences,
bribes, nepotism and corruption, which have severely circumscribed the common people's access to court.
While there have been many changes to the formal institutional framework, judicial independence has
principally been undermined in recent years through the appointments process, with significant numbers of
partisan and less able appointees to the bench. This has had an obvious effect on the quality of justice, on
the fairness and impartiality of decisions as poor quality judges are often beholden to those who appoint
them, and are more open to improper influence and corruption. This Report recognises corruption and
external interference in the lower courts as a serious problem, and highlights the growing recognition that
the superior courts have suffered a long term decline in both quality and integrity. The legitimacy of the
courts and citizens' trust in their decisions have thus been undermined.
The Reports finds that the informal rules - that have developed over time - which have governed the
Judiciary appear to have such strong roots that substantial changes to the formal legal framework have had
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relatively little impact. Thus, while the formal incentives within the Judiciary may not have changed
substantially over the last three decades, the informal incentives have changed or become accentuated in
recent years as patrimonialism has expanded. This in turn has distorted the application of formal processes
such as appointments and promotions, and led to the breakdown in routine monitoring and supervision.
The 2008 State of Governance in Bangladesh report provides an account of how the winning party has
customarily captured the state apparatus (i.e. the Parliament, the Judiciary, the oversight institutions and the
bureaucracy) to control public resources through all encompassing informal norms. Partisan influence has
rendered the formal accountability mechanisms of the state largely futile. This is the context in which the
nationwide perception survey was situated. The objectives of the survey were, broadly, to gauge public
perceptions about the state of the governance, the political system and political culture in Bangladesh. It
also attempted to ascertain citizen's perceptions and opinions about the institutional reform initiatives of
the CTG, especially their effectiveness, sustainability and impacts on the political system in Bangladesh. The
survey also evaluated the performance of CTG in holding fair and credible election and initiatives against
corruption. Last but not the least, it tried to determine public opinion about service delivery in education,
health, water, and electricity sectors, their living standards and price hike situation compared to the previous
year.
Survey findings have shown mixed results. On the one hand, citizens expressed their satisfaction with the
CTG reform efforts and free and fair parliamentary election. They have high hopes that the MPs and local
government representatives will be able to work constructively for citizens and their locality. In fact, contrary
to general belief, the survey revealed that citizens mostly seek help from their elected representatives when
faced with disputes/crimes. The majority of the respondents also expressed hope that the fairly elected
political government would bring some positive outcome to help the better functioning of democracy in
Bangladesh.
On the other hand, citizens perceive that political influence will continue to cripple the institutions of
accountability (e.g. judiciary) and hamper the service delivery (e.g law and order and social safety nets). Their
opinions uphold the Report findings that the eschewed framework of governance for political parties has
injected within the arteries of the State a culture of impunity, patronage, and a gradual institutionalisation of
practices which uphold partisanship within State organs. Citizens perceive that people having political
identity and/or strong political ties can easily grasp the major share of the VGD (Vulnerable Group
Development), VGF (Vulnerable Group Feeding) and other government provided safety net facilities for the
poor people - thus placing the survival of the real poor in jeopardy. Citizens also felt that political party
influences over the law and order and legal systems guarantee impunity from prosecution for those with the
right connections. Respondents also expressed their strong opinion that the opposition parties will continue
to exercise the negative political norm of boycotting Parliament and there will be lack of political consensus
among the ruling and opposition political parties on important national issues.
The role of the Fakhruddin-led Caretaker Government had been a much discussed issue throughout the year
2008. The CTG demonstrated a strong desire to rid the Bangladeshi political system of undemocratic
elements by launching an ambitious anti-corruption drive and reform agenda. Both the anti-corruption
drive and reform efforts of public institutions and initiatives to bring accountability and transparency to the
government were initially met with broad support from the public. However, the price of essential goods
and unemployment problem had gone up since mid-2008 which fused negatively with the people's living
standards, and led understandably to an ebb in the all-out support the CTG regime enjoyed in 2007. The
attempts of the CTG at balancing the power of government has manifested itself in the long-awaited
separation of the Judiciary from the Executive and the untangling of the stronghold that the political party
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in power ( the Executive) had maintained over key institutions of accountability. However, in
pursuing the objective of a fully-functional democracy in Bangladesh, it is widely agreed that the Caretaker
Government took certain liberties that were contrary to their constitutional mandate. Nevertheless, citizens
showed a high degree of awareness of the compromises that the Caretaker Government had to make to
secure the participation of the parties in the 2008 general election. In terms of the overall performance of
the CTG, although respondents largely supported the reform activities of the CTG, they remained
dissatisfied with the performance of the power sector, price hike of essential and existing state of
unemployment. Respondents also opined that CTG initiated anti-poor initiatives like closing down jute mills
and evicting slums. Finally, citizens were found optimistic about the state of governance in the years to
come.
With regard to the Ninth Parliamentary election - arguably the most awaited event of the year 2008, the
majority of the populace opined that it was free and fair. The role of BEC in conducting the election was very
much appreciated by the common people. They mostly appreciated the BEC initiative to prepare a new
voter list and the voter ID card. The electronic media actively disseminated election-related information and
citizens claimed to have chosen their candidates mostly on the basis of their qualifications and their political
party identity, although at the same time speculation was rife that a huge amount of money was being
distributed by the candidates. That the CTG was successful in preventing corrupt politicians from
participating in the election was agreed across the board. The public was also confident that both the
winning party and the opposition will learn a lesson from the anti-incumbency voting culture, and
expressed the hope that competition for the political stakes between the ruling and opposition parties was
going to be circumscribed in future. However, it was widely agreed that free and fair elections cannot alone
guarantee the continuity of stable democratic governance and sustainable development. This must be
complemented by other functional institutions including parliament, judiciary, media, civil society and
others, as has been stressed throughout the Report.
The Report identifies one possible solution to this 'winner take all' political game by reducing the stakes of
political competition. The opportunity of the incumbent to monopolise the state apparatus for serving its
partisan interests must be limited through strengthening of the formal rules, thereby reducing the stakes to
a tolerable level. Critical to this process is the establishment of credible mechanisms of accountability, for
the parameters of the stakes are defined in large part by such mechanisms. Such mechanisms, if placed
properly, will provide checks on the natural imperative of the Executive to monopolise control over state
institutions.
After careful analysis of the accountability mechanisms of the Bangladeshi political system, and their
consistent failure to hold the ruling party accountable, the Report proposes deregulation of state functions,
which will make the state 'pie' smaller. This would in turn reduce the pervasive unhealthy competition for
state resources. Uniformity and transparency in appointments, promotions and transfers in the civil service
would also serve to reduce scope for politicisation of the bureaucracy. In order to raise awareness among
the public - the owners of the Republic as per the Constitution - a stronger media and civil society must be
built to create opinion against confrontational politics and the high costs of unhealthy political competition.
The Report calls for institutionalisation of accountability mechanisms in all oversight institutions, both
internal and external, to reinforce efficiency and effectiveness. These measures moreover, have to be
rationalised to the citizens. Institutionalisation of the accountability mechanisms, both internal and external,
vis-à-vis
7.2 Recommendations
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is likely to reinforce efficiency and effectiveness. The Report also strongly recommends that dependence on
the Executive should be reduced, for both fiscal and human resources, as this curbs independent
functioning and also prevents long-term capacity building. Of course, political will is the main catalyst that
can bring about the real changes necessary to make the institutions of accountability effective in a
democratic framework. This, in turn, is likely to ensure good governance for the society as a whole.
A positive momentum from the Ninth Parliamentary election has led to the formation of all standing
committees in the first session of Parliament and the appointment of two opposition MPs as committee
chairs. It is glaringly obvious that a few good practices may mot result into an effective Parliament. This
Report recommends that in order to make Parliament truly effective in holding the Executive accountable,
there must be political consensus in bringing about significant changes in the Rules of Procedure. For
example, introduction of opposition days or the provision for regular unscheduled debates to subject the
government policies and measures to more effective parliamentary scrutiny would allow the opposition a
better opportunity to be pro-active. At the same time, an effective Parliament would also require the
presence of pro-active government backbenchers. A coalition between government backbenchers and
opposition members would cause the government to respond positively - as we have seen in the case of the
Fifth Parliament (regarding the introduction of parliamentary democracy). This Report feels that in
attempting to ensure parliamentary accountability, the focus should be on reforming the Rules of Procedure
to facilitate the forming of such a coalition. This 'empowerment' of the opposition in the parliamentary
procedures would arise out of a change in attitude of the ruling party and may in the long run pave the way
for change in the existing political culture.
In case of the Judiciary, while the appointment procedure of judges has been largely freed from Executive
control at the sub-ordinate Judiciary level (although the Report notes the remaining administrative and
financial reliance upon the Government), apart from the brief interlude of the Supreme Judicial Commission
during the CTG, the situation has changed little for the upper courts. It is hoped that the Government would
comply with the recent Appellate Division judgment which requires consultation with the Chief Justice.
Greater transparency and credibility in appointments would strengthen and endure the confidence of the
litigants and public in the judiciary. Apart from a transparent process for appointments with a greater role
for the Judiciary, the Report deems it necessary to overhaul the compensation package for the judges by
delinking it from the central government salary system and restoring it to the levels prevailing in the 1950s.
There is little doubt that amongst the efforts taken to bring about qualitative changes in the functioning of
the political parties during 2008, the change in electoral laws perhaps had the most positive impact as
candidates with comparatively cleaner images were fielded by the political parties. However, citizens have
unanimously agreed that free and fair elections cannot alone guarantee the continuity of stable democratic
governance and sustainable development. This must be complemented by other functional institutions
including parliament, judiciary, media, civil society and others, as has also been stressed throughout the
Report.
The establishment of accountability mechanisms is critical for the country to move from the existing 'winner
takes all' culture to a new equilibrium based on checks and balances that will encourage both winner and
losers to engage in rational negotiation instead of disruptive, if not violent, conflict. Political parties must be
encouraged to behave in a more 'responsible' manner. Developments of 2008 however clearly demonstrate
7.3 Looking ahead
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that reforms need to be achieved through a political process, rather than a bureaucratic one. Furthermore,
such reforms need to focus on systems as well as individuals, and need to be sustained through continuous
political mobilisation of support. Although civil society and media will advocate and mobilise support for
the reforms, the political parties will have to take leadership of the reform agenda. Political parties need to
be responsive to the demands for political reforms, develop the understanding about the necessity of
reforms, and need to make a commitment to carry the reform agenda forward.
The process of introducing adequate checks and balances under a political government should therefore
focus on bringing about sustainable systemic changes through a process in which players both within and
outside the government play constructive and complementary roles. The agenda of political reforms should
therefore be taken up by political parties, civil society, citizens and media with the ultimate goal of
ameliorating the dysfunctional political system.
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